Vexatious (Patent) Litigation & Art. 82 EC Following AstraZeneca - EC and US Converging Approaches? by Luterkort, Eva
 
 
FACULTY OF LAW 
University of Lund 
 
Eva Luterkort 
 
Vexatious (Patent) Litigation & 
Art. 82 EC Following 
AstraZeneca – EC and US 
Converging Approaches? 
Abstract: 
‘Vexatious litigation’ – a malicious legal action without probable 
cause, in which a litigant is not acting in good faith, but for the 
purpose of harassing an opponent or competitor – used as an 
anticompetitive weapon in patent enforcement proceedings is 
becoming a matter of increasing antitrust concern on both sides 
of the Atlantic. As any attempt to curtail the right to engage in 
such legal action is bound to involve not only the fundamental 
right of access to the courts, but also difficult issues at the direct 
point of intersection between IP and antitrust law, utmost care 
must be taken so as not the harm any of the competing interests. 
This thesis suggest that, in carrying out that balancing task, the 
approaches of EC and US competition authorities appear to be 
converging. In particular, the recent AstraZeneca decision 
provided by the European Commission constitutes proof of this. 
 
Master thesis 
20 points 
Hans Henrik Lidgard 
IP/Competition Law 
Spring 2007 
Contents 
SUMMARY 1 
ABBREVIATIONS 4 
1 INTRODUCTION 6 
1.1 Objective 6 
1.2 Method & Material 8 
1.3 Delimitations 9 
2 STRIKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN IP & ANTITRUST 10 
2.1 IP Law & Its Aim – The Economic Theory of Innovation 10 
2.2 Antitrust Law & Its Aim – The Economic Theory of Competition 12 
2.3 IP & Antitrust – The Right Balance 15 
3 THE PATENT LAWS 18 
3.1 Patents in the EC System 18 
3.1.1 The Current Order 19 
3.1.2 The Future Order 19 
3.2 Patents in the US System 21 
3.2.1 The Current Order 21 
3.2.2 The Future Order 23 
4 THE COMPETITION & ANTITRUST LAWS 24 
4.1 Competition Law in the EC 24 
4.1.1 Art. 82 EC – Abuse of a Dominant Position 25 
4.1.1.1 Dominance in the Relevant Market 26 
4.1.1.2 Abuse 34 
4.1.1.3 Effect on Trade 36 
4.1.1.4 Absence of Defence 36 
4.1.2 National IPRs, the EC Treaty & Article 82 36 
4.2 Antitrust Law in the US 38 
4.2.1 S. 2 of the Sherman Act – Monopolization 39 
4.2.1.1 Monopoly Power in the Relevant Market 40 
4.2.1.2 Wilful Acquisition or Maintenance of that Power 42 
4.2.1.3 Attempted Monopolization 42 
4.2.2 IPRs, the Constitution & Section 2 42 
5 ANTITRUST INTERVENTION 44 
5.1 The EC Approach 44 
5.1.1 The Existence v. Exercise Dichotomy 44 
5.1.2 The Specific Subject-Matter 46 
5.1.3 Exhaustion of Rights 46 
5.2 The US Approach 47 
5.2.1 The Patent Right & Its Core 48 
5.2.2 The Patent Misuse Doctrine 49 
6 PROCEDURAL ISSUES 51 
6.1 The Right of Access to the Courts 56 
6.2 Abuse of Process 56 
6.2.1 Abuse of Process in the US Legal System 57 
6.2.2 Abuse of Process in the EC Legal System 58 
6.3 Monopolization through IP Enforcement in the US 58 
6.3.1 Noerr-Pennington Immunity 60 
6.3.2 The Walker Process Doctrine 61 
6.3.3 The Sham Litigation Doctrine 62 
6.3.4 Infringement Suits as Part of Scheme to Monopolize 66 
6.4 Abuse of a Dominant Position through IP Enforcement in the EC 66 
6.4.1 Background – BBI / Boosey & Hawkes 66 
6.4.2 Decca Navigator System 67 
6.4.3 ITT Promedia v. Commission 68 
6.4.4 An EC ‘Vexatious Litigation Doctrine’? 71 
6.4.5 The Legal Position Post ITT Promedia 71 
7 ASTRAZENECA & ITS DEFENCE OF LOSEC 73 
7.1 Background & Arguments 74 
7.2 The Commission Decision 76 
7.2.1 The Two Abuses 77 
7.2.1.1 Misleading Representations 77 
7.2.1.2 Misuse of Regulatory Procedures 78 
7.2.2 The Exclusionary Strategies 79 
7.2.2.1 Directed at Generic Competitors 80 
7.2.2.2 Directed at Research Competitors 81 
7.2.3 The ‘Vexatious Litigation Doctrine’ Post AstraZeneca 82 
7.2.3.1 Can Groundless Threats Suffice? 82 
7.2.3.2 Conduct of Defence as an Abuse? 82 
7.2.3.3 Harassing Litigation as a Factor Indicating Dominance? 83 
7.2.3.4 Widening of the Special Responsibility? 83 
7.3 The Pending Appeal 83 
8 VEXATIOUS PATENT LITIGATION – EC & US 
APPROACHES COMPARED 85 
8.1 Curtailment of the Right to Bring Patent Infringement Actions 85 
8.2 EC and US Convergence? 86 
8.3 Private Antitrust Enforcement & Patent Litigation Insurance 88 
8.4 Anticipating Future Approaches 91 
9 CONCLUSIVE COMMENTS 96 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 98 
TABLE OF CASES 116 
 
Summary 
For many years, antitrust and intellectual property (IP) law were generally 
seen as being in conflict. The prevailing view was that intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) created monopolies to encourage innovation, while antitrust 
laws sought to eliminate monopolies.  
Nowadays, antitrust and IP laws are more often viewed as complementary. 
According to this perspective, both areas of law seek – and work in unison – 
to maximise wealth by promoting innovation, economic progress and 
consumer welfare. But, even if there is agreement on the common goals, 
there is far less agreement on the appropriate balance between the regimes 
in particular situations.1 For even though antitrust and IP law do not have 
conflicting aims, they strive to achieve them by different and sometimes 
conflicting means. Under some circumstances, tensions between the two 
branches of law are thus bound to occur.2 Consequently, issues at the 
intersection of antitrust and IP law continue to attract much attention in the 
US as well as in the EC, not only within courts and competition agencies, 
but also within the policy community at large.3
                                                 
1 David A. Balto and Andrew M. Wolman, 867 PLI/Pat 9, June 2006, ‘Intellectual Property 
and Antitrust: General Principles’, p. 13. 
2 Katarzyna A. Czapracka, ‘Where Antitrust Ends and IP Begins – On the Roots of the 
Transatlantic Clashes’, I.J.C.L.P., May 2006, p. 24. See also Richard Eccles and Romain 
Ferla, The Antitrust and IP Interface in the US and EU, available at 
http://www.twobirds.com/english/publications/articles/The_Antitrust_and_IP_Interface_in_
the_US_and_EU.cfm. Visited on June 20, 2007. 
3 See presentations at the US FTC/DOJ Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property 
Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy (February 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect. Visited on June 20, 2007. 
See also speech by Timothy Muris ‘Looking Forward: the FTC and the Future 
Development of US Competition Policy’, December 2002, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/handler.htm. See further the FTC Report ‘To Promote 
Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Policy’, Oct 2003, (in 
particular Chapters 1, 2 and 5) available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/10/cpreport.htm; 
the Patent Hearings in 2005 at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/patentconference.shtm and 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050609comppolicy.pdf as well as most recently, 
FTC’s Testimony, available at  
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/02/patenttestimony.shtm. Visited on June 20, 2007.  
See further the European Commission Communication, ‘A Pro-active Competition Policy 
for a Competitive Europe’, COM (2004) 293 final, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/com/cnc/2004/com2004_0293en01.pdf. Visited on June 20, 2007; 
the ‘DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
Exclusionary Abuses’, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf, and the EAGCP 
report ‘An economic approach to Article 82’ 2005, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/studies/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf. 
See also Luc Peeperkorn, DG Competition, unit A-1. ‘Commission publishes discussion 
paper on abuse of dominance’, EC Competition Policy Newsletter, No. 1 – Spring 2006, 
pp. 4-7, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/cpn. The most 
important topics raised in the public consultation process following the publication of the 
Discussion Paper were discussed in a Public Hearing in June 2006, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/art82/hearing.html. Visited on 4th of 
February 2007. 
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One issue at the direct point of intersection, is the question how far a patent 
holder may go to defend his right against infringement. Since exclusivity is 
the essence of all IPRs, the owner of a patent may generally exclude others 
from infringing that patent. This includes the right to bring legal 
proceedings against a patent infringer to prevent or stop an infringement and 
to obtain a remedy in law.4 But if that right is used to harass competitors, 
the patent holder’s right to enter into litigation can be questioned. In 
particular, it may be argued that if a dominant company acts in such an 
abusive way, antitrust concerns may motivate a curtailment of the right to 
bring a patent infringement action.  
 
However, considering the dignity of the rights and interests at stake, such a 
statement is controversial on both sides of the Atlantic. Careful balancing is 
therefore necessary between the fundamental principle of access to the 
courts on the one hand, and the antitrust striving for normal or fair 
competition on the other. Moreover, though IPRs are not immune from 
antitrust intervention, it may be argued that the special features of IPRs must 
be taken into account when antitrust law is applied to them. The value of the 
IP at stake, the scope of legal protection that it is afforded, as well as its 
importance in the particular industry are thus factors that are not without 
consequence in the application of antitrust rules.5
 
In the United States (US), the traditional approach has been to ensure that 
antitrust immunity is conferred upon firms, including monopolists, that 
petition the government through lobbying, administrative procedures or 
litigation.6 However, litigation in which the court process is used as an anti-
competitive weapon, is not protected. Rather, such anti-competitive conduct 
violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act 18907 under three main theories. 
Under each theory, harassing patent infringement actions may thus be 
caught by antitrust law.8 Though not often successful, Section 2 claims 
based on anti-competitive patent enforcement litigation are becoming 
increasingly common.9
 
This can be contrasted with the situation in the European Community (EC), 
where the question whether, and in what circumstances, anti-competitive 
patent enforcement litigation should be able to constitute an abuse under 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty has still to be settled. However, a cautious and 
                                                 
4 Dieter Stauder, ‘Enforcing Industrial Property Rights: Patent Protection From a 
Comparative Viewpoint’ in: Christopher Heath and Anselm Kamperman Sanders (eds), 
‘New Frontiers of Intellectual Property Law, IP and Cultural Heritage, Geographical 
Indications, Enforcement and Overprotection’, IIC Studies Volume 25 2005, p. 291.  
5 Czapracka, pp. 24-5. See the DG Competition Discussion Paper, pp. 66-67, paras. 235-6. 
6 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 671-72 (1965); E.R.R. v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 135-37, 145 (1961). See the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine below. 
7 Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C § 2, prohibits monopolization, see below.  
8 See Balto and Wolman, pp. 74-80. 
9 See Michael J. Meurer, ‘Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-competitive Intellectual 
Property Litigation’, 2003, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 509, p. 540 and Davies, Leburn & Stargard, 
‘Seeking the Right Balance to Maintain a Free Market’, 
http://howrey.com/docs/seekingtherightbalance.pdf, p. 4. 
 2
strict approach has been taken in relation to vexatious litigation issues in 
general. Whilst recourse to a remedy in law cannot be deemed, of itself, to 
raise competition law concerns,10 the bringing of legal proceedings has, in 
ITT Promedia,11 been held to be abusive in wholly exceptional 
circumstances. Provided two cumulative criteria are satisfied,12 it thus 
appears that vexatious litigation can be contrary to Article 82 and thereby 
amount to an abuse of a dominant position.13 Till now, however, the case 
law on the matter is scarce, to say the least, and so far no cases have reached 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
 
Nevertheless, following the Commission’s AstraZeneca decision,14 it seems 
that the EC may be taking on a more ‘US style’ approach in relation to anti-
competitive enforcement litigation. At the very least, the Commission 
decision can be seen to have reaffirmed and clarified the earlier ‘vexatious 
litigation doctrine’ developed in ITT Promedia. However, the decision still 
leaves several important questions unanswered, hopefully to be clarified by 
the Court of First Instance (CFI) in the pending appeal.15 In the meantime, 
the many uncertainties surrounding the potential abuse are likely to impose 
a heavy burden on dominant undertakings, or undertakings that fear that 
they might be considered to be dominant. This is especially so in industries 
such as the pharmaceutical industry, in which IPRs are of particular 
significance and where infringement actions, and the threat of such actions, 
are commonplace.16 Unless and until the matter is finally settled and defined 
in EC law, undertakings in these industries will thus have to thread carefully 
indeed on what can be described as the ‘patent infringement proceedings 
minefield’.17
                                                 
10 See Industrie des poudres sphériques SA v. Commission, Case T-5/97 [2000] ECR II-
3755, para. 213.  
11 ITT Promedia v. Commission, Case T-111/96 [1998] ECR II-2937, paras. 29-30, 54-62. 
12 See below. 
13 See Steven Preece, ‘Establishing an Abuse of Predatory Litigation’, E.C.L.R. 1999, 
20(2), 118-122; Alexander Böhlke, ‘Monopolies and Market Dominance: Waiting for 
Modernisation’, http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/11_monopolies.cfm, p. 2. 
Visited on June 12, 2006. 
14 Commission Decision (COMP/37.507) of 15 June 2005.  
Compare US ‘improper Orange Book listings cases’ brought by the FTC: Biovail 
(www.ftc.gov/os/2002/10/biovaildo.pdf) and Bristol Myers Squibb 
(www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/bristolmyerscmp.pdf) in E.C.L.R. 2005, 26(12), 669-684, 
Gunther and Breuvart, ‘Misuse of Patent and Drug Regulatory Approval Systems in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: An Analysis of US and EU Converging Approahes’, pp. 673 and 
676-7. Visited on June 20, 2007. 
15 Action brought on 25 August 2005, AstraZeneca v. Commission, Case T-321/05. 
16 Richard Whish, ‘Competition Law’, 5th ed. 2003, p. 680. 
17 Compare Ewan Nettleton and Brian Cordery, ‘Walking the groundless threats minefield’, 
J.I.P.L.P. 2005 Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51 f. 
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COMP/A.37.507/F3 AstraZeneca) 
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   on the Application of Article 82 of 
   the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses 
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EPO   European Patent Office 
EU   European Union 
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Science, Technology, and 
Economic Policy 
Treaty   Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
Establishing the European 
Community ([2002] OJ C 325/33) 
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1 Introduction  
‘IP litigation may be expensive but, if you look after it properly, it 
will ultimately look after you.’18
1.1 Objective 
The aim of this thesis is to clarify (i) whether a ‘vexatious litigation 
doctrine’ has come to exist under Article 82 EC, and if so, (ii) whether this 
development can be seen as evidence of an EC approach converging with 
that in the US in relation to the problem of anti-competitive patent litigation.  
These questions are topical for a number of reasons: 
 
1. First and foremost because they involve issues at the very heart of 
the intersection between IP and Competition Law, a theme that 
continues to give rise to intense debate, both in the EC and the US.19 
The fact that in the contemporary world, wealth and power reside 
less in hard assets than in IPRs has dramatically changed the forms 
under which acts of anti-competitive abuse take place today.20 In 
addition, current trends in parts of the EC point towards an increased 
IP litigiousness that resembles the more aggressive litigation culture 
in the US.21 Will this turn into a Community problem to be tackled 
by Competition Law? If so, what are the consequences of such a 
view for innovation within the internal market? 
 
2. Second, the recent Commission AstraZeneca (AZ) decision in June 
2005, in which a €60 million fine was imposed on AZ for having 
abused its dominant position in relation to its anti-ulcer medicine 
‘Losec’,22 can be seen to have brought new life into the earlier ITT 
Promedia decision and thus, arguably, to have revived the US style 
‘vexatious litigation doctrine’ presented in that case. AZ has 
appealed the Decision to the CFI,23 and it will be interesting to see 
how the Court assesses the Commission’s analysis in this respect. 
                                                 
18 J. Phillips, ‘IP Litigation, the New Money Spinner’, J.I.P.L.P. 2006, Vol. 1, No. 8, 497. 
19 See below.  
20 Jacques Werner, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: The Uneasy Relationship, The 
Journal of World Intellectual Property, 1999 2(3), 417-22, at 421-22.  
21 See ‘Patent Litigation Insurance – A Study for the European Commission on the 
Feasibility of Possible Insurance Schemes against Patent Litigation Risks’, Final Report 
June 2006, p. 13, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/patent/index_en.htm. Visited on February 3 
2007. 
22 See Commission Decision from the 15th of April 2005 Relating to a Proceeding Under 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case 
COMP/A.37.507/F3 AstraZeneca). The AstraZeneca decision is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37507/en.pdf. 
23 See notification of action brought by AstraZeneca on the 25th of August 2005 – 
AstraZeneca/Commission in case T-321/05, ([2005] OJ C 271/24).  
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3. Third, the Discussion Paper issued by the Director General for 
Competition of the European Commission in December 2005,24 
though not binding, has cast a considerable amount of light on the 
interpretation of Article 82 of the Treaty as well as on the methods 
likely to be applied by the Commission in the future. Surprisingly 
however, the document contains only one footnote reference to the 
important AstraZeneca decision and avoided any comment on the 
application of Article 82 EC to situations involving anti-competitive 
litigation.25 Considering that one of the aims of the Article 82 review 
has been to increase the transparency, certainty and predictability, 
this may be criticised. It remains to be seen whether clarification will 
be achieved by the further steps expected to be announced in 2007.26 
 
4. Fourth, the topic is pertinent considering the plans to set up a 
European Patent Litigation Insurance Scheme. Ever since the 
reconsideration of the Patent system commenced in 1997 with the 
European Commission’s Green Paper on the Community Patent and 
Patent System in Europe,27 an insurance scheme has been one of the 
possibilities considered for making the patent system more 
attractive. A Final Report on patent litigation insurance was 
presented in June 2006,28 commenting (albeit very briefly) on the 
potential problem of vexatious litigation.29 
 
5. Lastly, following the publication in December 2005 of the 
Commission’s Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the 
EC Antitrust Rules – aimed at facilitating private actions – the 
Commission is currently preparing a White Paper expected to be 
adopted in 2007.30 Whether this will open the floodgates of litigation 
in the Community remains to be seen.  
 
                                                 
24 See the Discussion Paper above, fn. 3. 
25 See Discussion Paper para. 60: ‘Where a certain exclusionary conduct is clearly not 
competition on the merits, in particular conduct which clearly creates no efficiencies and 
which only raises obstacles to residual competition, such conduct is presumed to be an 
abuse.’ Fn. 52: ‘See for instance the recent Commission decision AstraZeneca of 
15.06.2005’. See, however, a more elaborate general comment in the EC Competition 
Policy Newsletter, No. 1 – Spring 2007, ‘Competition in Pharmaceuticals: the challenges 
ahead post AstraZeneca’, Nadia De Souza, DG for Competition, unit B-2, p. 39 f.  
26 See generally on the state of the Article 82 review,  
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/art82/index.html. Visited on June 27, 2007. 
27 See COM(97) 314f. 
28 See ‘Patent Litigation Insurance – A Study for the European Commission on the 
Feasibility of Possible Insurance Schemes against Patent Litigation Risks’, Final Report 
June 2006, p. 13, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/patent/index_en.htm. Visited on 3rd of 
February 2007. 
29 See below.  
30 See Green Paper Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, Commission of 
the European Communities, COM (2005) 672 final. See also 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html, visited on 3rd of 
February 2007. See also Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, ‘European Union 
Law’, Cambridge University Press 2006, pp. 967-74. 
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For the just stated reasons it seems to be of high priority to analyse the 
scope of possible application of Article 82 EC to excessive patent litigation, 
and above all, to clarify where the line can be drawn between legitimate 
defence of business interests and illegitimate anti-competitive behaviour.  
In order to do so, this thesis will examine the most recent EC developments 
in relation to vexatious litigation as an abuse under Article 82, with the aim 
of establishing the likely future significance of that article in the context of 
anti-competitive patent infringement actions. This will be done with 
particular focus on the Commission’s AstraZeneca decision and the most 
recent steps taken in the Article 82 EC review process.  
Following an overview of the basic law and policy of the EC and US 
antitrust and IP law regimes, EC and US case law will be compared to 
analyse to what extent there can be said to be a growing convergence in the 
respective approaches. Finally, an attempt will be made to anticipate future 
transatlantic policy approaches in relation to the IP and antitrust 
intersection. 
1.2 Method & Material 
In order to illustrate the author’s view of the current legal position in EC 
law in relation to the application of Article 82 EC in the IP litigation 
context, a comparative legal research method was used to examine relevant 
EC and US legal material and case-law. 
Information was acquired using relevant literature as well as various articles 
from journals and internet resources. Of particular importance was the 
Discussion Paper, the follow-up Public Hearing and, naturally, the 
Commission AstraZeneca decision. 
Furthermore, internet was used to access legal acts of the European 
institutions. However, reference was made to the publications in the Official 
Journal. When referring to Articles in the Treaty, reference was made to the 
Treaty of Amsterdam numbering. The style of reference to the articles used 
corresponds with that used by the CFI and the ECJ.31
Decisions and other legal acts of the Commission were accessed over the 
internet and reference was made either to the relevant Official Journal or to 
the internet site. Similarly, case-law of the ECJ and CFI was analysed using 
documents available from the internet, but reference was made to the 
European Court Reports. 
Finally, the necessary US material was acquired using relevant literature, 
journals and internet resources. When legal acts and decisions were 
accessed over the internet reference was made to the relevant internet site. 
 
                                                 
31 See Note on the Citation of Articles of the Treaties in the Publications of the Court of 
Justice and the Court of First Instance, ([1999] OJ C 246/1). 
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1.3 Delimitations 
Even though some background information is presented in the thesis, it is 
assumed that the reader has basic knowledge of the European Union, the EC 
and US antitrust regimes as well as of the relevant IP regimes. Antitrust and 
IP law principles and provisions are presented and analysed only insofar as 
is needed to illustrate the particular issues relevant to the object of the 
thesis. Moreover, many important issues referred to are described only in 
such detail that it would enable the average legal professional who has 
knowledge of the relevant legal rules, to understand the presented arguments 
from an antitrust / IP intersection point of view. 
As no access was had to the complete version of the AstraZeneca decision 
or to the file, the analysis was bound to be based on the non-confidential 
text of the Decision in the form it was made public, as well as on the notice 
about the appeal by AZ.32 Conclusions have been drawn based on the facts 
presented therein, which have been presumed to be correct. 
Due to the relatively limited span of the thesis, the scope of analysis was 
necessarily reduced to the key questions relating to vexatious litigation as an 
abuse in the EC and US systems. Consequently, many interesting and 
closely linked legal issues that could have been included in a more thorough 
comparative analysis had to be left out. 
 
                                                 
32 The provisional version of the Commission Decision from the 15th of April 2005 (Case 
COMP/A.37.507/F3 AstraZeneca) as it was first made public is available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37507/prov_version.pdf, 
(236 pages). A revised version is now available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37507/en.pdf, (214 pages). 
Reference will be made to the recitals and page numbers in this latter version. 
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2 Striking the Balance between 
IP & Antitrust 
The essential feature of what is generally referred to as the ‘New Economy’ 
is its increased dependence on products and services that are embodied in 
ideas. Hence, in several of the fastest growing segments of the present 
economy, the ‘product’ or ‘service’ is a piece of IP. 33  
In these new markets, characterised by the presence of IP, antitrust enforcers 
are faced with special characteristics: incentives to innovate are particularly 
important, competition at the research and development (R&D) level is 
critical; markets are dynamic and market shares often unstable; predictions 
about market-development are uncertain; and the issues that enforcers must 
address are unusually complicated and technical.34  
A major challenge in the next decade is therefore to shape the policies that 
will best balance the two regimes and thus allow the market economy to 
thrive in the context of the ‘IP revolution’.35  
However, before making any attempt to strike a balance between IP and 
antitrust, it is necessary to examine their respective objects. 
2.1 IP Law & Its Aim – The Economic 
Theory of Innovation 
IP law can itself be said to carry out a balancing act – namely that between 
the need to give incentives for innovation with the interest of the public in 
having access to the products protected by the rights. Patent law can be 
viewed as the clearest example of this – the grant of the patent gives the 
owner a twenty-year monopoly of exploitation, but the trade off is that the 
details of the process are made public, so that at the end of the protection 
period everyone else gets access to it. Thus, the owner’s original monopoly 
enables him to reap the reward for the innovation but thereafter the public 
interest in access and dissemination takes over.36
                                                 
33 See speech by Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of FTC, at the Antitrust, Technology and 
Intellectual Property Conference, March 2 2001, ‘Antitrust and Intellectual Property: 
Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy’, at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/ipf301.shtm, visited on February 4 2007, p. 1. 
34 See speech by Pitofsky, pp. 5-6. 
35 See speech by Pitofsky, p. 1. 
36 The question is how far this inherent balancing act within IP law between incentives and 
access makes interference by competition laws on monopolies superfluous. Is there any 
need for competition law to control the exploitation of the rights when IP law takes care to 
strike a balance with the public interest? Whereas e.g. Govaere argues that ‘no additional 
restraints on IP owners need to be introduced in order to safeguard competition; it suffices 
to reinforce the restrictions inherent in the different types of IPRs’, Anderman argues that 
there is a role for competition law. See S. Anderman, ‘EC Competition Law and Intellectual 
Property Rights’ (1998); I. Govaere, ‘The Use and Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights in 
E.C. Law’ (1996).  
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Not surprisingly, the principal philosophical theory applied to justify the 
protection of utilitarian works such as technological inventions has been 
utilitarianism.37 Economists on the other hand, have generally offered four 
principal incentive-based rationales for the existence of IPRs. These 
rationales, which include theories based on incentive, are also underlying 
the patent system’s grant to the patent applicant of the right to exclude 
others from practicing an invention.38
(i) First and foremost, the ‘incentive to invent theory’ suggests that IPRs 
encourage invention. Under this theory, it is assumed that without the 
inducement of e.g. a patent, inventors might not invest sufficiently in the 
inventive process. For without IPRs, inventors might not be able to 
appropriate the full value of their inventions. ‘Free riders’ would be able to 
benefit from the results of innovation without actually investing in 
innovation themselves, which would decrease the incentive to invent. 
(ii) Second, the ‘incentive to disclose theory’ suggests that IPRs lead to the 
broader dissemination of innovations. Without the protection of IPRs, 
inventors would be forced to conceal their inventions in order to prevent 
free riding. A valuable source of teaching would thus disappear. Moreover, 
without the exclusivity and public announcement provided by a patent, 
wastefully duplicative expenditures could ensue. To avoid this, the patent 
laws offer a ‘bargain’ – they give the possibility of exclusivity, allow for 
licenses and give these value by protecting patents against infringement – in 
exchange, the patent applicant gives public disclosure of the IP in the patent 
application. 
(iii) Third, the primary theory that focuses on organising post-inventive 
activity is called the ‘prospect theory’. Related theories focus on the 
incentive to invest, to innovate, or to commercialise – all of which aim at 
making an invention practicable and useful. According to these theories, 
IPRs lead to a greater commercialisation of inventions and encourage the 
licensing of those property rights to entities that are better able to exploit 
them in an economically efficient manner. For the prospect theory, the 
signalling function of the patent is crucial, as it is with the issuance that 
venture capitalists, developers, advertisers and sellers can all start making 
the necessary investments to ensure that consumers will eventually be 
offered the commercial embodiment of the invention.  
(iv) Lastly, the ‘incentive to design around theory’ suggests that there are 
advantages in encouraging competitors to circumvent a patent’s scope by 
inventing substitutes. As a market for a patented product becomes 
increasingly successful, the patent provides an increasingly strong incentive 
for other players to invent non-infringing substitutes, or even infringing 
improvements. Patent rights thus assure the public availability of inventions 
with a strong potential for follow-on innovation. Though some argue that 
                                                 
37 Peter S. Menell, ‘Intellectual Property: General Theories’, 1999 University of California 
at Berkley, 129-188, pp. 129-30. See also William Fischer, ‘Theories of Intellectual 
Property’, 1-60, p. 2. 
38 Wendy J. Gordon in:  The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Chapter 28), Oxford 
University Press, edited by Peter Can and Mark Tushnet (October 2003) – Boston 
University School of Law, Working Paper Series, Law and Economics Working Paper No. 
03-10, pp. 631-33. See also Balto and Wolman, pp. 22-24; Peter S. Menell, pp. 146-47. 
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such secondary inventive activity is largely superfluous, others claim that it 
is desirable in that second-generation products may be better than the first, 
whether it is because they are cheaper, more effective, or because they have 
fewer or different collateral costs or side-effects.  
 
While agreeing on the rationales for the existence of IPRs, commentators 
disagree on the extent of IP protection that is desirable. Some of the 
potentially negative effects that the over extensive protection of IPRs may 
have on the economy are:39
(i) IPRs may discourage second-generation innovation. As the cost of 
acquiring access to protected IP increases, the amount of research conducted 
using such property will decrease. 
(ii) IPRs are a form of legalised monopoly, and as such it can be harmful to 
a competitive economy. To receive the greatest return, a monopolist will 
generally price at a level that excludes part of the market that is willing and 
able to pay above marginal cost for the product, with the effect that a 
deadweight loss is created. 
(iii) Moreover, it has been observed that increasing the cost of information 
through IP protection will lead to dynamic inefficiencies in the economy.  
Market decisions will either not be fully informed or will be influenced by 
the cost of acquiring information. 
(iv) Finally, IPRs can allow a company to leverage its possession of those 
rights in order to engage in anticompetitive behaviour or monopolisation 
beyond what is expressly allowed by the IP grant. Preventing this last 
negative economic effect from occurring is also one of the antitrust laws’ 
greatest concerns in the IP context. 
2.2 Antitrust Law & Its Aim – The 
Economic Theory of Competition  
Ever since the enactment of the pioneering US ‘antitrust laws’ – most 
notably the Sherman Act 1890 – and the later competition provisions in the 
ECSC Treaty 1951, there has been a considerable debate about the aims of 
competition law. Today, the majority view is that competition law should be 
enforced against firms whose behaviour harms consumers. The minority 
view, on the other hand, is that competition law can be enforced to attain a 
wider set of economic and non-economic ambitions. Some scholars – 
particularly those in the US – argue that competition law should be 
interpreted solely according to what economic theory dictates.40 Irrespective 
of which view is the preferable, the debates on the appropriate aims of 
competition law have had, and continue to have, a significant impact on the 
shaping of the law in practice.41
 
                                                 
39Balto & Wolman, pp. 22-24. 
40 R.H. Bork, ‘The Antitrust Paradox’ (New York, The Free Press, 1978, reprinted 1993); 
R. A. Posner, ‘Antitrust Law’ (2nd edn., Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2000).  
41 Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, pp. 928-29. 
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For instance, although the role of economics was clearly insufficiently 
recognised in the early days of competition law in the EC, the general view 
today is that the theory and practice of competition law are inextricably tied 
to economics. Consequently, in the EC – admittedly with some delay 
compared to the US – the modern view of competition policy as an 
economic policy concerned with economic structures, conduct, and effects, 
has contributed to a growing awareness among competition policy makers 
of the importance of economics for their daily work.42
 
Contemporary competition law enforcement is thus built upon an 
understanding of how markets work. Put simply, legal intervention should 
perform a twofold task: (i) prohibit commercial practices that damage the 
operation of markets and (ii) promote activities that yield economic benefits. 
Accordingly, a successful competition law is one that sustains an efficient 
economic order. While there is widespread disagreement on how such a 
competition law should be construed and enforced, economists tend to 
unanimously agree that competition legal norms are just as crucial to the 
modern economic order as the right to property and freedom of contract. 
Moreover, economists agree that there are three broad classes of efficiencies 
that are relevant for the analysis of competition. The first, ‘allocative 
efficiency’, means that resources are allocated to the production of goods 
and services in the way that society most values. The second type, 
‘productive efficiency’, means that output is being produced at the lowest 
possible cost. ‘Dynamic efficiency’, finally, is connected to whether 
appropriate incentives and ability exist to increase productivity and engage 
in innovative activity over time, which may yield cheaper or better goods or 
new products that afford consumers more satisfaction than previous 
consumption choices.43  
The central concept in competition law, however, is ‘market power’ – the 
ability of a firm to exercise significant influence over price and output in a 
particular market over time.44 While the general view is that market power 
may lead to allocative inefficiency and to a worsened productive efficiency, 
its impact on innovation is a lot more controversial.45
 
In the US, two schools of economists have dominated antitrust thought – the 
Harvard and Chicago schools, developed in the 1960s and 1970s 
respectively. The Harvard school was born out of the conviction that 
undertakings that have market power are likely to act inefficiently and that 
competition law therefore must be enforced against them.46  
The Chicago scholars on the other hand, believe that the fundamental 
goal/sole pursuit of antitrust is, or ought to be, the pursuit of efficiency, or 
                                                 
42 Whish, p. 1; Kirsty Middleton, ‘Cases and Materials on UK and EC Competition Law’, 
Oxford University Press 2003, p. 17.  
43 Whish, p. 1078; Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, pp. 929-30. 
44 Whish, p. 1080.  
45 Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, p. 930. 
46 According to these scholars, a direct causal link exists between market structure and 
economic performance, whereby the fewer the firms and thus the more concentrated the 
market, the less competitive the industry is bound to be. Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, 
Tomkins, p. 933. 
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rather the maximisation of allocative efficiency. According to this view, 
consumer welfare is optimised in free markets. Even monopolistic markets 
are acceptable and state intervention is required only in extreme cases where 
new entrants are prohibited from the market.47  
Obviously, the views represented by the two schools diverge significantly in 
their prescriptions for competition law enforcement. Although the Chicago 
School has so far been regarded as the most influential, that model is 
currently being contested by ‘post-Chicagoans’ and their economic theories.  
Unlike the Chicago scholars, the post-Chicago economists believe that 
market failures are not necessarily self-correcting, and that firms therefore 
can take advantage of imperfections to produce inefficient results even in 
apparently competitive markets.48 Consequently, they argue that these 
distortions to competition legitimise scrutiny of a wider variety of conduct 
than the traditional Chicago school does. Moreover, while Chicagoans 
presuppose that markets promote efficient business behaviour and that 
judges are ill-equipped to identify and assess market imperfections, post-
Chicagoans have less trust in markets and more confidence in the judiciary’s 
ability to distinguish between competitive and anticompetitive conduct.49
 
That task is particularly challenging when it comes to realising dynamic 
efficiency in today’s society. On the one hand, an inefficient market 
structure today might be the only way to have future inventions tomorrow. 
For even though one might e.g. object to a monopolised pharmaceutical 
sector, it may be necessary to concentrate resources to obtain important 
drugs in the future. On the other hand, one may question to what extent 
competition today must be hampered in favour of greater consumer benefits 
tomorrow. For although some argue that the frequent innovations that occur 
in high technology markets mean that competition law should not be overly 
concerned about monopolies in such markets, others have taken the view 
that innovation can and will occur only if new entrants are protected by 
competition law regulating the firms that monopolise the market.  
Despite the fact that antitrust economists agree that net efficiency gains 
from continuing innovation may far outweigh the static gains from 
marginal-cost pricing, no consensus exists as to the best competition policy 
to facilitate innovation. Consequently, competition authorities are left with 
the task of choosing which means are best to maximise dynamic efficiency 
‘in a climate where economics provides no clear answer’.50
 
In carrying out this task, EC competition law was in its early years strongly 
influenced by the so-called ‘ordoliberal’ economic philosophy. Under this 
theory, the process of competition is valued and access and opportunities for 
new businesses favoured. Concern about economic power should therefore 
                                                 
47 Middleton, pp.5-6.  
48 Whilst ‘Chicagoans’ assume that the desire to maximise profits makes market 
imperfections disappear of themselves in the competitive process, ‘post-Chicagoans’ 
believe that strategising firms can create or maintain market imperfections that can 
seriously hinder the competitive balance. 
49 Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, pp. 932-34. 
50 Id.  
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lead competition authorities to intervene even if it would not result in the 
most efficient outcome. Article 82 of the EC Treaty, forbidding the abuse of 
market power by dominant firms, is a clear illustration of this concern about 
economic power. For a long time this view stood uncontested in the 
Community legal order. EC competition law was to serve a sole political 
objective – the preservation of the competitive process – and other goals 
were to be obtained by enforcing competition law.51  
However, as the EC transformed into a ‘neoliberal’ market economy, the 
increased emphasis on the benefits of efficient markets undermined the 
ordoliberal concerns about economic power. The current approach in the EC 
is best summarised by the speech recently held by the current Competition 
Commissioner Neelie Kroes: ‘Consumer welfare is now well established as 
the standard the Commission applies when assessing mergers and 
infringements of the Treaty rules on cartels and monopolies. Our aim is 
simple: to protect competition in the market as a means of enhancing 
consumer welfare and ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. An 
effects-based approach, grounded in solid economics, ensures that citizens 
enjoy the benefits of a competitive, dynamic market economy.’52
2.3 IP & Antitrust – The Right Balance 
As illustrated above, the IP laws provide incentives for innovation and its 
dissemination and commercialisation by establishing enforceable property 
rights for the creators of new and useful products. The antitrust laws, on the 
other hand, promote innovation and consumer welfare by prohibiting certain 
actions that may harm competition.53  
Competition and patents are thus not inherently in conflict. Although ‘the 
aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, 
wholly at odds [...] the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as 
both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition.’54
While IPRs subsidise investments in innovation by granting substantial but 
time-limited market power, antitrust ensures that firms compete, and by 
competing, seek new roads to innovation. It also prevents dominant firms 
from harming or retarding innovation.55  
                                                 
51 Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, pp. 935-36. 
52 Speech on 15 Sept. 2005, ’European Competition Policy: Delivering Better Markets and 
Better Choices’, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/index_en.html. See also 
Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, pp. 936-38. 
53 US DoJ and FTC ‘Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of IP’ (1995), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf, p. 2. Visited on June 20, 2007. 
54 See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 897 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990) in the US DoJ 
and FTC 1995 IP Guidelines, p. 2. and the 2003 FTC report, ’To Promote Innovation: The 
Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy’ – Executive Summary, 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrptsummary.pdf, p. 2. Compare 
Section 7 of the 2004 EC Guidelines on Technology Transfer Agreements (Official Journal 
C 101 of 27.04.2004) available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_123/l_12320040427en00110017.pdf, 
recognising that there is no ‘inherent conflict between [IPRs] and the Community 
competition rules’ as ‘both bodies of law share the same basic objective of promoting 
consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of resources’. Visited on June 20, 2007.  
55 See speech by Robert Pitofsky, p. 5. 
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Both competition and patent law and policy can thus stimulate innovation 
and benefit the public, but they must work together in a proper balance to do 
so. Errors or system biases in how one policy’s rules are interpreted and 
applied can harm the other policy’s effectiveness.56 To avoid the serious 
problems that are bound to arise when either regime is accorded 
disproportionate weight, it is thus essential that the balancing act continues 
and is regularly made subject of review.57  
 
In October 2003, after extensive hearings, the FTC issued the first of two 
reports on how to promote innovation by finding the proper balance 
between competition and patent law and policy. This 2003 FTC Report 
contains conclusions and recommendations addressing the patent system.58 
The report concluded that questionable patents are a significant competitive 
concern and can harm innovation. The report made ten recommendations for 
reducing the number of questionable patents that are issued and upheld.59
In 2004 a further report was produced by National Academies’ Board on 
Science, Technology, and Economic Policy (STEP), as well as position 
papers by the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA).60
In October 2004, DoJ's Task Force on Intellectual Property released a 
Report on Intellectual Property.61 Apart from recommending three 
interesting antitrust initiatives,62 the report identified key principles shaping 
the DoJ’s IP enforcement efforts as well as providing a basis for 
recommending further actions.63
                                                 
56 See report by the FTC, ’To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and 
Patent Law and Policy’ – Executive Summary, p. 1.  
57 See speech by Robert Pitofsky, p. 5. 
58 The report – ‘To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent 
Law and Policy’ – is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.  Visited 
on June 20, 2007. The second, joint report by the FTC and DOJ, which should make similar 
recommendations for antitrust law has not yet been issued. 
59 The FTC’s 10 recommendations included the following;  
To increase a challenger’s ability to eliminate questionable patents, legislation should be 
enacted to create a new administrative procedure to allow post-grant review of and 
opposition to a patent after it is issued. 
To promote the disclosure function of patents, legislation should be enacted to require, as a 
predicate for liability for wilful infringement, either written notice of infringement from the 
patentee or deliberate copying of the patentee’s invention, knowing it to be patented. 
60 The STEP Board Report 2004:‘A Patent System for the 21st Century’ is available at 
http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem. See also AIPLA at http://www.aipla.org. Visited on 
June 20, 2007. 
61See DoJ's Task Force Report on Intellectual Property 2004, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/IPTaskForceReport.pdf. Visited on June 20, 
2007. 
62 First, it supported the right of IP owners to determine independently whether or not to 
license their technology. Second, it encouraged the use of the DoJ’s business review 
procedure for guidance on antitrust concerns relating to industry standards for the 
prevention of IP theft. Lastly, it suggested that international co-operation on the application 
of antitrust laws to IPRs be promoted. See DoJ Report, pp. 41-5.  
63 For instance, it was stressed that the government and IP owners have a collective 
responsibility to take action against violations of federal IP laws & that the federal 
government should punish those who misuse innovative technologies rather than innovation 
itself. See the DoJ Report, pp.11-12. 
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Following the FTC 2003 Report, the 2004 STEP Board Report and the 
AIPLA position papers, a series of patent hearings were organised in 2005 
in order to initiate a discussion among all stakeholders in the patent system 
on the content of needed reforms.64 All parties concluded that the patent 
system would benefit from some form of post-grant review. As the Report 
had observed, litigation removes invalid patents only slowly and at great 
cost; challengers cannot seek declaratory judgments until imminently 
threatened with suit. Taken together with the fact that ‘patent litigation is 
lengthy and expensive’,65 those considerations suggested that ‘some 
unwarranted patents will be issued and will remain factors in the market for 
considerable time. They may create unnecessary market power and 
transaction costs and infect markets with risk, uncertainty, and distorted 
business planning.’66
In a testimony in February 2007, the FTC further emphasised that invalid or 
questionable patents can increase costs and hinder competition.67 
Implementing the patent reform recommendations the agency made in its 
2003 report would increase the likelihood that issued patents are valid, and 
that challenges to invalid patents will proceed more efficiently. 
 
Since 2004 and the European Commission’s Communication ‘A pro-active 
Competition Policy for a Competitive Europe’ the aim of developing 
competitive, innovative markets has been at the head of the EC agenda..68 
Naturally, the Commission is therefore conscious of the need to balance 
competition and innovation. The IP-antitrust interplay is also an important 
aspect of the overall Article 82 review process.69
 
                                                 
64 See http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/patentconference.shtm, visited on June 20, 2007. 
Themes of discussion included: establishment of a system of post-grant review within the 
PTO to weed out questionable patents; limiting litigation over wilful infringement in order 
to foster dissemination of information about inventions; and expanding publication of 
patent applications to avoid harm to competition and to facilitate rational business planning. 
65 The STEP Board Report 2004, at 68, notes that litigation ‘typically costs millions of 
dollars and takes years to resolve. The median costs to each party of proceeding through a 
patent infringement suit to a trial verdict are at least $500,000 when the stakes are relatively 
modest. When more than $25 million is at risk in a patent suit, the median litigation costs 
for the plaintiff and the defendant average $4 million each, and in the highest-stakes patent 
suit, costs can exceed this amount by more than fivefold.’ 
66 See speech available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050609comppolicy.pdf. 
Visited on June 20, 2007. 
67 According to the testimony (February 15, 2007), patents of questionable quality can 
distort competition, innovation, and the marketplace in at least four ways: 1) They may 
slow innovation by discouraging companies from conducting research and development in 
areas that the patent improperly covers; 2) patents that should not have been granted raise 
costs when they are challenged in litigation; 3) questionable patents may raise costs by 
inducing unnecessary licensing; and 4) firms facing overlapping patent rights may spend 
resources obtaining ‘defensive patents,’ not to protect their own innovation from use by 
others, but to have ‘bargaining chips’ to obtain access to others’ patents through a cross-
license, or to counter allegations of infringement. The testimony is available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/02/patenttestimony.shtm. Visited on June 20, 2007.  
68 See European Commission Communication, ‘A Pro-active Competition Policy for a 
Competitive Europe’, COM (2004) 293 final, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/com/cnc/2004/com2004_0293en01.pdf. Visited on June 20, 2007. 
69 See below.  
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3 The Patent Laws 
As stated above, ‘[t]he central function of IPRs is to protect the moral rights 
in a right-holder’s work and ensure a reward for the creative effort.’70 IPRs 
generally – and the patent grant particularly – reward invention and 
innovation and thus function to encourage investment in the discovery of 
new technologies. ‘From the composition of a new drug to the latest time-
saving gadget, patents protect the world of inventions.’71  
The patent grant, which is intended to increase the perceived financial 
reward from investments, does so by offering the investor the monopoly, for 
a maximum period of twenty years from the date when patent application is 
filed,72  to exploit the new and inventive product or process. The investor is 
thus given the right to prevent others from making, disposing of, using or 
importing a product, which is the subject of the patent or derived from it, or 
from using the patented process itself. 
Without such protection, free-riders that have not made the investment that 
resulted in discovery of the technology would be able to appropriate much 
of its value at the expense of the investor. The exclusive patent grant 
eliminates the deterrent effect of such free-riding, as well as increases the 
likelihood that the profits of research which come to fruition can cover the 
costs of that which does not. Even though the right to exclude is made 
contingent on a full disclosure of the details of the invention in the patent 
specification to any interested member of the public, the right to exclude 
thus enables the investor to appropriate much of the value to society that 
results from the technological advance.73
That patents are a driving force for promoting innovation, growth and 
competitiveness is common ground on both sides of the Atlantic. Both legal 
systems have thus aimed at modelling patent systems that will yield the 
most added value for their industries. However, so far the unified US federal 
patent law system stands in stark contrast to the fragmented EC system, 
where a Community-wide patent still shines with its absence.  
3.1 Patents in the EC System 
Recent figures show that the incomplete single market for patents has 
serious consequences for the competitiveness of Europe in relation to the 
challenges of the US, Japan and emerging economic powers such as China. 
That the Community is clearly lagging behind in terms of patent activity 
                                                 
70 Case COMP/C 3/37.792 Microsoft-Antitrust [2004] EC Comm. 1, para. 711. 
71 See the DoJ’s Task Force Report on IP, October 2004, p. 3.  
72 The term of a US patent is generally 20 years. Patent term extensions or adjustments may 
be available for pharmaceuticals. The maximum 20 years is also common throughout the 
EU. In relation to pharmaceuticals, Council Reg. 1786/92, [1992] OJ L182/1, on the 
creation of supplementary protection certificates for medical products enables a period not 
exceeding five years to be added to this in respect of the period between the date of filing 
the application and the grant. 
73 See Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, ‘EC Competition Law – Texts, Cases and 
Materials’, Oxford University Press 2001, p. 557 and Balto & Wolman, p. 25.  
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becomes evident when one considers that even in Europe, the US and Japan 
patent more than the EC. Moreover, the figures show that a European patent 
designating 13 countries is 11 times more expensive than a US patent and 
13 times more expensive than a Japanese patent if processing and translation 
costs are considered. For the total costs with up to 20 years of protection, 
European patents are nearly nine times more expensive than Japanese and 
US patents. Moreover, the existing system of patent litigation, with the risk 
of multiple patent litigation in several countries on the same patent issue, 
leads to unnecessary costs for all parties involved and causes lack of legal 
certainty. Hence, there is an urgent need for action.74
3.1.1 The Current Order 
Although the indispensability of a patent system to the economic wellbeing 
of Europe is generally recognised within the Community, all attempts to 
achieve consensus on the creation of a ‘Community Patent’ (COMPAT) 
have so far proved unsuccessful. The idea of a COMPAT, which would 
allow individuals and companies to obtain a unitary patent throughout the 
EC, dates back to the 1960s, but has repeatedly failed due to what must be 
lack of political will on the part of the Member States. 
Today, therefore, common patent rules exist only in certain areas such as 
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, and patents within the EC are still 
awarded either on a national basis or through the European Patent Office 
(EPO). The EPO, which is not an  agency of the EU but an autonomous 
body with 31 member states, was established in 1973 by the European 
Patent Convention (EPC), to issue so-called ‘European Patents’. These are 
not Europe-wide patents, but rather represent bundles of national patents 
that must be translated into the contracting states’ official languages in order 
to be legally valid in their territory. Once granted, the protection is then 
dependent on the national patent rules in each one of the selected countries. 
Despite the fact that there is a single application and granting procedure, 
which saves some time and money for applicants, the EPC system has 
deficiencies in that it – apart from significant translation costs – generates 
large enforcement costs for businesses, as disputes must be handled via 
individual national courts.75
3.1.2 The Future Order 
In follow-up to the Lisbon Council, which outlined a ten-year plan to make 
the EU more competitive, the Commission, in July 2000, proposed the 
creation of a Community Patent to tackle the weaknesses of the EPC 
                                                 
74 See the ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council – Enhancing the patent system in Europe’, Brussels, COM (2007) 29-03-07, pp. 2-
3. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/strategy_en.pdf, 
visited on April 4th 2007. See also the Commission’s Press Release ‘Patents: Commission 
sets out vision for improving patent system in Europe’, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/463&type=HTML&aged=0
&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr, visited on the 4th of April 2007.  
75 See http://www.euractiv.com/en/innovation/community-patent/article-117529, visited on 
April 4 2007.  
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system. However, as many times before, the creation process reached a state 
of stagnation and it was to take the Member States until March 2003 to 
reach agreement on a 'common political approach' concerning the 
establishment of a Community Patent Court (CPC) which would rule on 
disputes, language regimes, costs and the role of national patent offices. In 
December 2003, the Commission then presented a proposal to confer formal 
jurisdiction over COMPAT disputes to the ECJ and to establish a CPC to 
exercise the ECJ’s jurisdiction on its behalf. However, the proposal never 
received Council’s approval.76
The difficulties in making progress on patents and especially on the creation 
of a COMPAT led the Commission to launch, in 2006, a Consultation on 
the future patent system, the results of which in the Commission’s words 
‘leave no doubt on the urgent need for action to provide a simple, cost-
effective and high-quality patent system in Europe, both for examination 
and grant as well as post-grant procedures, including litigation’.77  
Recently, in yet another attempt to revitalise the debate on the issue, the 
Commission has set out its vision on how to improve the patent system in a 
Communication.78 Making the COMPAT a reality and improving the 
existing patent litigation system are two steps that are thought to make the 
patent system more accessible and bring cost savings for all. Above all, it is 
thought to better equip Europe for the competitive climate in today’s 
increasingly competitive global economy. ‘Europe [simply] cannot afford to 
lose ground in an area as crucial as patent policy.’79  
If (or when) it becomes reality, the COMPAT would allow individuals and 
companies to obtain a unitary patent throughout the European Union. Unlike 
the European Patents under the EPC, which once granted, constitute a 
bundle of nationally enforceable patents in the designated states, the 
COMPAT would provide a patent right that is consistent across Europe. 
This would further one of the objects of the internal market – namely that 
the same market conditions should exist wherever in Europe trade is carried 
out. Until this aim is achieved, the single market for patents arguably 
remains incomplete.80  
                                                 
76 See http://www.euractiv.com/en/innovation/community-patent/article-117529, visited on 
April 4 2007. See also generally 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/patent/index_en.htm, visited on June 20, 2007. 
77 See the Commission’s Press Release ‘Patents: Commission sets out vision for improving 
patent system in Europe’, Reference : IP/07/463; Date: 03/04/2007. Available at  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/463&language=EN. See 
also consultation documents available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/patent/consultation_en.htm. 
78 See the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council – ‘Enhancing the Patent System in Europe’ COM(2007) 165 final, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2007/com2007_0165en01.pdf.  
The Patent Communication is intended to draw operational conclusions from the 
stakeholder consultation and to allow the Council to launch deliberations on patent reforms, 
in particular on the Community patent and jurisdictional arrangements. A complementary 
but separate and comprehensive IPR Communication is planned for 2008, to address 
outstanding non-legislative and horizontal issues in all fields of IP. 
79 See Press Release IP/07/463.  
80 In view of the difficulties in reaching an agreement on the COMPAT, other legal 
agreements have been proposed outside the EU legal framework to reduce costs, namely 
the Agreement dated 17 October 2000 on the application of Article 65 of the Convention on 
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3.2 Patents in the US System 
The Constitution of the United States gives the US Congress the power to 
enact laws relating to patents. According to Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 
‘Congress shall have power…[t]o promote the progress of science and 
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.’81
Since the first Patent Act was enacted in 1790, the US Congress has enacted 
various laws relating to patents under this power. A general revision of the 
patent laws came into effect in 1953 and was codified in Title 35, United 
States Code (U.S.C.). Additionally, in 1999, Congress enacted the American 
Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), which further revised the patent laws.82  
US Patents are issued by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). 
Generally, the term of the patent is 20 years from the date on which the 
application for the patent was filed in the US (or, in special cases, from the 
date an earlier related application was filed, subject to the payment of 
maintenance fees). However, just like in the EC, patent term extensions or 
adjustments may be available under certain circumstances.83 US patent 
grants are effective only within the United States, its territories and 
possessions.84
3.2.1 The Current Order 
As the Patent Act provides ‘[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to 
the conditions and requirements of this title.’85  
Taken together, the patentable classes of subject matter include practically 
everything that is made by man and the processes for making the products.86  
However, the patent law specifies that the subject matter must be useful, 
meaning that the subject matter must have a useful purpose and 
operativeness. Moreover, interpretations of the statute by the courts have 
defined the limits of the field of subject matter that can be patented so that 
                                                                                                                            
the Grant of European Patents (the London Agreement) and the Draft Agreement on the 
establishment of a European patent litigation system (the draft European Patent Litigation 
Agreement (EPLA)).  
81 Balto &Wolman, p. 24.  
82 See ‘General Information Concerning Patents’ provided by the US PTO, available at   
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/index.html#patent, visited on April 5 
2007. 
83 The terms may be extended for certain pharmaceuticals and for certain circumstances as 
provided by law. 
84 See PTO – General Information. 
85 Id. and 35 U.S.C. § 101. See also Balto & Wolman, p. 24.  
86 Three types of patents may be granted: 1) Utility patents may be granted to anyone who 
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, article of manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof; 2) Design patents may 
be granted to anyone who invents a new, original, and ornamental design for an article of 
manufacture; 3) Plant patents may be granted to anyone who invents or discovers and 
asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant. See PTO – General Information.  
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the laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not 
patentable subject matter.87  
In order for an invention to be patentable it must be new or novel as defined 
in the patent law, which provides that an invention cannot be patented if: 
‘(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented 
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the 
invention thereof by the applicant for patent,’ or  
‘(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this 
or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country more than one 
year prior to the application for patent in the United States […]’88
Even if the subject matter sought to be patented is not exactly shown by the 
prior art, a patent may nevertheless be refused if the subject matter sought to 
be patented is not sufficiently different from what has been used or 
described before. In other words, it must be non-obvious to a person having 
ordinary skill in the area of technology related to the invention.89
 
Two sections of the Patent Act collectively represent the foundation that 
grants patent owners a legal monopoly over their inventions; The first of the 
two central sections is 35 U.S.C. § 154, which states that ’[e]very patent 
shall contain [...] a grant to the patentee [...] the right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the 
United States or importing the invention into the United States […]’  
The second section is 35 U.S.C. §  271(d), which states that ’[n]o patent 
owner otherwise entitled to relief [...] shall be denied relief or deemed guilty 
of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having [...] 
refused to license or use any rights to the patent [...]’ 
From this follows that the IPR conferred on the inventor by the patent grant 
is the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, selling or 
importing the invention during the protection period.90 Hence, patent 
owners can restrict others' access to their inventions, or even exclude others 
from their inventions entirely, without violating the law.91  
Still, a patentee is not authorised to make, use, offer for sale, or sell, or 
import the invention if doing so would violate any law. One such limitation 
is that a patentee may not infringe another’s patent, which is still in force. 
Another is that a patentee may not violate the federal antitrust laws by virtue 
of having a patent.92
                                                 
87 Id.  
88 Id. Thus, if the invention has been described in a printed publication anywhere in the 
world, or if it was known or used by others in this country before the date that the applicant 
made his/her invention, a patent cannot be obtained. Nor can a patent be obtained if the 
invention has been described in a printed publication anywhere, or has been in public use or 
on sale in the U.S. more than one year before the date on which an application for patent is 
filed in there. In this connection it is immaterial when the invention was made, or whether 
the printed publication or public use was by the inventor himself/herself or by someone 
else. 
89 See PTO – General Information. 
90 Balto & Wolman, p. 24.  
91 Barry M. Visconte, ‘A Bitter Pill to Swallow: Patent Law, A True Exception to Antitrust 
Law – Schor v. Abbott Laboratories’, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 399, 2006 University of 
Cincinnati, pp. 403-404.  
92 See PTO – General Information.   
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3.2.2 The Future Order 
The well developed and unified US patent system obviously faces very 
different problems and challenges than those faced by the European 
Community. For instance, whereas reforms in the EC aim at increasing 
patent activity and reducing costs, recent reform proposals in the US are 
directed at preventing the issuing of invalid or questionable patents. In 
particular, the 2003 FTC Report contains important conclusions and 
recommendations addressing the patent system.93 It may be expected that a 
system of post-grant review within the PTO will be established in the near 
future.94
                                                 
93 The report – ‘To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent 
Law and Policy’ – is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.  Visited 
on June 20, 2007.  
94 See the FTC testimony available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/02/patenttestimony.shtm. Visited on June 20, 2007. 
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4 The Competition & Antitrust 
Laws 
Both the US and EC systems rest on the idea that enterprises holding 
significant market power should be subject to considerable scrutiny by 
competition authorities. The economic explanation behind this idea is that 
dominant firms generally have the kind of economic power that tends to 
reduce efficiency, in particular where there are no competitive pressures to 
prevent them from raising prices and reducing output. In addition, there are 
persuasive policy arguments in favour of preventing large firms from 
exercising their market power to consolidate their dominance, or even to 
expand their influence into the political domain.95  
4.1 Competition Law in the EC 
The creation of a single market has been the overriding aim of the 
Community since its inception and the commitment to free market 
principles is evidenced throughout the Treaties.96  
The basis for the EC competition law regime may be found in Articles 2 and 
3 (1) (g) of the Treaty. Article 2, in which the main objectives of the 
Community are articulated, states that the ‘Community shall have as its task, 
by establishing a common market […] to promote throughout the 
Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of 
economic activities’ and ‘a high degree of competitiveness’. Article 3 then 
lists the means necessary to achieve the goals in Article 2 and requires in 
paragraph (g) the institution of ‘a system ensuring that competition in the 
common market is not distorted’. 
The competition rules themselves can be found in Articles 81-86 of the EC 
Treaty, which apply to undertakings, private and public. The cornerstones of 
Community competition policy are Articles 81 and 82 EC. Whereas Article 
81 is concerned with agreements, decisions and concerted practices which 
have an anticompetitive object or effect, Article 82 is directed towards the 
unilateral conduct of dominant firms which act in an abusive manner. These 
articles, which are not mutually exclusive, complement the free movement 
of goods provisions.97  
Of particular importance for a proper understanding of the Community 
competition law is the ECJ’s teleological interpretation of the Treaty, 
whereby it consistently applies the competition rules against the background 
of the overall objectives expressed in Article 2 and 3 (1) (g). This has been 
highly significant in the cases involving anti-competitive abuses.98
                                                 
95 Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, p. 1024.  
96 Compare the Ninth Report on Competition Policy (1980) pp. 9-12, which remains an 
authoritative view of the policy objectives of Community competition policy. 
97 Whish, p. 175. See also Middleton, pp. 14-17. 
98 Whish, p. 194.  
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4.1.1 Art. 82 EC – Abuse of a Dominant Position 
In the Community, dominant firms are subject to Article 82 EC, the primary 
purposes of which is to prevent businesses which possess power through 
their position on the market from distorting competition within the internal 
market. The provision can be seen as supporting the four freedoms from the 
damaging effects, which may be caused by the use and abuse of market 
power within the Community. The prohibition of the ‘abuse’ of this power 
is set out in Article 82 EC, which stipulates that:99
 
‘Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market 
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in 
so far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.’ 
 
In the EC, Article 82 EC thus represents one of the pillars in the system 
ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted. By 
encouraging ‘competition on the merits’, and by stimulating and awarding 
businesses that strive to satisfy consumer needs, the EC system seeks to 
ensure that superior business performance is the sole factor determining the 
success of an undertaking and that the most efficient use of resources is 
attained. Article 82 EC thus aims at protecting the competitive process and 
thereby the opportunities of competitors to compete on the merits.  
However, this objective and the efficiencies thought to be associated with 
genuine undistorted competition, are clearly not end goals in themselves. 
Rather, they are pursued for the benefit of the consumers, who are to be 
protected not only from direct harm, but also from practices detrimental to 
them through their impact on the effective competition structure .100 This 
was emphasised in the recent Discussion Paper on exclusionary abuses, 
according to which ‘the objective of Article 82 is the protection of 
competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of 
ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. Effective competition brings 
benefits to consumers, such as low process, high quality products, a wide 
selection of goods and services, and innovation. Competition and market 
integration serve these ends since the creation and preservation of an open 
single market promotes an efficient allocation of resources throughout the 
Community for the benefit of consumers.’101
 
                                                 
99 Middleton, p. 297.  
100 See Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continetal Can Company Inc. v 
Commission of the European Communities, [1973] ECR 215 para. 26.  
101 Discussion Paper, para. 4.    
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Having looked at the aims and objectives of the Article, the following 
sections will focus on the different components that need to be satisfied for 
there to be ‘an abuse of a dominant position’. To establish an infringement 
of Article 82 EC, it must be shown that: 102
 
(i) an undertaking is dominant in a given market  
(ii) it has abused its dominant position  
(iii) the abuse has had an effect on trade between Member States 
(iv) there is an absence of a defence 
 
4.1.1.1 Dominance in the Relevant Market  
For the purposes of Article 82, it is vital to ensure that an undertaking, 
which is suspected of abusing its dominant position, does indeed have 
market power. For without that dominance or market power, the 
undertaking will be naturally constrained by its competitors and antitrust 
intervention is unnecessary.103 However, since a dominant position always 
exists in relation to a certain market,104 a finding of market power cannot be 
established without first determining in which market the undertaking 
operates.  
 
Market Definition – In response to the criticism directed at the 
Commission’s arguably arbitrary, unsophisticated, economically 
indefensible and overly narrow approach to market definition, a Notice on 
market definition was published in 1997.105 The Notice, which is not a 
legally binding market definition code, sought to introduce a new, more 
objective and transparent standard for defining the relevant market as well 
as a more economically-oriented methodology to market definition. 
Considering that the same approach to market definition should be taken 
regardless of the type of competition law inquiry, it plays an important role 
for all EC competition law.106 This was confirmed in the Discussion Paper, 
which states that the Notice should serve as the basis for market definition 
issues also for the application of Article 82 EC.107
Market definition, as described in the Notice, is a tool to establish the 
framework within which competition policy is applied by the Commission. 
Its purpose is to identify in a systematic way the competitive constraints 
faced by the undertakings involved. By defining a market in terms of both a 
product and geographic dimension, those actual competitors of the 
undertakings involved representing an effective competitive pressure 
capable of constraining their behaviour and of preventing them from 
behaving independently are identified.108
                                                 
102 See Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, pp. 1025-6. 
103 Middleton, p. 300.  
104 See Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, p. 1026. 
105 Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purposes of 
Community Competition Law, ([1997] OJ C 372).  
106 Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, pp. 1026-27 and p. 1035.  
107 See the Discussion Paper, para. 12.  
108 See the Notice, para. 2.  
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Naturally, the definition of the relevant market has a decisive influence on 
the assessment of a competition case.109 The more narrowly the relevant 
market is defined, the more likely it is that the undertaking in question is 
deemed to be in a dominant position.110 Although it must be emphasised 
that market definitions do not always have clear limits and obviously should 
not alone determine whether the firm has market power, they do focus 
attention on the factors relevant to appraising market power.111  
 
Three principal sources of competitive constraints must be considered when  
defining the market. The first, demand-side substitutability, consists in 
identifying what the relevant product is from the perspective of consumers. 
The second requires determining, again from the consumer perspective, 
what the relevant geographical market is. Finally, supply-side 
substitutability, involves an inquiry into whether there are any potential 
competitors who might enter the relevant market in the future.112
From an economic perspective, demand-side substitution constitutes the 
most effective constraint on the suppliers of a given product. If customers 
are in a position to switch easily to available substitute products or to 
suppliers located elsewhere, an undertaking will not be able to exert a 
significant impact on the conditions of sale, such as prices. The task of 
defining the market is therefore concerned with identifying the effective 
alternative sources of supply for the customers of the relevant undertaking, 
both in terms of products/services and geographic location of suppliers.  
By way of contrast, the constraints on firms arising from supply-side 
substitutability and potential competition are in general less immediate and 
in any event require an analysis of additional factors. As a result, these are 
taken into account at the assessment stage of competition analysis.113
 
(i) Product Market Definition & Demand-Side Substitution – The 
traditional approach to market definition is best illustrated by the United 
Brands case, where the ECJ was confronted with the question whether 
bananas represented a market of its own. In the Court’s words, ‘[f]or the 
banana to be regarded as forming a market which is sufficiently 
differentiated from other fruit markets it must be possible for it to be singled 
out by such special features distinguishing it from other fruits that it is only 
to a limited extent interchangeable with them and is only exposed to their 
competition in a way that is hardly perceptible’.114  
                                                 
109 See the Notice, para. 4. 
110 Conversely, a too wide definition indicates a smaller market share and thus risks 
understating the firm’s market power. The effect may be that an undertaking is (falsely) 
viewed as not in a dominant position, with the consequence that it falls outside of the ambit 
of Article 82 EC. 
111 V. Korah, ‘EC Competition Law’, Hart Publishing Limited, 2001, p. 82.  
112 Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, p. 1026. Note that markets may also need 
to be defined in terms of time (temporal markets), e.g. where the market conditions 
considered are limited in time or operate on a seasonal basis. See Middleton, p. 314. 
113 See the Notice, paras. 13-14. 
114 Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission 
of the European Communities, [1978] ECR 207, para. 22. 
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Having pointed out that the banana was always available and that the 
question whether it could be replaced by other fruits therefore had to be 
determined over the whole of the year, the Court found that no significant 
long-term cross-elasticity existed.115 In particular however, the banana was 
found to have ‘certain characteristics, appearance, taste, softness 
seedlessness, easy handling, a constant level of production which enable it 
to satisfy the constant needs of an important section of the population 
consisting of the very young, the old and the sick’. From this followed that 
‘a very large number of consumers having a constant need for bananas are 
not noticeably or even appreciably enticed away from the consumption of 
this product by the arrival of other fresh fruit on the market’. Consequently, 
the banana market was viewed to be a market which was sufficiently distinct 
from the other fresh fruit markets.116
 
The assessment of demand-side substitution thus entails a determination of 
the range of products, which are viewed as substitutes by the consumer. One 
way of determining this is by applying the so-called ‘SSNIP-test’ (Small but 
Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price), which ‘can be viewed as a 
speculative experiment, postulating a hypothetical small, lasting change in 
relative prices and evaluating the likely reactions of consumers to that 
increase’.117 The question posed in the test is ‘whether the parties’ 
customers would switch to readily available substitutes or to suppliers 
located elsewhere in response to a hypothetical small (in the range 5 to 10 
per cent) but permanent relative price increase in the products and areas 
being considered. If substitution were enough to make the price increase 
unprofitable because of the resulting loss of sales, additional substitutes and 
areas are included in the relevant market. This would be done until the set of 
products and geographical areas is such that small, permanent increases in 
relative price would be profitable.’118 At that point, the ability to profitably 
raise prices by 5 to 10 per cent would signify that the products and areas in 
question constitute a market that is worth monopolizing.119
 
One problem with the SSNIP-test in the Article 82 context is, however, that 
the test assumes that the prevailing price constitutes the appropriate 
benchmark for the analysis. This is an assumption that generally does not 
hold in such cases. As the very notion of dominance involves an assessment 
of whether or not the undertaking in question is subject to effective 
competitive constraints, the appropriate benchmark for this assessment is 
the competitive price, which may not be the prevailing price.120 Additional 
methods are thus required to ensure that the market has been correctly 
defined. These involve (i) reconstructing the competitive price to apply the 
SSNIP test, (ii) examining the characteristics and intended use of the 
products concerned to assess whether they are capable of satisfying the 
                                                 
115 Id. paras. 27-28.  
116 Id. paras 34-35. 
117 See the Notice, para. 15. 
118 See the Notice, para. 17.  
119 See the Discussion Paper, para. 14. 
120 Id. para. 15. See also Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, p. 1038.  
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inelastic consumer need and (iii) comparing prices across various regions to 
determine the geographic and product market.121
 
As to product market definition in the pharmaceutical sector, the 
Commission distinguishes between: (i) prescription pharmaceuticals, (ii) 
over the counter pharmaceuticals, and (iii) new products122. Each of these 
markets is then further segmented by therapeutic indications, i.e. degree of 
similarity in clinical effects.123 To this end, the Commission uses the 
European Pharmaceutical Marketing Research Association's or the World 
Health Organisation's ‘Anatomical Therapeutic Classification’ (ATC), 
usually at level 3 of such classification.124 However, the Commission has 
acknowledged that it may be appropriate to carry out an analysis at other 
levels of the ATC system, where using a level 3 category does not reflect 
the ‘true’ product market. Thus, a given ATC 3 class may therefore be 
subdivided into distinct market segments. Conversely, certain Commission 
decisions have held that the ATC 3 classification is too narrow to define the 
relevant product market and that several ATC classes may be included in the 
same product market.125
 
(ii) Geographical Market definition – Once the product market is correctly 
defined it is necessary to identify the geographical extent of the market. 
According to the general rule, the geographical market is that territory 
where ‘the objective conditions of competition applying to the product in 
question must be the same for all traders’.126 Some markets will be 
necessarily localised, while others may be global.127 Obviously, such a 
decision will have an impact on the level of competition on that market. 
 
(iii) Supply-Side Substitution & Potential Competition – Finally, supply-
side substitution is another constraint that may be taken into account when 
defining markets. It can be said to exist when ‘suppliers are able to switch 
production to the relevant products and market them in the short term 
                                                 
121 Id. paras 16-19. 
122 i.e. products that are not yet on the market but which are at an advanced stage of 
development, that is to say either at Phase II or Phase III of clinical trials. 
123 See, e.g. Commission Decisions M.1378, Hoechst/Rhône-Poulenc, January 30, 2004 and 
M.737, Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz, February 4, 1998. 
124 See, e.g. Commission Decisions M.3544, Bayer Healthcare/Roche (OTC business), 
November 19, 2004; M.3354, Sanofi-Synthelabo/Aventis, April 26, 2004; and M.2922, 
Pfizer/Pharmacia, February 27, 2003.  
125 Gunther & Breuvart, pp. 680-81. Note that in the Commission’s AstraZeneca decision, 
AZ’s dominance arose at level 4 of the ATC system. This is the first Article 82 case in 
which this level has been used. See Sophie Lawrance, ‘United Kingdom: Commission 
explains AstraZeneca decision’, Managing Intellectual Property, September 2006, at 
http://www.managingip.com/includes/magazine/PRINT.asp?SID=648513&ISS=22412&P
UBID=34. Visited on July 5, 2007.  
126 United Brands, para. 44.  
127 Conditions that affect the geographical extent of the market are e.g. transportation costs 
relative to the price of the product, national technical standards and national preferences. 
While these factors can be said to be of general application, others such as language and 
culture apply only to specific economic sectors such as the media sector, where markets 
tend to be national or regional. Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, p. 1030. See 
also Middleton, p. 313.   
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without incurring significant additional costs or risks in response to small 
and permanent changes in relative prices’. Where this is the case, the 
additional production that is put on the market will have a disciplinary effect 
on the behaviour of the companies involved, which in terms of effectiveness 
and immediacy will be equivalent to that of demand substitution.128  
However, since the conditions under which potential competition will 
actually represent an effective competitive constraint depend on the analysis 
of specific factors such as circumstances related to the conditions of entry, 
potential competition is generally not taken into account when defining 
markets. If required, this analysis is rather carried out at a subsequent stage, 
in general once the position of the companies involved in the relevant 
market has already been ascertained, and when such position gives rise to 
concerns from a competition point of view.129
 
The Concept of Dominance – The leading definition of dominance was 
formulated by the ECJ in United Brands, where it stated that a ‘dominant 
position […] relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an 
undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being 
maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and 
ultimately of its consumers’. Moreover, the Court added that ‘[i]n general a 
dominant position derives from a combination of several factors which, 
taken separately, are not necessarily determinative’.130  
In line with the settled case law, the Discussion Paper also states that the 
definition of dominance consists of three components;131
(i) There must be a position of economic strength on a market 
(ii) which enables the undertaking(s) in question to prevent effective 
competition being maintained on that market  
(iii) by affording it the power to behave independently to an 
appreciable extent. 
The first component implies and confirms that dominance exists in relation 
to a market. Naturally, it cannot exist in the abstract. It also implies that an 
undertaking either on its own or together with other undertakings must hold 
a leading position on that market compared to its rivals.132
The second and third components concern the link between the position of 
economic strength held by the undertaking concerned and the competitive 
process, in other words the way in which the undertaking and other players 
act and interact on the market. According to settled case law dominance is 
the ability to prevent effective competition being maintained on the market 
and to act to an appreciable extent independently of other players.133  
The special feature of dominance – the notion of independence – is related 
to the level of competitive constraint facing the undertaking(s) in question. 
                                                 
128 Notice, para. 20. 
129 Id. para. 24. 
130 United Brands, paras. 65-66. The definition was confirmed in Case 322/81 NV 
Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission of the European Communities, 
[1983] ECR 3461 para. 38. 
131 See the Discussion Paper, para. 21 (emphasis added).  
132 Id. para. 22. 
133 Id. para. 23. 
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Dominance can only exist where the undertaking concerned is not subject to 
effective competitive constraints, i.e., where it has substantial market 
power.134 Market power is the power to influence market prices, output, 
innovation, the variety or quality of goods and services, or other parameters 
of competition on the market for a significant period of time.135 The 
decisive factor is thus that the undertaking has the power to harm the 
competitive process, either by harming consumers or by harming 
competitors. Clearly, different degrees of such dominance may exist. While 
some undertakings are so powerful that they face no competitive constraint 
whatsoever, other dominant undertakings may face some competition, but 
are strong enough to hold smaller competitors back. Regardless of the 
degree however, the ECJ measures dominance by first considering the 
undertaking’s market share and secondly, by other factors used to 
determine the undertakings position vis-à-vis its competitors, customers and 
consumers.136
 
(i) Market Shares – Market shares, established by calculating the respective 
undertakings’ shares of total sales in the relevant market, are used as a 
starting point and a preliminary filter to determine whether there is 
dominance.137  
As evidenced by Hoffmann-La Roche,138 the ECJ puts great store in market 
shares as an indication of market strength. The larger the market share, the 
stronger an undertaking generally is in comparison to its competitors.139 
However, the ECJ has also recognized that their value in determining 
dominance varies depending on the market structure. Hence, the Court asks 
for more than a mere calculation of market shares. Not only should the 
undertaking hold the high market shares for some time, but its rivals’ market 
shares should also be considerably smaller. Only in such a situation can the 
dominant firm be convinced that it has enough power to resist threats from 
competitors. In line with this reasoning, the Commission stated in AKZO 
that ‘market share, while important, is only one of the indicators from which 
the existence of a dominant position may be inferred. Its significance in a 
particular case may vary from market to market according to the structure 
and characteristics of the market in question. To assess market power for the 
purposes of the case at hand, the Commission must consider also all the 
relevant economic evidence.’140 The Discussion Paper confirms this 
approach by stressing that the strength of any indication based on market 
                                                 
134 Id. 
135 Id. para. 24. 
136 Michelin, para. 31. See also Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, p. 1041. 
137 Michelin para. 29. 
138 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461. 
139 The ECJ has suggested that undertakings with very high market shares (around 80 per 
cent) may be treated differently from those who are in a less strong position. Following 
Irish Sugar plc v Commission, [1999] ECR II-2969, it appears clear that the stronger the 
market position of an undertaking, the more strictly they will be controlled by Community 
competition law. See Middleton, pp. 317-20. 
140 85/609/EEC: Commission Decision of 14 December 1985 relating to a proceeding under 
Article [82] of the EEC Treaty (IV/30.698 - ECS/AKZO), ([1985] OJ L 374/1, paras 68-69). 
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share depends on the facts of each individual case and that market share is 
only a proxy for market power, which is the decisive factor.141
Nevertheless, ‘rules of thumb’ have been formulated in the case law 
suggesting, amongst other things, that a market share of 50 per cent can give 
rise to a presumption of dominance.142 Such a presumption could, of course, 
be rebutted if the undertaking could adduce evidence to indicate that its 
apparent strength shown by its market share does not in reality give rise to 
dominance and true independence.143 In many cases, however, dominant 
firms that have held market shares of over 50 per cent while their 
competitors have had considerably smaller market shares, have been unable 
to do so.144 Even a market share between 40 and 50 per cent has been 
sufficient to identify a dominant position once other factors were taken into 
consideration, for instance where there were significant barriers to entry.145
 
(ii) Other Factors: Barriers to/Ease of Entry – The most obvious objection 
to a monopolist is that he is in a position to reduce output and thereby 
increase the price of his products above the competitive level. However, if 
barriers to entry are absent or low, a monopolist earning monopoly profits 
would be expected to attract new entrants to the market – exploitation of a 
monopoly position may thus actually increase competition.146  
In the Discussion Paper, barriers to entry are defined as ‘factors that make 
entry impossible or unprofitable while permitting established undertakings 
to charge prices above competitive level.’147 When identifying possible 
barriers to expansion and entry it is therefore important to focus on whether 
rivals can reasonably replicate circumstances that give advantages to the 
allegedly dominant undertaking. According to the Commission, barriers to 
expansion and entry can have a number of origins relating to the legal or 
economic environment on the relevant market, so that absolute cost-
advantages, including access to innovation, R&D and IP also may be 
considered as barriers.148 This follows the reasoning of the ECJ in cases 
where a dominant position has been held to be protected by ownership of 
IPRs which prevent others from duplicating the dominant undertaking’s 
                                                 
141 See the Discussion Paper, para. 32. 
142 Case 62/86 AKZO v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359, para. 60.  
143 A number of reasons why apparent market strength may not lead to dominance may 
exist, one of which is the absence of barriers to entry. See Middleton, p. 317. 
144 E.g. Case 322/81 Nederlansche Banden-Industrie Michelin NV v Commission [1983] 
ECR 3461 (dominant firm with a market share of approximately 57-60 per cent and the 
others with market shares between 4 and 8 per cent).  
145 United Brands, paras. 109-10; Case T-219/99 British Airways v Commission [2003] 
ECR II-5917, paras. 211-24. See Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, pp. 1042-3.  
146 Whish, p. 194. See also the Discussion Paper, para. 34, stating that where barriers to 
expansion and entry are low, the fact that one undertaking has a high market share may not 
necessarily point to dominance, since any attempt by an undertaking to increase prices 
above the competitive level would attract expansion or new entry by rivals with the effect 
that the price increase would be undermined. 
147 See the Discussion Paper para. 38.  
148 Id. para. 40. 
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products.149 Patents and the protection they afford may thus be seen to 
represent effective legal barriers to entry.  
One criticism that has been raised in this context is that by considering these 
factors one is merely using the efficiencies of the dominant firm as a means 
to determine dominance. That criticism was rejected by the ECJ in Michelin 
where the Court took the opportunity to point out that ‘a finding that an 
undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a recrimination but 
simply means that, irrespective of the reasons for which it has such a 
dominant position, the undertaking concerned has a special responsibility 
not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the 
common market.’150 However, that reasoning does not seem to have 
convinced those who think that a too wide definition of dominance, 
combined with the ‘special responsibility’, places a too heavy burden on 
dominant undertakings, whose commercial freedom is adversely affected, 
paradoxically restricting the very kind of competition they are said to 
endanger.151
 
(iii) Other Factors: Buyer power – Buyer power is another factor that can 
serve to counter a finding of dominance. According to the Discussion 
Paper, the market position of buyers provides an indication of the extent to 
which they are likely to constrain the allegedly dominant undertaking. 
However, the presence of strong buyers can only serve to counter a finding 
of dominance if it is likely that in response to prices being increased above 
the competitive level, the buyers in question will pave the way for effective 
new entry or lead existing suppliers in the market to significantly expand 
their output so as to defeat the price increase. In other words, the strong 
buyers should not only protect themselves, but effectively protect the 
market.152  
To be able to do this, the demand side will generally have to be highly 
concentrated, which is more of an exception than a norm in most industries.  
One such exception however, is represented by the pharmaceutical sector, 
where single buyers such as national health authorities, or a few powerful 
purchasers such as clinics or hospitals, frequently constitute a highly 
concentrated demand side which has sufficient leverage against the 
suppliers to affect price.153
 
(iv) Other Factors: Conduct – Though not mentioned in the Discussion 
Paper, and though it may seem methodologically problematic, the case law 
of the ECJ can be seen to contain yet another category. Since a dominant 
position requires that the undertaking is able to act in a certain way, the 
conduct of the undertaking on the relevant market has also occasionally 
                                                 
149 E.g. Case 22/78 Hugin Kassaregister AB v Commission [1979] ECR 1869; Case T-30/89 
Hilti v Commission [1991] ECR II-1439 (affirmed in Case C-53/92 P Hilti v Commission 
[1994] ECR I-667).  
150 Michelin, para. 57 (emphasis added).  
151 See Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, pp. 1045-46.  
152 See the Discussion Paper, para. 41. 
153 EFPIA paper ‘Article 82 EC: Can It Be Applied to Control Sales by Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers to Wholesalers?’ page 41. Available at 
http://www.efpia.org/6_publ/Article82ECNov04.pdf. Visited on the April 23 2007. 
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been considered when examining whether it is dominant. In other words, the 
fact that the undertaking has acted in an abusive way may be viewed as a 
factor indicating dominance.154
 
To summarize the preceding section, any finding of a dominant position or 
market power must consider the actual circumstances of each particular 
case. First, defining the relevant product and geographic markets must take 
into account possible substitutes on the demand side, supply side and 
potential competition. Only where the relevant market has been correctly 
defined can a high market share be said to be truly indicative of dominance. 
Second, despite the fact that high market shares could constitute an 
indicator of market power, other factors such as low barriers of entry or 
buyer power could counter a finding of dominance and must always be 
made subject of a thorough analysis.  
 
4.1.1.2 Abuse 
Once it has been decided that a firm has a dominant position in a substantial 
part of the common market, it is necessary to consider what constitutes an 
abuse of that position. As Article 82 of the EC Treaty does not forbid the 
holding of a dominant position per se but only the abuse of it, the meaning 
of abuse is of vital importance. Although the term is not defined, Article 82 
sets out an illustrative list of abusive practices. The list however, ‘merely 
gives examples, i.e., is not an exhaustive list of the kinds of abusive 
exploitation of a dominant position prohibited by the Treaty’,155 and the 
Commission decisions and the case law of the Community Courts have 
revealed Article 82 to be a formidable weapon.156
In Hoffman-La Roche, the ECJ held that: ‘the concept of abuse is an 
objective concept relating to the behavior of an undertaking in a dominant 
position which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a 
result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of 
competition is weakened and which, through recourse to methods different 
from those which condition normal competition in products or services on 
the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of 
hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the 
market or the growth of that competition.’157  
The often cited reference to the concept of abuse as an ‘objective’ one, 
means that behaviour can be abusive even where the dominant firm had no 
intention of infringing Article 82 EC. The fact that there are certain abuses 
where evidence of intention is an integral part of establishing an 
infringement does not contradict this idea. As conduct may be harmful to 
                                                 
154 See Eilmansberger in Streinz, ’EUV/EGV-Kommentar’, C.H. Beck 2003, p. 1017. 
Compare the AstraZeneca decision. 
155 Case 6/72 Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215, Cases C-395/96 P etc 
Compagnie Maritime Belge Transport SA v Commission [2000] ECR I-1365.  
156 See Jones & Sufrin, p. 239; Whish, p. 194; Middleton, p. 297; See also Chalmers, 
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the market whether it was intended to be harmful or not, intention is not a 
key component of the concept of abuse.158
The reference to ‘normal’ competition in this context may seem 
questionable. In fact, many of the practices that have been condemned under 
Article 82 cannot be said to be abnormal. Rather, their use by undertakings 
which were already in a position of some strength has had an impact that 
has drawn the attention of the Commission.159
As was touched on above, whilst it is not an offence for a firm to have a 
dominant position, a firm in a dominant position has a ‘special 
responsibility’ not to allow its conduct to impair undistorted competition on 
the common market,160 and it appears that this responsibility becomes 
greater (so that a finding of abuse becomes more likely) where the firm 
under investigation is not merely dominant, but ‘super-dominant’.161  
Regarding the kind of behaviour that falls within the mischief of Article 82, 
exploitative and exclusionary (anti-competitive) abuses have generally been 
considered separately.162 This was also the approach taken by the 
Commission in the recent Discussion Paper, which only comments on 
exclusionary abuses.  
According to the Discussion Paper, the essential objective of Article 82 EC 
when analyzing exclusionary conduct is the protection of competition on the 
market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an 
efficient allocation of resources. The concern is to prevent exclusionary 
conduct of the dominant firm which is likely to limit the remaining 
competitive constraints on the dominant company, including entry of 
newcomers, so as to avoid that consumers are harmed. Consequently, it is 
competition, and not competitors as such, that is to be protected. 
Furthermore, the purpose of Article 82 EC is not to protect competitors from 
dominant firms’ genuine competition based on factors such as higher 
quality, novel products, opportune innovation or otherwise better 
performance, but to ensure that these competitors are also able to expand in 
or enter the market and compete therein on the merits, without facing 
competition conditions which are distorted or impaired by the dominant 
firm.163 Certain exclusionary conduct which is clearly not competition on 
the merits – in particular conduct which clearly creates no efficiencies and 
which only raises obstacles to residual competition – will be presumed to be 
an abuse.164 Such a presumption will be rebuttable by a dominant company 
which is able to provide convincing evidence that the conduct does not and 
will not have the alleged likely exclusionary effect, or that the conduct is 
objectively justified.165
                                                 
158 Jones & Sufrin, p. 250.  
159 Mark Furse, ‘Competition Law of the UK and EC’, Blackstone Press 1999, p. 202.  
160 See Michelin, para. 57.  
161 See Whish, p. 194 and Middleton, pp. 319-20.  
162 Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti, Tomkins, p. 1048.  
163 See the Discussion Paper, para. 54.  
164 When defining the presumption of abuse as ‘conduct clearly not competition on the 
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165 Id. para. 60. Compare Whish, pp. 194-95. 
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4.1.1.3 Effect on Trade 
Due to the particular features of Article 82 EC and its focus on the  
protection of the development of the Single Market, there is great focus on 
the structure of markets. Article 82 only applies to conduct that affects trade 
between Member States. However, Article 82 may apply to conduct that 
only occurs within one Member State, if that conduct has the potential effect 
of retarding the development of intra-Community trade.166
 
4.1.1.4 Absence of Defence 
In view of the aim to adopt a more economic approach to antitrust 
enforcement, the Discussion Paper comments on both objective 
justifications and efficiencies as possible defences to abuse.167 According to 
the Commission, exclusionary conduct may escape the prohibition of 
Article 82 in case the dominant undertaking can provide an objective 
justification for its behaviour or it can demonstrate that its conduct produces 
efficiencies, which outweigh the negative effect on competition.168
Two types of possible objective justifications are mentioned: (i) The first 
type – the ‘objective necessity defence’ – is where the dominant company is 
able to show that the otherwise abusive conduct is actually necessary 
conduct on the basis of objective factors external to the parties involved and 
in particular external to the dominant company. (ii) The second type – 
‘meeting competition defence’ – is where the dominant company is able to 
show that the otherwise abusive conduct is actually a loss minimising 
reaction to competition from others.169
In relation to the efficiency defence the Discussion Paper states that ‘the 
dominant company must be able to show that the efficiencies brought about 
by the conduct concerned outweigh the likely negative effects on 
competition resulting from the conduct and therewith the likely harm to 
consumers that the conduct might otherwise have’.170
4.1.2 National IPRs, the EC Treaty & Article 82  
As noted above, IPRs in the EC constitute legal rights granted by national 
law, which give the holder an exclusionary (sometimes exclusive) right to 
the exploitation of an emanation of the intellect. As such, they are of vital 
importance to the economic wellbeing of the Community. Surprising as it 
may seem for a document claiming to lay down the foundations for the 
single market, the EC Treaty itself only touches on IP. The general rule 
about IPRs is contained in Article 295, which stipulates: ‘This treaty shall in 
no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of 
property ownership.’ By recognising the existence and ownership of rights 
given by national law, the provision also excludes Community legislative 
                                                 
166 See Middleton, pp. 298-99.  
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competence in the IP area. As a general rule, the regulation of the 
exploitation and acquisition of IPRs thus takes place on a national level. 
However, to a certain extent, this is modified by the EC rules on free 
movement of goods and competition (i.e. Articles 28-30 and 81-82 
respectively).171  
 
As regards the IP–free movement relationship, there is a fundamental 
conflict between the recognition of national IPRs and the basic principle of 
the free movement of goods, contained in Article 28 EC.172 For if goods 
cannot be imported freely because it would infringe a national patent, or if 
such a patent is used to prevent parallel import, the market is clearly divided 
along national lines. In other words, the free circulation of goods may be 
seriously impeded by national IPRs. A derogation from the free movement 
provision in Article 28 is provided in Article 30, which also is the only part 
of the Treaty that specifically deals with IPRs. Under this article, ‘Article 28 
[…] shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports […] justified 
on grounds of […] the protection of industrial and commercial property.’173 
This implies that Community law accepts that restrictions on free movement 
may be justified to protect national IPRs. However, Article 30 contains a 
final condition in the last sentence. The restrictions must not constitute ‘a 
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction’ on inter-
Member State trade. Arguably, this can be described as the ‘sting in the 
tail’,174 which has been used to justify many of the limitations which the 
ECJ has placed on the exercise of national IPRs.175
 
Furthermore, that the regulation of IPRs is a matter of national concern and 
that national IP rules are accepted and protected by the Treaty has not 
prevented Community interference where national IPRs hinder competition 
on the internal market.176 Put differently, the national IP rights and rules 
must be exploited and applied in accordance with the Treaty rules on 
competition contained in Articles 81 and 82 EC. As far as the latter 
provision is concerned, there are two facets to the relationship between 
Article 82 and IPRs: (i) First, there is the extent to which the ownership of 
IPRs  puts the holder in a dominant position. (ii) Secondly, there is the 
question whether the holding, acquisition, or exploitation of IPRs can 
constitute an abuse of a dominant position, and if so in what circumstances. 
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In relation to the first facet, the ECJ has consistently held that the ownership 
of IPRs does not necessarily mean that the owner has a dominant 
position.177 The legal monopoly may not necessarily amount to an economic 
monopoly if the relevant market is wider than the protected product. 
However, the fact that access to a market is protected by IPRs will serve as a 
barrier to entry and may thus be relevant as a factor indicating dominance. 
This was the case in Hugin, Hilti and Tetra Pak II.178  
In relation to the second facet, although Community law (as will be seen 
below) in the absence of harmonisation measures does not regulate the 
conditions upon which national law grants IPRs (i.e. their existence),179 it 
may curtail the exercise of them where this can be characterised as 
abusive.180 Moreover, under ‘exceptional circumstances’ and where a 
particular exercise of IPRs conflicts with Article 82 EC, a compulsory 
licence may be ordered.181 However, reconciling the exploitation of IPRs 
with the concept of abuse is bound to always be problematic and 
controversial. For even where abuse is defined as conduct, which goes 
beyond normal competition and affects the structure of competition on 
already dominated markets, there is the difficulty, if not impossibility, of 
distinguishing such conduct from the normal exploitation of IPRs.182
4.2 Antitrust Law in the US 
The starting point for all competition laws may be traced to US antitrust. 
The Sherman Act 1890 is the earliest example of a ‘modern’ competition 
law system and remains in force today.183 Although the Sherman Act has 
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179 See e.g. Case 144/81, Keurkoop v. Nancy Kean Gifts [1982] ECR 2653; Cases C241-
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182 See Jones & Sufrin pp. 622-628.  
183 ‘An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies’, 15 
USC, 2 July 1890. It was supplemented by later statutes, the Clayton Act (1914), the 
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been supplemented by other legislation over the last century, the Act 
remains central to antirust policy in the United States. The Supreme Court 
has even described the antitrust laws as the ‘Magna Carta of the free 
enterprise’ and compared them to the Bill of Rights.184 Moreover, the 
influence of US antitrust scholars on the development of competition laws 
throughout the world has been profound.185
The three main statutory provisions defining conduct that is unlawful under 
the US antitrust laws are Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act186 
and Section 7 of the Clayton Act.187 In addition, there are other statutory 
antitrust provisions that occasionally come into play in the IP context, such 
as Section 5 of the FTC Act188 and Section 3 of the Clayton Act.189
Whereas Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits ‘every contract, 
combination […] or conspiracy’ at federal level that constitutes an 
‘unreasonable’ restraint of trade,190 Section 2 – the American equivalent to 
Article 82 EC – targets unilateral conduct and condemns ‘monopolization’. 
4.2.1 S. 2 of the Sherman Act – Monopolization 
Section 2, forbidding the use of monopoly power ‘to foreclose competition, 
to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor’,191 states:  
 
‘Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire 
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among 
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.’ 
 
Section 2, which reaches both collective conduct (combination or 
conspiracy) and unilateral conduct (monopolization and attempts to 
monopolize), thus has two elements: 
 
(i) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, and  
(ii) the wilful acquisition or maintenance of that power.192 
 
Due to the fact that the terms used are not capable of narrow definition and 
application, the courts have been given a relatively wide margin of 
appreciation in defining and applying them to the facts of each particular 
case. For many years, the uncertain scope of the laws was somewhat 
                                                                                                                            
Federal Trade Commission Act (1914), and the Robinson-Patman Act (1936).  See Jones & 
Sufrin, p. 18.  
184 US v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
185 See Middleton, pp. 13-14. 
186 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.  
187 Id. § 18. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits certain stock and asset acquisitions where 
‘the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to 
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188 Id. § 45. Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits unfair methods of competition.  
189 Id. § 14. Section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits certain forms of tying and exclusive 
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190 Standard Oil Co. of new Jersey v United States (1911) 221 US 1.  
191 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482-83 (1992) 
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curtailed by the use by the courts of per se prohibitions for various types of 
conduct considered presumptively anticompetitive. However, over the past 
twenty-five years per se prohibitions have in many areas given way to a 
more nuanced rule of reason analysis that takes the likely economic 
consequences of a particular course of conduct into account.193 The basic 
focus of the antitrust inquiry is therefore to determine whether the conduct 
under scrutiny is likely to harm consumers. This leads to the inquiry of 
whether the conduct will serve to create or maintain monopoly power, or 
facilitate cartel behaviour so that monopoly power can be exercised jointly. 
As a rule of thumb, highly competitive markets where firms have low 
market shares or where it would be easy for new entrants to compete do not 
attract much antitrust concern. Conversely, restrictive conduct in highly 
concentrated markets with few competitors and high barriers to new entry is 
more likely to threaten the operation of competitive markets and is, 
therefore, closely scrutinized by the courts and antitrust agencies.194
 
4.2.1.1 Monopoly Power in the Relevant Market 
Monopoly power is defined as ‘the power to control prices or exclude 
competition.’195 It may be ‘inferred from a firm's possession of a dominant 
share of a relevant market that is protected by entry barriers.’196  
To determine whether monopoly power exists in a relevant market, it is 
necessary to define the relevant product and geographic market. ‘Defining 
the relevant market is an indispensable element of any monopolization or 
attempt case.’197 Whereas the geographic market is the geographic area to 
which customers may look for such competing products, the product market 
includes substitute products to which a customer may turn in response to a 
rise in price of the main product.198 Thus, commodities that are ‘reasonably 
interchangeable’ make up part of the same relevant market.199  
 
As regards the product market definition in the pharmaceutical sector, the 
FTC's approach to market definition in this industry is arguably not as 
transparent as that of the European Commission.200 The overall impression 
is that the FTC's approach is one of considerable flexibility and pragmatism, 
based loosely on principles of substitutability and the SSNIP test 201. In non-
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195 U.S. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
196 U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
197 Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) For relevant 
market definitions, see generally US DoJ and FTC ‘Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ (April 
2, 1992), § 1. Available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/toc.html. 
Visited on June 20, 2007. 
198 Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 571. 
199 E.I. Du Pont, 351 U.S. at 395. See Balto & Wolman, p. 18. 
200 See M. Howard Morse, ‘Product market definition in the pharmaceutical industry’ 
(2003) 71 Antitrust Law Journal 633. 
201 As defined by the Merger Guidelines, § 1.11, the SSNIP test consists in examining 
whether a ‘small but significant and nontransitory’ price increase would cause enough 
 40
merger cases, the FTC generally alleges narrow markets, limited to a single 
drug and its generic equivalent,202 or, in a very limited number of cases, to 
generic drugs excluding the bio-equivalent brand name drug.203  
Unfortunately, however, the FTC complaints are not particularly detailed 
and generally contain only market allegations without further discussion. 
The Biovail case is an illustrating example of this. Here, the FTC alleged a 
market for ‘Tiazac and generic bio-equivalent versions of Tiazac’ and 
asserted, without further evidence, (i) that even if other therapeutic agents 
could be used to treat hypertension and angina, including other branded and 
generic formulations of once-a-day diltiazem, those drugs ‘do not 
significantly constrain Tiazac's pricing’ and (ii) that entry of a generic 
version of Tiazac ‘likely would result in a significant, immediate decrease in 
the sales of branded Tiazac and lead to a significant reduction in the average 
market price paid for Tiazac and its generic bioequivalents’.204  
Furthermore, most of the antitrust cases involving pharmaceuticals end with 
settlement between the FTC and the undertakings concerned prior to judicial 
consideration. This leads to a scarcity of court decisions in these cases, with 
the consequence that it is not possible to know whether the market 
definitions made by the FTC would have been upheld. While the approach 
taken by the FTC may be justifiable on the basis of the SSNIP test, it seems 
that pragmatism is the driving force behind the FTC's market definition in 
this context, as opposed to the seemingly more rigid (but more certain) 
focus by the Commission on ATC 3 classes.205
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2000) (Complaint § § 10-12), available at www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/c3945complaint.htm; 
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. & Andrx Corp., FTC Docket No.9293 (March 16, 2000) 
(Complaint § 12), available at http://ftc.gov/os/2000/03/hoechstandrxycomplaint.htm.  
Visited on June 20, 2007. Compare the AstraZeneca decision. 
203 In recent merger enforcement actions, the FTC has alleged prescription drug markets 
ranging from those based upon a particular chemical compound, to broader markets based 
upon various drugs that have the same mechanism of action, to still broader markets of all 
drugs used to treat a particular disease or condition. It has also often included in the market 
not only marketed drugs, but other drugs under development, alleging ‘innovation markets’. 
See Gunther & Breuvart, pp. 680-81.  
204 In Biovail, the Commission charged Biovail Corporation with illegally acquiring an 
exclusive patent license for the pharmaceutical Tiazac. The complaint further alleged that 
Biovail, in an effort to maintain its monopoly, wrongfully listed the acquired license in the 
US Food and Drug Administration’s ’Orange Book’ for the purpose of blocking generic 
competition to its branded Tiazac. The consent order (Final Order October 2, 2002) 
required Biovail to divest part of its exclusive rights to DOV; prohibited the firm from 
taking any action that would trigger additional statutory stays on final FDA approval of a 
generic form of Tiazac; and also prohibited Biovail from wrongfully listing any patents in 
the Orange Book for a product for which the company already has an New Drug 
Application (NDA) from the FDA. See ‘ABA Antitrust Section Spring Meeting, Summary of 
Bureau of Competition Activity, Fiscal Year 2002 Trough March 15 2006’, p.25,  available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/aba/abaspring2006.pdf. Visited on June 20, 2007. 
205 Gunther & Breuvart, pp. 680-81.  
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4.2.1.2 Wilful Acquisition or Maintenance of that Power 
As it is possible to argue that it is the legitimate goal of any businessman to 
‘monopolise’ his industry, a distinction has been drawn between the ‘wilful’ 
acquisition or maintenance of that power, which is condemned, and 
monopoly arising from better commercial practices (i.e. from growth or 
development as a consequence of a  superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident), which escapes the Act’s application.206
 
4.2.1.3 Attempted Monopolization 
Attempted monopolization also infringes Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
This requires a showing of:207
(i) intent to monopolize a relevant market, 
(ii) predatory conduct in pursuit of that end,  
(iii) a dangerous probability of success, and  
(iv) causal antitrust injury. 
 
4.2.2 IPRs, the Constitution & Section 2  
Just as in the EC, there are two facets to the relationship between Section 2  
of the Sherman Act and IPRs:  
(i) First, there is the extent to which the ownership of IPRs means that the 
holder possesses monopoly power in the relevant market.  
(ii) Secondly, there is the question whether the holding, acquisition, or 
exploitation of IPRs can constitute wilful acquisition or maintenance of 
such power, and if so, in what circumstances.  
 
In relation to the first facet, US antitrust agencies concur with their EC 
counterparts that market power cannot be inferred from the ownership of 
IPRs alone.208 In particular, there is no economic basis for inferring market 
power from the mere fact that the defendant holds a patent.209 Yet, under 
                                                 
206 U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966). See Balto & Wolman, p. 18; Furse, 
pp. 5-6. 
207 Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1983). See 
Balto & Wolman, p. 18. 
208 See the DoJ and FTC ‘Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property’ 
(April 6, 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf., para. 2.2 
(visited on June 20, 2007). Compare the EC Guidelines on technology transfer agreements, 
paras. 16-17. See also the EC Discussion Paper, para. 40. See Czapracka, pp. 6-8. 
209 As stated above, this is because there is a difference between the exclusive rights granted 
by IPRs and the monopoly power that is the concern of antitrust law. Exclusive rights in the 
patent will give rise to market power only if there are no substitutes to the patented product 
and provided that there is sufficient consumer demand for the product in question. 
Similarly, the fact that the owner of an IPR may be able to charge a price higher than the 
marginal cost does not mean that she enjoys monopoly power, as there is usually a high 
sunk cost involved in the development of a new product. In Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. 
Independent Ink, Inc., 126 St. Ct. 1281 (U.S. 2006), the Supreme Court held that the fact 
that a tying product is patented does not support the presumption of market power in a 
patented product. See Czapracka, pp. 6-8; See also Eccles & Ferla, p. 5 and the IP 
Guidelines. 
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certain circumstances, IPRs may create barriers to entry and thus enhance 
market power.210 Whether or not monopoly power is inferred from IPRs, the 
key issue is the definition of a relevant market. If the relevant market is 
defined narrowly so that it includes solely the product covered by an IPR, 
the IP holder will always be dominant.211 This was the case for example in 
Eastman Kodak, where the Supreme Court found that a single brand of 
product or service can be relevant market under the Sherman Act 
prohibition against monopolization.212  
 
As to the second facet, the question whether the holding, acquisition, or 
exploitation of IPRs can constitute an antitrust offence raises just as much 
controversy as in the EC. Whereas, in the US, the exclusive rights deriving 
from patents find their anchor in the US Constitution, the main antitrust 
principles are laid down in the Sherman Act which, if not formally part of 
the US Constitution, is of  quasi-Constitutional force. Therefore, while it is 
beyond discussion that the US antitrust laws should be applied in such a 
way so as not to harm the IPRs duly recognized by the US Constitution, it is 
obvious as well that the acquisition and exploitation of patents are subject to 
the antitrust laws just like any other property.213 As a result of this 
compromise, the exercise of patent rights may be restricted by the so called 
‘patent misuse doctrine’.214 Moreover, despite the general rule that a US 
patent does not have to be licensed,215 Section 2 may prohibit a firm from 
unilaterally refusing to license their IPRs where such a refusal would allow 
the firm to obtain or maintain monopoly power by excluding competition in 
a way that does not benefit consumers.216 These issues will be returned to 
below.  
                                                 
210 In the US, barriers to entry are generally defined as factors that allow incumbent 
companies earn supra-competitive returns without attracting entry. A patent, for example, 
may be a barrier to entry if it controls the only available technology. Czapracka, pp. 6-8. 
211 Arguably, this may be justified e.g. in some cases concerning pharmaceuticals where 
there are no substitutes available to a patented medicine. See in general M. Howard Morse 
‘Product Market Definition in the Pharmaceutical Industry’ 71 Antitrust L.J. 633 (2003). 
212 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. 504 U.S. 451, 481-482 (U.S. 
1992). Compare Magill, (Case T-69/89, RTE v. Commission, 1991 ECR II-485, upheld on 
appeal by the ECJ in joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v. 
Commission, 1995 ECR I-743) where the ECJ rejected the possibility that dominance could 
be inferred from possession of copyright, but accepted a very narrow definition of the 
market, basically coinciding with the copyrighted subject matter. 
213 Jacques Werner, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: The Uneasy Relationship, The 
Journal of World Intellectual Property, 1999 2(3), 417-422, at 421. 
214 Czapracka, p. 23.  
215 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908); 35 U.S.C. § 
271(d)(4). This rule conforms to the fundamental principle of antitrust law that companies 
are allowed to unilaterally choose with whom they want to conduct business, see U.S. v. 
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). 
216 Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 480, n. 29 (1992). The court stated that a patent holder could refuse 
to license, but such refusal was subject to a rebuttable presumption that refusing to license 
was harmful to consumers. See also e.g. Image Technical Serv., v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 
F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kodak II). CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 
1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000). See Balto & Wolman, pp. 44-45. 
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5 Antitrust Intervention 
In the following, a closer look will be had at the main instances in which 
antitrust intervention in the IP context is thought to be justified in the EC 
and US systems. 
5.1 The EC Approach 
In its attempt to reconcile the conflicting demands of the economic 
integration of the single market with the protection of IPRs, three main 
interlinking concepts have been developed by the ECJ in its case law.217
(i) First, the Court has drawn a distinction between the existence of IPRs 
and their exercise – whereas the existence of rights is unaffected by the 
Treaty, their exercise may be. 
(ii) Second, the Court has developed the idea that there is a specific subject-
matter of each kind of right, the protection of which is justified even if it 
leads to restrictions on inter-Member State trade. In other words, the 
exercise of IPRs, which partitions the market, will be allowed in so far as it 
is necessary to protect the specific subject-matter. 
(iii) Lastly, it has built up a jurisprudence on the exhaustion of rights. Once 
a rights holder has consented to the marketing of the protected product 
within the Community, the rights encompassed in the specific subject-
matter are exhausted with the effect that the holder cannot rely on national 
rights to prevent the movement of the goods between Member States. 
5.1.1 The Existence v. Exercise Dichotomy 
The ECJ has in several cases made it clear that owners of IPRs do not enjoy 
a complete immunity in the exclusive exploitation of their rights under the 
EC Treaty.218 The distinction between existence and exercise was 
introduced already in 1966 in Consten & Grundig.219 The case concerned an 
exclusive distribution agreement, which appointed Consten to be Grundig’s 
exclusive distributor in France and allowed Consten to register its trademark 
GINT there. The provisions of the agreement and the registration of the 
trademark had the effect of conferring absolute territorial protection on 
Consten by enabling it to prevent parallel imports of Grundig’s products 
into France through proceedings for trademark infringement. The Court held 
                                                 
217 See Jones & Sufrin, pp. 561-67. 
218 The main area of tension between IPRs and Article 82 has been the question whether it 
is an abuse for a dominant undertaking to refuse to allow others to use its rights. See in 
particular Case 238/87, Volvo AB v. Erik Veng [1988] ECR 6211, Case 53/87, CICRA v. 
Renault [1988] ECR 6039, Cases C-241-241/91 P RTE & ITP v. Commission [1995] ECR 
I-743 (Magill), Case Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbrooke SA v. Commission [1997] ECR II-
293, Case Case-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-7791. 
See Jones & Sufrin pp. 622-628. See also the more recent Case COMP/C 3/37.792 
Microsoft-Antitrust [2004] EC Comm.1. 
219 Cases 56 & 58/64, Consten & Grundig v. Commission [1966] ECR 229.  
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that the Commission’s condemnation of the arrangements did not affect the 
grant of the trademark rights but ‘only limits their exercise’.220
Since then, the case law on the exercise of exclusive rights including IPRs 
by dominant undertakings has developed into one of the most controversial 
areas in EC competition law.221 Until recently, however, the precedents 
mainly focused on the question as to whether the grant of compulsory 
licences for IPRs could be imposed on dominant undertakings by 
competition authorities. In this respect, the ECJ ruled in various landmark 
cases, most notably Magill and Bronner, that the exercise of an exclusive 
right and, more specifically, that the refusal by a company holding a 
dominant position to grant a licence for an IPR may, in certain exceptional 
circumstances, constitute an abuse of a dominant position.222 Hence, under 
‘exceptional circumstances’ and where a particular exercise of IPRs by their 
owners conflicts with Article 82 of the Treaty, EC competition authorities 
reserve the right to order a compulsory licence.223  
In 2004, the ECJ delivered its judgment in IMS.224 This case is of central 
importance as it illustrates the ECJ's current approach in relation to the 
‘essential facilities doctrine’ in a context where the facility in question is 
protected by IPRs. In its judgment, the ECJ repeated the assessment 
contained in Bronner,225 according to which the application of the doctrine 
requires a demonstration that the replication of a similar facility by a 
company of comparable size would not be economically viable. The ECJ 
added that a factor that should be taken into account by the national court 
when assessing whether the copyright was essential was whether the 
participation by customers in the development of the facility constituted an 
additional barrier to the creation of a competing facility. On the refusal to 
licence issue, the ECJ held that for a refusal to be regarded as abusive it 
must not only (i) prevent the emergence of a new product or service for 
which there is a potential demand and (ii) be without objective justification, 
but also (iii) be capable of eliminating all competition on the relevant 
market.226  
                                                 
220 This distinction drawn between the grant of rights and their exercise was elaborated 
further in Case 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft v. Metro-SB-Großmärkte GmbH 
[1971] ECR 487. 
221 It is often argued that the distinction between the existence and exercise of rights is not 
convincing. A property right which cannot be exercised has no value. IPRs are valuable 
because they enable the holder to exercise rights which prevent third parties from 
committing infringing acts. If Community law limits the holder’s ability to control third 
parties then the value of the right is diminished, and the fact that the ‘existence’ of the right 
is untouched is of little comfort. Arguably the existence/exercise dichotomy is simply a 
flexible tool developed by the ECJ which enables it to make policy decisions under the 
guise of principle. 
222 See Joined Cases C 241/91 P & 242/91 P, Magill [1995] E.C.R. I-743; Case C-7/97, 
Bronner [1998] E.C.R. I-7791. 
223 See Eccles & Ferla, p. 7. 
224 See Case C-418/01, IMS Health v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG, 29 April 2004. See 
also Eccles & Ferla, pp. 6-7. 
225 Case Case-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-7791. 
226 Unfortunately, the concept of a ‘new product’ was not elaborated on and remains for the 
national court to define. See Eccles & Ferla, p. 7. See also Henemann, ‘Compulsory 
Licences and Product Integration in European Competition Law - Assessment of the 
European Commission´s Microsoft Decision’, IIC 2005 Heft 1, 63 f., pp. 70-71.  
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As regards the Commission's current review of Article 82, as a result of 
which it is thought to adopt a more economics based approach to allegedly 
abusive practices, it is worth noting that the 2005 Report by the Economic 
Advisory Group for Competition Policy (EAGCP) in the context of refusal-
to-deal cases pointed out that ‘the competition authority should be 
particularly reluctant to interfere when the source of the bottleneck is an 
intellectual property right’ since such intervention may reduce ‘the 
incentives to innovate’. Indeed, the EAGCP indicated that ‘[IPRs] have 
been granted by the state in order to create market power and to give 
innovators a reward to their efforts’ and that ‘it is inconsistent if the state 
interferes with these rights ex post and takes market power away’.227
5.1.2 The Specific Subject-Matter 
In order to draw the appropriate line of demarcation between IP protection 
and the Community goal of free movement of goods, the ECJ has sought to 
identify the core value – or essential function – of the various IPRs. 
Arguably, this delineation is just as relevant in the context of IP protection 
and competition. 
In Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug228 the Court first defined the specific 
subject-matter of a patent as ‘the guarantee that the patentee, to reward the 
creative effort of the inventor, has the exclusive right to use an invention 
with a view to manufacturing industrial products and putting them into 
circulation for the first time, either directly or by the grant of licences to 
third parties, as well as the right to oppose infringements.’229
5.1.3 Exhaustion of Rights 
Apart from the exclusive right to use the invention and to defend the patent 
right against infringements, the specific subject-matter of a patent thus 
entails the right to put the patented product on the market for the first time. 
Despite its hindrance to inter-member state trade, the exclusive right to do 
this is seen as necessary to reward the inventor for its creative effort. 
However, under the so-called ‘exhaustion of rights doctrine’, once the 
patentee has consented to placing the product on the Community market,230 
s/he has exhausted the rights encompassed in the specific subject-matter and 
                                                                                                                            
Note in this context, the comment that a generic copy, by its very nature, duplicates an 
existing product (albeit that it may be available at a lower price) and thus cannot constitute 
a new product. See Sophie Lawrance and Pat Treacy, ‘The Commission’s AstraZeneca 
Decision: Delaying Generic Entry is an Abuse of A Dominant Position’, J.I.P.L.P., 2005, 
Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 7, at p. 9. Compare the AstraZeneca decision. 
227 The EAGCP report is available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/studies/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf.  
228 Case 15/74 Centrafarm v. Sterling Drugs [1974] ECR 1147.  
229 Id. para. 9 (emphasis added).  
230 The ‘Community’ should be interpreted in this context to mean the whole EEA. The 
EEA is the relevant area by virtue of Prot. 28 of the EEA Agreement, which provides for 
exhaustion throughout the EEA in accordance with the case law of the Court. 
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cannot prevent the product moving freely within the Community.231 
Obviously, the effect of the doctrine has been to severely limit the ways in 
which holders of parallel patents in different Member States may exploit 
their rights. In particular, it has had that effect on the trade in 
pharmaceuticals, where price differentials between Member States are 
common.232
 
Common for the three concepts developed above is that they all have had 
far-reaching implications on the IP-antitrust relationship in the Community. 
In particular, the scope within which a patentee may legitimately enjoy and 
defend his exclusive IPR has been significantly narrowed.  
In the AstraZeneca decision examined below, the Commission has arguably 
gone beyond these existing precedents by enlarging the range of abusive 
conduct in relation to exclusive rights. As will be seen, the Decision does 
not only concern the abusive exercise of IPRs, but also the abusive 
obtaining, extension and, above all, protection of the rights themselves.233
5.2 The US Approach 
The last three decades have seen great changes in the attitudes of the FTC 
and DoJ in relation to the role of IP in the competitive process. These have 
pended from systematic suspicion of IP licensing in the 1970s to a very 
lenient approach in the 1980s, to the more recent view that transactions 
involving IP will most often promote, rather than restrain, competition.234
An illustrative example of this more recent pro-IP view is the IP Guidelines 
issued in 1995,235 in which the agencies clarified their enforcement position 
in relation to restraints in IP licensing arrangements. These stipulate that, in 
most cases, licensing restrains are to be evaluated under the rule of reason 
i.e., by comparing a restraint's pro- and anti-competitive effects. However, 
certain categories of restraints are ‘so plainly anticompetitive that [they] 
should be treated as unlawful per se without an elaborate inquiry into [their] 
likely competitive effects’.236 The IP Guidelines also establish safe 
harbours in which conduct is considered lawful, in the absence of 
                                                 
231 That the exhaustion of rights doctrine is based on the idea of consent means that the 
patentee, if s/he has consented to the first marketing of the protected product in the 
Community, cannot prevent its circulation within the Community by relying on national 
IPRs. The patent holder is thought to have exhausted her/his rights as soon as s/he has had 
the opportunity to reap the rewards of the first marketing of the product. However, there is 
neither consent for the purposes of the exhaustion of rights doctrine where the patentee is 
legally bound to market the products in the exporting State (See cases C-267-268/95, Merck 
v. Primetown [1996] ECR I-6285, at paras. 49-50), nor where the patentee has been forced 
to give compulsory licence by national law (Case 19/84), Pharmon v. Hoechst [1985] ECR 
2281. See Jones & Sufrin, pp. 561-67. 
232 In Centrafarm, the Court expressly denied the right of the patentee to command higher 
prices in one Member State than in another. See, paras. 22-25. 
233 Compare Gunther & Breuvart, p. 679. 
234 See Eccles & Ferla, p. 1. 
235 See the US DoJ and FTC ‘Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of IP’ (1995), above. 
236 Section 3.4, IP Guidelines (emphasis added). 
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extraordinary circumstances.237 Moreover, they provide the agencies' 
general views on specific types of licensing arrangements.238
5.2.1 The Patent Right & Its Core 
In the US, the ‘core’ of the patent is thought to be the patentee’s right to 
exclude others from making, using, or selling a protected invention. As long 
as the patent holder remains within the legitimate confines of the patent, 
there is a shield that precludes liability under the US antitrust laws. To some 
extent, a patent can therefore be viewed as a statutorily authorised exception 
to the general rule prohibiting monopolization, conferring on its owner a 
form of immunity from antitrust liability.  
As far as refusals to license are concerned, the traditional US view that the 
unconditional and unilateral refusal by an IP owner to license its IPRs is 
justified, was reinforced by declarations made by representatives of the 
agencies in 2004. In a comment on the Supreme Court decision in Trinko,239 
it was stated that the case ‘clarified that there is no basis in US antitrust law 
for a stand-alone essential facilities doctrine’. Moreover, ‘profound 
scepticism [was expressed] that the antitrust laws were intended to create a 
duty by one competitor to assist its competitors by assuring them access to 
its tangible or intellectual property’.240 In another comment citing Trinko, it 
was stated that while ‘compulsory licensing as a merger remedy is a well-
established tool […] non-merger compulsory licensing imposed by an 
agency or the courts should be a rare beast’ due to the difficulty of 
administering the remedy and the possibility of reducing innovation 
incentives.241 Clearly, this reflects a US approach that is highly critical to 
compulsory licences of IPRs. Consequently, US competition agencies and 
courts (unlike the EC competition authorities who occasionally have 
analysed refusals to licence IPRs as abuse of dominance) practically never 
treat refusals to deal as antitrust violations.242
 
However, this does not mean that a US patentee’s immunity from antitrust 
liability is absolute. Where the patent holder goes ‘beyond the limited 
monopoly which is granted, the arrangements by which the patent is utilized 
are subject to general law […]. The possession of a valid patent or patents 
                                                 
237 The safe harbours differ according to whether the relevant market is a goods market, a 
technology market or an innovation market. As far as innovation markets are concerned, a 
proposed licensing arrangement falls within the safe harbour if it is not facially anti-
competitive and there are at least four independently controlled entities, in addition to the 
parties, that have the incentive, assets and characteristics necessary to engage in R&D that 
is a close substitute for the activities of licensee and licensor. 
238 See Section 5.2-6, 1995 IP Guidelines.  
239 Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis v Trinko LLP (2004 WL 51011 
(2004).  
240 See Assistant Attorney General R Hewitt Pate commenting on Trinko at 
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/205389.htm. Visited on June 20, 2007. 
241 See Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Policy Makan Delrahim at 
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/203627.htm. Visited on June 20, 2007. 
242 Eccles & Ferla, p. 4.  
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does not give the patentee any exemption from the provisions of the 
Sherman Act beyond the limits of the patent monopoly.’243  
As will be seen below, if a patentee e.g. initiates litigation seeking to 
enforce a patent that is known by her/him to be invalid, such action can be 
an unlawful attempt to monopolize under section 2 of the Sherman Act.244 
Since there would be no valid patent to serve as a shield against the antitrust 
laws, there would be nothing preventing the conduct from being measured 
under basic antitrust principles. As a result, the defendant could not only 
enter a counterclaim seeking relief under the antitrust laws, but could also 
assert the defence of ‘patent misuse’.245
5.2.2 The Patent Misuse Doctrine 
In the US, the courts have found certain actions by patentees that do not 
necessarily violate the antitrust laws to be improper and constitute IP 
misuse.246 The misuse concept originated in the patent area as a defence to 
patent infringement,247 and was intended to prevent the patentee from 
extending the power of the patent beyond the grant defined in the patent 
claims.248 The doctrine is equitable in nature and arises out of the defence of 
‘unclean hands’. Rather than rendering a patent invalid, the misuse defence 
renders the patent unenforceable until the abusive practice has been 
abandoned and the effects of the practice have dissipated.249  
The first application of the principle of patent misuse was in the case of 
Motion Picture Patents.250 The Court further developed the doctrine in a 
series of cases, Carbice, Leitch, Morton Salt and Mercoid against a 
backdrop of continued national concern about the use of patents.251  
                                                 
243 Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v Swift-Eckrich, Inc. 375 F.3d 1357 (quoting United States v 
Springer Mfg Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196-97 (1963)). 
244 NB: If the action is brought by the FTC the anticompetitive behaviour may be contrary 
to Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See Gunther & Breuvart, p. 672.  
245 Arnold B. Silverman, ‘Patent Misuse: Limitations on a Patentee’s Rights’, JOM, 44 (8) 
(1992), pp. 54-55. Available at http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/matters/mattters-
9208.html, visited on April 26 2007. 
246 Balto & Wolman, p. 79. 
247 That is, rather than being a basis for an affirmative damages suit, misuse constitutes a 
defence in a suit for infringement. See Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 
1001 (Fed.Cir.1986)); Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868- 69 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997) in Balto & Wolman, p. 80.  
248 See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998):‘The key 
inquiry is whether, by imposing conditions that derive their force from the patent, the 
patentee has impermissibly broadened the scope of the patent grant with anticompetitive 
effect.’ See Balto & Wolman, p. 79.  
249 See Balto & Wolman, p. 80. See also Robin Feldman, ‘Should We Breathe Life into 
Patent Misuse?’, Hastings College of Law, pp. 4-5. 
250 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 235 F. 398 (2d. Cir. 1916). See 
‘Contributory Infringement and Misuse – The Effect of Section 271 of the Patent Act of 
1952’, 66 Harv. L Rev. 909, 911 (1953).   
251 See Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Leitch Mfg. v. 
Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 
(1942); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 668 n. 1 (1944). 
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By the mid-1940s, the Supreme Court had delineated the basic outline of 
patent misuse – a patent holder commits patent misuse by trying to 
improperly extend the time or scope of the patent grant.252  
Although it was not originally a prerequisite to prove misuse, Federal 
Circuit case law and legislation now require a showing of injury for most 
types of misuse.253  
Generally, misuse is held to exist where the patentee has either engaged in 
conduct involving the patent that amounts to a violation of the antitrust laws 
or has improperly sought to expand the scope of the patent (either in a 
physical or temporal sense).254  
Since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morton Salt, it has been clear that  
patent misuse does not require a violation of the antitrust laws. Thus, while 
violations of the antitrust laws involving patents also involve patent misuse, 
there can be misuse without violating antitrust laws.255 This notion is 
consistent with the view that patent misuse is tested under patent policy, not 
antitrust policy.256  
Some commentators believe that the misuse doctrine is unnecessary. 
Because the antitrust laws are intended to separate procompetitive from 
anticompetitive conduct, it is not clear what rational economic policy is 
furthered by using the misuse doctrine to punish conduct when there is no 
violation of the antitrust laws.257
 
                                                 
252 See ‘Patents – Extent of Use of Patent Use of Tying Agreement Bars Patentee in 
Infringement Suit’, 9U. Chi. L. Rev. 518, 520 (1941-42). See Robin Feldman, pp. 13-15. 
253 Balto & Wolman, p. 80.  
254 Arnold B. Silverman, p. 54.  
255 See Morton Salt, 490, 492. 
256 See Robin Feldman, pp. 13-15; Arnold B. Silverman, p. 55. 
257 See Roger B. Andewelt, ‘Competition Policy and the Patent Misuse Doctrine’, 25 Pat. 
Trademark & Copy. J. 41, 42 (1982). See Balto & Wolman, p. 80.  
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6 Procedural Issues 
As was seen above, IP law stimulates the creation and distribution of 
information and products that are vital to economic growth and 
wellbeing.258 The negative side to it is that it also may promote harmful 
litigation by IP owners who seek to profit from opportunistic and anti-
competitive lawsuits.259 In fact, some seem to value their IPRs primarily as 
tickets into court, enabling them to sue IP users. This, taken together with 
the fact that the rights are relatively easy to acquire and have a potentially 
broad application, has made harmful IP litigation a common phenomenon. 
Moreover, the problem is intensifying due to the expansion of the scope and 
strength of IP law on both sides of the Atlantic.260
More specifically, harmful IP litigation may arise when a party (i) seeks to 
enforce an IPR that is probably invalid or (ii) seeks to stretch a valid right to 
cover activities outside the proper scope of the right. In other words, the 
activity it is based on making a ‘weak lawsuit’ look credible.261  
 
A weak lawsuit is generally viewed as one in which the objective 
probability of success (i.e. of proving infringement) is low at the time of 
filing. This is evaluated using the knowledge of a hypothetical plaintiff who 
files after conducting a reasonable investigation.262 Moreover, a weak 
lawsuit may be classified as anticompetitive if the defendant's alleged 
infringing behaviour occurs in a market the plaintiff participates in or 
intends to enter – otherwise, it may be classified as opportunistic.  
Whereas a plaintiff usually files an anticompetitive lawsuit seeking to 
impair the defendant's performance in their shared market, or even to 
exclude the defendant from the market completely, a plaintiff generally files 
an opportunistic lawsuit seeking a settlement payment.263  
Although it may seem hard to understand why rational defendants succumb 
to the threat of weak IP suits, three reasons may be presented to show why 
such lawsuits may seem credible:264
                                                 
258 See Robert E. Evenson & Sunil Kanwar, ‘Does Intellectual Property Protection Spur 
Technological Change?’ 3 Econ. Growth Ctr., Yale Univ., Center Discussion Paper No. 
831, June 2001, available at  
http:// papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=275322#Paper%20Download. 
259 See Meurer, p. 509. 
260 Robert P. Merges, ‘One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-
2000’, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 2187, 2239-40 (2000) (asserting that the belief that economic policy 
should be grounded in a competitive baseline is starting to give way to a notion that all sorts 
of intangibles deserve protection from some form of property law). 
261 See Meurer, p. 509. 
262 See Meurer, p. 512. Compare Robert G. Bone, ‘Modelling Frivolous Suits’, 145 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 519, 533 (1997) (stating that a lawsuit is frivolous ‘(1) when a plaintiff files 
knowing facts that establish complete (or virtually complete) absence of merit as an 
objective matter on the legal theories alleged, or (2) when a plaintiff files without 
conducting a reasonable investigation which, if conducted, would place the lawsuit in prong 
(1).’). 
263 See e.g. Chris Guthrie, ‘Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory’, 67 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 163 (2000). 
264 See Meurer, pp. 512-13. 
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(i) First, the scope of IPRs is far from fixed. Disagreement as to the proper 
interpretation of patent claims, vague standards of infringement, conflicting 
expert testimony and the complexity of the evidence are all factors that 
make trial errors in IP litigation not only possible, but also difficult to 
detect.265 Also, high variance in the scope of IPRs makes it lucrative for 
plaintiffs with narrow IPRs to take the chance that a court will grant them 
broad rights.266
(ii) Second, a weak lawsuit may present a credible threat to a defendant who 
has trouble distinguishing weak lawsuits from strong ones.267 Particularly in 
the early stages of IP litigation the plaintiff is likely to have better 
information about the scope and validity of the IPRs than the defendant and 
may thus ‘bluff’ the defendant into leaving the market. Walker Process268 
illustrates the role of asymmetric information in making weak lawsuits 
credible. In this case, Food Machinery was granted a process patent by 
fraudulently concealing information about prior use. When Walker entered 
the market, Food Machinery filed a patent infringement lawsuit. However, 
due to the fact that Walker uncovered evidence of the prior use and proved 
the patent was invalid, Food Machinery failed in its attempt to bluff its new 
rival out of the market.269 Although successful bluffs are bound to pass 
unnoticed, it seems very likely that many similar attempts succeed in 
deterring market entry or forcing a restrictive license onto an entrant.270
(iii) Finally, a weak lawsuit may be credible because of the costs it may 
impose on the defendant.271 Whereas a defendant may settle an 
opportunistic lawsuit to avoid the nuisance of mounting a defence, a 
defendant may settle an anticompetitive suit because the cost of a defence 
threatens the defendant's solvency.272 Particularly, if a plaintiff establishes a 
                                                 
265 A weak lawsuit is credible if the court is likely to err in favour of the plaintiff. Even 
though the defendant recognizes that she should win at trial, if the risk of error is high 
enough, then the plaintiff holds a credible threat. See Meurer p. 513. 
266 Robert C. Nissen, ‘The Art of the Counterclaim: Festo Won't End Frivolous 
Infringement Cases, But It Does Make It Easier to Fight Back’, Intell. Prop., May 7, 2001, 
at 64 (‘Defending against frivolous infringement allegations can be a nightmare. At best, 
after spending hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars, a defendant is restored to 
the position it held before the case was filed. At worst, a defendant is found liable because 
the jury was bewildered by the complex technologies at issue.’) 
267 For a model of patent litigation in which plaintiffs with weak claims can successfully 
bluff their way to a settlement payment, see generally Michael J. Meurer, ‘The Settlement of 
Patent Litigation’, 20 Rand J. Econ. 77 (1989). See Meurer, p. 514. 
268 See Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp. 382 U.S. 
172, 178 (1965). 
269 Id. at 174.  
270 See Robert H. Bork, ‘The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself’ 347 (1978) 
(expressing concern about the threat of predation through Walker Process-type fraud); Gary 
Myers, ‘Litigation as a Predatory Practice’, 80 KY. L.J. 565, 594 (1992) (noting that 
litigation can be used to prevent or delay a competitor's entry into a market).  
271 See Meurer, p. 515. 
272 Note that IP cases often do impose much higher litigation costs on defendants than 
plaintiffs. One source of asymmetry arises from disruption of the defendant's business 
caused by preliminary injunctions and other factors. Another asymmetry arises because 
some plaintiffs sue multiple defendants and spread the cost of litigation across those cases.  
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, ‘A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of 
Threats to Sue’, 25 J. Legal Stud. 371, 373 (1996).  
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predatory reputation for prosecuting weak suits through to the end, the 
threat of a weak lawsuit may effectively deter entry into the market.273  
Upon a comparison with other predatory behaviour, it seems that predatory 
litigation is more likely to succeed.274 Predatory litigation (although it has 
not been studied as closely as predatory pricing) has the advantage over 
predatory pricing that the cost to the predator declines after the first lawsuit 
– the plaintiff can use the work product from the first litigation in 
subsequent litigation.275
 
As far as opportunistic IP litigation is concerned, there are strong 
indications suggesting that the problem is serious and even getting worse:276
(i) First, as a consequence of IP becoming more valuable  and as the number 
of IPRs – especially patents – are increasing rapidly, the rate of IP litigation 
has grown proportionately.277 Under these conditions, opportunistic suits 
tend to increase simply because the large number of legitimate cases makes 
the opportunistic ones easier to conceal.  
(ii) Second, a growing market for the sale of IPRs promotes opportunistic IP 
litigation by making it easier for those who try to bluff their way to large 
settlement payments to enter the market.278
(iii) Finally, in recent years patent plaintiffs (particularly in the US) have 
been effectively organized and financed by specialists in patent litigation 
                                                 
273 Generally, a plaintiff is more likely to succeed by bringing a sequence of frivolous suits 
than by bringing an isolated suit. Partly, this is because the plaintiff then can develop a 
reputation for imposing costs on defendants (even if that also means costs to the plaintiff). 
The reputation for being ‘tough’ makes the frivolous claim more credible and more 
valuable. See Reinhard Selten, ‘The Chain Store Paradox’, 9 Theory & Decision 127 
(1978).  See also Patrick Bolton et al., ‘Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal 
Policy’, 88 Geo. L.J. 2239, 2300-01 (2000) (describing reputation effect predation).  
For a non-IP example of bad faith litigation deterring entry, see Otter Tail Power Co. v. 
United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368 (1973) (noting that power company maintained monopoly 
by using litigation to prevent rival's entry). See Meurer, pp. 515 and 518. 
274 Predatory litigation is more difficult to detect, especially when the lawsuit has some 
merit. See generally Michael W. Bien, ‘Litigation as an Antitrust Violation: Conflict 
Between the First Amendment and the Sherman Act’, 16 U.S.F. L. Rev. 41 (1981). 
275 Predatory pricing might place greater costs on the predator than the prey because the 
predator suffers a loss across a larger share of the market. By way of contrast, predatory 
litigation favours the plaintiff because the plaintiff gets to choose the forum and the initial 
direction of the discovery. See Gary Myers, at 597-99. 
276 See Meurer, pp. 513-16. 
277 Brenda Sandburg, ‘A New Industry Transforms the Patent System: Congress, 
Corporations Eye Reform as Power of Patent Enforcers Grows’, The Recorder, July 30, 
2001, at http://www.law.com (‘With the growth in patent licensing, the number of patent 
suits has doubled in the past decade, from 1,171 in 1991 to 2,484 in 2000, according to data 
compiled by Paul Janicke, a professor at the University of Houston Law Center.’). Visited 
on June 20, 2007. Del Jones, ‘Businesses Battle Over Intellectual Property: Courts Choked 
with Lawsuits to Protect Ideas and Profits’, USA Today, Aug. 2, 2000, at 1B, available at 
2000 WL 5785645 (describing the flood of patent litigation). 
Similar trends may be observed in parts of the EC, see ‘Patent Litigation Insurance – A 
Study for the European Commission on the Feasibility of Possible Insurance Schemes 
against Patent Litigation Risks’, Final Report June 2006, p. 13. 
278 Brenda Sandburg, ‘Patent Blockbuster Goes to High Court: IP attorneys looking to U.S. 
Supreme Court to clear up confusion over Festo’ The Recorder, June 18, 2001, at 
http://www.law.com (‘[T]here are companies that buy a patent for $50,000 at a bankruptcy 
auction and then decide to sue the world for it…'). Visited on June 20, 2007. 
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and licensing. Patent lawsuit investors buy interests in the patents, join as 
plaintiffs and receive compensation for whatever reward the lawsuit 
brings.279 Alternatively, patent litigation is done on a contingency basis with 
percentages as high as 45 per cent.280
There is no doubt that opportunistic IP suits impose direct and indirect costs 
on defendants and society.281 Apart from settlement payments, there are 
direct legal costs and indirect costs borne by potential defendants who work 
to minimize their exposure to opportunistic litigation.282 That way, 
opportunistic patent cases may deter firms from entering new markets or 
adopting new product features or designs.283
 
As regards anticompetitive IP litigation, this has long been a frequently used 
tool for strong firms to exclude their weaker rivals from the market. 
Although exclusionary litigation to a certain extent can be a socially 
desirable way to secure a reward to innovative firms, there is a fine line 
between this and socially undesirable exclusion.284 Anticompetitive suits 
will achieve harmful exclusionary outcomes where defendants settle 
because they fear the plaintiff's IPR will be construed too broadly, or 
because they lack information proving the plaintiff's right is invalid.  
Undesirable exclusionary outcomes will also be achieved where defendants 
may be confident that the plaintiff will lose the lawsuit, but still settle 
simply to avoid the costs of litigation.285 Apart from gaining a favourable 
settlement, the owner of a weak IPR may in such cases thus succeed in 
deterring competitors from using his IP because of the threat of suit.286 
While successful anti-competitive IP litigation does not leave any traces, 
                                                 
279 See Linda Himelstein, ‘Investors Wanted For Lawsuits’, Bus. WK., Nov. 15, 1993, at 
78; Susan Lorde Martin, ‘Financing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular (and 
Legal) Business’, 33 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 57, 58 (2000).  
280 Meurer, p. 520, fn. 69. 
281 Defendants who fear the high cost of IP litigation often settle opportunistic claims to 
avoid that cost. To the extent that settlement payment to end frivolous lawsuits distort the 
decision of a firm to enter a market protected by IPRs because of the fear of litigation they 
also cause a social loss. 
282 Amy Harmon, ‘Suddenly, ‘Idea Wars’ Take on a New Global Urgency’, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 11, 2001, at 4A 30, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/11/business/11PROP.html (reporting that patent 
litigation cost American companies $4 billion in the year 2000), visited on June 20, 2007; 
Large firms that fear frequent opportunistic suits may (thanks to financial resources etc.) be 
able to develop an effective reputation as ‘tough defendants’. Conversely, small firms 
might be much more vulnerable to opportunistic suits and most often represent week 
defendants. 
283 Meurer, p. 519. 
284 In Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., Judge Posner wrote that ‘litigation could 
be used for improper purposes even when there is probable cause for the litigation; and if 
the improper purpose is to use litigation as a tool for suppressing competition in its antitrust 
sense, it becomes a matter of antitrust concern.’ 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1982). 
285 Meurer, p. 521. 
286 See Grip-Pak: ‘[M]any claims not wholly groundless would never be sued on for their 
own sake; the stakes, discounted by the probability of winning, would be too low to repay 
the investment in litigation.’. 
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there are many cases where exclusion failed.287 One example is Handgards, 
Inc. v. Ethicon.288 In this US case, the patent plaintiff Ethicon controlled 90 
per cent of the market for plastic gloves. Ethicon knew the patent was 
invalid because of an earlier inventor and prior use, but tried to preserve its 
dominant position by suing an entrant, Handgards, for patent 
infringement.289 However, to Ethicon’s dismay, Handgards discovered 
evidence of the inequitable behaviour and thus invalidated the patent. 
Even where not entirely successful, predatory litigation has a negative 
impact on a company’s cash flow because of the high cost of IP litigation 
and a variety of other indirect costs. This may be a serious problem 
especially for smaller defendants who are new in the business.290  
For the predator, costly predatory tactics are irrational unless the predator 
can recoup its litigation cost.291 Such recoupment is much facilitated by a 
preliminary injunction and the like. Ultimately, however, the predator hopes 
to more than recoup its cost of litigation by reducing competition and 
raising prices. Obviously, this is most likely to occur when the plaintiff has 
greater financial resources than the defendant.292  
 
Arguably, harmful litigation of the types described above can and should be 
controlled. Apart from measures that reduce the risk that parties will acquire 
invalid IPRs and which make the scope of IPRs clearer, a mix of procedural 
and substantive measures may have to be taken to mitigate the harm 
caused.293 However, to the extent that such measures aim at targeting the 
illegitimate use of the court process, utmost care will have to be taken so as 
not to interfere with the basic human right of access to the courts, which 
ensures the rule of law and represents one of the cornerstones of the 
democratic state. 
 
                                                 
287 See Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp., No. 200-CV-128-WCO, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23907, 
at *12 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2001) (addressing allegedly baseless patent infringement by 
Bayer to block competition from generic drug). 
288 Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984). 
289 Id. at 1294 and at 1288. 
290 Litigation can sour a defendant's credit rating. A predatory plaintiff can divert customers 
from a defendant by threatening the defendant's customers with a lawsuit. Furthermore, the 
plaintiff can use a preliminary injunction to block the defendant's production and sales 
before trial. See Handguards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(claiming that Ethicon, the defendant, ‘had generated adverse publicity regarding its 
infringement actions, [...] threatening potential customers of the plaintiff, with the result 
that vital corporate resources were committed to defence of the infringement actions, 
Handgards' relations with potential customers were impaired, a proposed joint venture was 
aborted, and the company found itself unable to obtain outside financing necessary for it to 
remain competitive in the industry.’); See also Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, ‘Tilting the 
Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions’, 44 J.L. & Econ. 573, 591 (2001) (stating that 
smaller firms have higher litigation costs and suffer greater indirect costs caused by the 
dilution of management's equity ownership).  
291 See generally Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 
(1993). 
292 Meurer, pp. 524-25. 
293 See Meurer, p. 509.  
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6.1 The Right of Access to the Courts 
In the EC, the responsibility for ensuring the individual’s right of access to 
the courts lies on a national level. However, the ability to assert one's rights 
through the courts has been recognised by the ECJ to express a general 
principle of law, which underlies the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States.294 The right is also laid down in Articles 6 and 13 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR). Through the Maastricht Treaty, the ECHR was 
incorporated into Community law through Article 6.2.  
In the US, the right of access to the courts is one aspect of the right of 
petition.295 This right is guaranteed by the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of 1787, which specifically prohibits Congress from, amongst 
others, abridging ‘the right of the people […] to petition the Government for 
redress of grievances.’296 The ability to petition the government (including 
the right of access to courts) is thus one of the pre-eminent rights granted 
under the Bill of Rights.297
6.2 Abuse of Process 
Although access to the courts is a fundamental right and a general principle 
ensuring the rule of law, most legal systems agree that, in exceptional 
circumstances, it may be legitimate to curtail that right. Where, for example, 
the judicial process is used for an illegitimate purpose and unfounded legal 
proceedings are brought as a means of harassing, threatening, weakening or 
eliminating the opponent, the general rule of access to the courts may be 
restricted under various abuse of process doctrines. Common for these 
doctrines is that they protect the integrity of the judicial process by limiting 
abuses of the judicial system. In other words, they are designed to prevent 
use of the judicial process as an anticompetitive weapon. 
                                                 
294 Case T-111/96 ITT Promedia NV / Commission [1998] ECR II s. 2941, pp. 1 and 11. 
The right of access to courts was also emphasised in Case 222/84, Johnston / Chief 
Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, [1986] ECR s. 1651, pp. 17-18.. 
295 See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), at 510. 
The right to petition the government has been interpreted as extending to petitions of all 
three branches: the Congress, the executive and the judiciary. See S.W. O'Donnell, ‘Unified 
Theory of Antitrust Counterclaims in Patent Litigation’, Virginia Journal of Law & 
Technology Summer 2004, p. 1. 
296 The First Amendment to the US Constitution is a part of the US Bill of Rights (Article 
the third, [amendment one], available at http://www.constitution.org/cons/constitu.htm 
(visited on June 20, 2007). It prohibits the federal legislature from making laws that 
establish religion or prohibit free exercise of religion, laws that infringe the freedom of 
speech, infringe the freedom of the press, limit the right to assemble peaceably, or limit the 
right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Although the First Amendment 
only explicitly prohibits the named rights from being abridged by laws made by Congress, 
the courts have interpreted it as applying more broadly. In the last decades, the right to 
petition has e.g. been construed to include the right to bring suits in the US courts. 
297 The Bill of Rights comprises the first ten amendments to the Constitution, adopted 
between 1789 and 1791, all of which relate to limiting the power of the federal government. 
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6.2.1 Abuse of Process in the US Legal System 
Three US Abuse of process doctrines limit abuses of the judicial system by 
imposing sanctions when a plaintiff litigates in bad faith; (i) Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (ii) the common law tort of abuse of 
process and (iii) the federal courts’ inherent authority to protect the 
integrity of the judicial process.298 Under each of these doctrines, a 
plaintiff’s subjective intent is determinative.  
The elements of a valid cause of action of the common law tort of abuse of 
process299 is generally defined as the malicious and deliberate misuse or 
perversion of regularly issued court process not justified by the underlying 
legal action. In such cases, sanctions may be imposed upon a person who is 
interested only in accomplishing some improper purpose that is collateral to 
the proper object of the process and that offends justice.300
Rule 11 requires an attorney or party to certify that a pleading, motion, or 
other paper filed is ‘not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation’.301 While Rule 11’s reach may be somewhat limited in the sense 
that a well grounded initial complaint cannot, of itself, violate the purpose 
element and be sanctioned,302 it is nevertheless thought that ‘if a court finds 
that a motion or paper, other than a complaint, is filed in the context of a 
persistent pattern of clearly abusive litigation activity, it will be deemed to 
have been filed for an improper purpose and sanctionable even if it is not 
frivolous.’303  
Finally, a federal court always has the inherent authority to assess attorney’s 
fees when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons’304 – although, of course – such inherent powers must be 
exercised with restraint and discretion.305
                                                 
298 Charles C. Hsieh, ‘Professional Real Estate: The Line between Patent and Antitrust’, 
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Volume 7, Number 1 Fall 1993, 173, pp. 183-4, 
available at http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v07/07HarvJLTech173.pdf.  
299 See e.g. Joseph B. Maher, ‘Survival of the Common Law Abuse of Process Tort in the 
Face of a Noerr-Pennington Defense’, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 
2 (Spring, 1998), pp. 627-652.  
300 Abuse of process is to be distinguished from malicious prosecution, another type of tort 
that involves misuse of the public right of access to the courts. 
301 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 
302 See the Ninth Circuit in Zaldviar v. City of Los Angeles 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986). 
303 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Alla Medical Servs., 855 F.2d 1470, 1476 (9th Cir. 1988). See 
Hsieh, p. 184-5, fn. 76.  
NB: Frivolous litigation is a legal claim or defense presented even though the party and the 
party's legal counsel had reason to know that the claim or defense had no merit. A claim or 
defense may be frivolous because it had no underlying justification in fact, or because it 
was not presented with an argument for a reasonable extension or reinterpretation of the 
law, or because laws are in place unequivocally prohibiting such a claim. 
304 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc.y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975) (citation 
omitted) See also Chambers v. NASCO, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (1991); Hall v. Cole, 412U.S. 1, 5 
(1973).  
305 See Roadways Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980). 
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6.2.2 Abuse of Process in the EC Legal System 
Abuse of process rules exist in most Member States of the Community, but 
vary greatly in scope and reach. As the issue is a matter of national concern, 
abuse of process is dealt with very differently in each Member State. 
Whereas e.g. Swedish courts, apart from being able to strike out obviously 
unfounded actions and to require a party who has instituted unnecessary 
legal proceeding to bear the costs,306 lack specific remedies that target such 
abuses, their UK counterparts have a well developed system of rules and 
remedies targeting ‘vexatious litigants’ to fall back upon.307  
Under the UK common law tort of abuse of process, even an action, which 
is well founded, can amount to an abuse, provided that it is brought for the 
predominant purpose of using the legal process for something other than 
that which it was designed.308 The UK remedies are to be found in the Civil 
Procedure Rules as well as in the various IP laws. Under Section 42 of the 
Supreme Court Act 1981 a High Court may, if satisfied that any person has 
habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted 
vexatious civil proceedings, make an order restricting the right of access to 
the courts. Also, the IP laws contain explicit rules that prohibit abuse of 
process through the use of IPRs. In relation to registrable rights such as 
patents, these rules include groundless threats of such actions. In particular, 
Section 70 of the UK Patents Act 1977 provides remedies for unjustified 
threats of proceedings for patent infringement. A person aggrieved by the 
threats may bring proceedings in the court against the person making the 
threats, claiming relief in the form of a declaration to the effect that the 
threats are unjustifiable, an injunction or interdict against the continuance of 
the threats, or damages in respect of any loss which the plaintiff or pursuer 
has sustained by the threats.309
6.3 Monopolization through IP 
Enforcement in the US 
Although patents grant certain rights that restrain competitors, antitrust law 
defines the limits of permissible anticompetitive behaviour. The Supreme 
                                                 
306 An ‘obviously unfounded’ civil suit may be struck out by the court under RB 42 kap. 2-
4§§. Moreover, the rules on the distribution of costs give the courts the power to require a 
party who has instituted ‘unnecessary proceedings’ to bear the costs of the legal 
proceedings under RB 18 kap. 3§ 1st. Similarly, the German system has chosen costs rules 
to deter frivolous actions and defences. The general rule in civil procedure is that the losing 
party bears the costs (court fees, lawyers’ fees, witness and expert expenses) of the 
opposing party. Such cost orders are viewed as a sufficient disincentive against pursuing 
frivolous claims, actions or defences. 
307 See Nettleton and Cordery, pp. 52-54. See also Hughes Jean, ‘Trademarks Unjustified 
Threats’, European Intellectual Property Review, Vol. 22, No. 8, 2000, pp. N116-117. For a 
comprehensive analysis of the abuse of process, see W. Wells ‘The Abuse of Process’ 
(1985) 102 L.Q.R. 
308 Compare Steven Preece, p. 122. 
309 Id.  
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Court made this point clear in the landmark 1942 case of Morton Salt.310 
Even though a ‘patent operates to create and grant to the patentee an 
exclusive right to make, use and vend the particular device described and 
claimed in the patent’, the Court held that a patent ‘affords no immunity for 
a monopoly not within the grant, and the use of it to suppress competition 
[…] may deprive the patentee of the aid of a court of equity to restrain an 
alleged infringement by one who is a competitor’.311 However, exactly 
where the line of demarcation between a lawful assertion of IPRs and an 
antitrust violation should be drawn has been a subject of much confusion, 
especially in the context of IPR enforcement.312
 
An illustrative example of the US approach can nevertheless be seen in the 
CSU litigation.313 Here, Xerox Corporation had refused to sell patented 
parts, copyrighted manuals, and copyrighted software to CSU and other 
independent service organizations (ISOs),314 which caused CSU to sue 
Xerox for a Sherman Act Section 2 violation. Xerox counterclaimed for 
patent infringement.315 In determining the outcome of whether Xerox's 
patents provided Xerox with immunity in relation to the antitrust laws, the 
Federal Circuit noted from its prior case law that ’a patent owner who brings 
suit to enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making, using, or 
selling the claimed invention is exempt from the antitrust laws, even though 
such a suit may have an anticompetitive effect, unless the infringement 
defendant proves one of two conditions. First, he may prove that the 
asserted patent was obtained through knowing and wilful fraud [...] or he 
may demonstrate that the infringement suit was a mere sham to cover what 
is actually no more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business 
relationships of a competitor.’316 The Federal Circuit held, that ’[i]n the 
absence of any indication of [...] fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, 
or sham litigation, the patent holder may enforce the statutory right to 
exclude others from making, using, or selling the claimed invention free 
from liability under the antitrust laws. We therefore will not inquire into his 
subjective motivation for exerting his statutory rights, even though his 
refusal to sell or license his patented invention may have an anticompetitive 
effect, so long as that anticompetitive effect is not illegally extended beyond 
the statutory patent grant.’317
 
This very well reflects the traditional approach of ensuring that antitrust 
immunity is conferred upon firms, including monopolists, that petition 
                                                 
310 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
311 Morton Salt, 490-91. 
312 Compare Hsieh, p. 173. 
313 In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation (CSU) 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 
(Fed. Cir. 2000). 
314 Id. at 1324.
315 Id.  Xerox also had counterclaims for copyright infringement as well as contesting and 
defending against CSU's claims and defenses. 
316 CSU, 203 F.3d at 1326 (emphasis added). 
317 Id. at 1327-28. On the facts of the case, the Federal Circuit concluded that Xerox did not 
violate any antitrust provisions by relying on its patent rights to refuse to sell or license its 
patented work to CSU and other ISOs. 
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government through lobbying, administrative procedures or litigation.318 
The general rule is therefore that enforcement of IPRs will not lead to an 
antitrust violation. However, there are certain exceptions to this rule.319 
Litigation in which the governmental or judicial process is used as an anti-
competitive weapon, is not protected. Rather, such anti-competitive 
litigation violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act under three main theories. 
Under each theory, harassing patent infringement actions may be caught by 
antitrust law. Though not always successful, Section 2 claims based on anti-
competitive litigation are becoming increasingly common.320
6.3.1 Noerr-Pennington Immunity 
At the very intersection between the Sherman Act and the First Amendment 
lies Noerr-Pennington immunity. The immunity doctrine, based upon the 
right to petition the government in the First Amendment, was laid out in 
three Supreme Court cases.  
In the first decision, Noerr, the Court held that ‘no violation of the 
[Sherman] Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the 
passage or enforcement of laws.’321 Consequently, railroads’ publicity and 
lobbying efforts to obtain favourable state legislation that would destroy 
their motor trucking competitors were immune from antitrust attack. Noting 
that ‘[t]the right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bills of 
Rights’, the Court refused to apply antitrust analysis to the railroads’ 
activities ‘insofar as those activities comprise mere solicitation of 
governmental action with respect to the passage and enforcement of 
laws.’322 Nevertheless, the Court concluded with the important statement 
that ‘[t]here may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly 
directed toward influencing governmental action, is actually nothing more 
than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a 
competitor’. In such exceptional circumstances an ‘application of the 
Sherman Act would be justified.’323
The immunity granted under Noerr soon evolved beyond the limited 
legislative arena. In Pennington, the doctrine was applied to protect efforts 
to influence an administrative proceeding.324 The Supreme Court ruled that 
‘[j]oint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws 
even though intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, 
                                                 
318 E.R.R. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 135-37, 145 (1961); United Mine Workers 
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 671-72 (1965). See the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine below. 
319 Balto & Wolman, p. 74.  
320 See Meurer, p. 540; Davies, Leburn & Stargard, ‘Seeking the Right Balance to Maintain 
a Free Market’, http://howrey.com/docs/seekingtherightbalance.pdf, p. 4. 
321 Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127 
(1961).  
322 Id. at 138.  
323 Id. at 144. In other words, the focus was on whether the purpose of the petition was to 
directly eliminate competition rather than to obtain favourable government action. 
Lobbying to obtain government action the result of which was to restrain trade was 
permissible; lobbying without expectation of government action, but with the intent to harm 
competition, was not. See S.W. O'Donnell, pp. 7-9. 
324 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).  
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either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself violative of the 
Sherman Act.’325  
Finally, in California Motor, the Court extended the application of the 
immunity doctrine to a judicial proceeding.326
6.3.2 The Walker Process Doctrine 
As noted above however, there are exceptions to the Noerr-Pennington 
immunity. The first applies only to patent infringement suits where the 
antitrust plaintiff can show that the patent holder fraudulently obtained his 
patent and that he would not have obtained it but for the fraud.327  
In the landmark case of Walker Process Equipment,328 the Supreme Court 
held that when a company obtains a patent by committing fraud on the US 
PTO and then attempts to enforce that patent on its competitor, this 
purposeful anticompetitive conduct may be the basis of an antitrust action 
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.329 The doctrine has since been 
developed further in a number of important circuit court cases.330 As the 
doctrine now stands, the antitrust plaintiff must show: 
(i) that the patent owner acquired the patent by means of either fraudulent 
misrepresentation or a fraudulent omission of pertinent information, 
evidencing a clear intent to deceive the patent examiner,331  
(ii) that this caused the PTO to issue an invalid patent that would not have 
been granted absent the fraudulent conduct,332 and  
(iii) that the patentee was aware of the fraud when bringing the suit to 
enforce its patent.333  
(iv) Lastly, the other elements for a Section 2 offence must be present.334
Most often Walker Process claims arise as counterclaims in patent 
infringement litigation. However, a Section 2 violation can also result where 
the patent was not secured by fraud but the patentee came to know that the 
patent was invalid and nevertheless pursued the infringement action.335
                                                 
325 Id. at 670.  
326 California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).  
327 See Meurer, pp. 538-540. 
328 Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp. 382 U.S. 172 
(1965).  
329 Id. at 174. Consequently, the maintenance and enforcement of the fraudulently obtained 
patent can also be subject to a treble damages claim by an injured party under s.4 of the 
Clayton Act (at 176-77). 
330 See e.g. Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chemical Coatings, Inc., 450 F.2d 769, 771-73 (9th 
Cir. 1971); Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 456 F.2d 592, 599-600 (3d Cir. 1972); 
Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 166 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
331 See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 129 F.3d 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1997), 
rev'd, 141 F.3d 1059, 1068-70 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
332 Litton, 755 F.2d at 166; Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d. at 1071. 
333 See Gunther & Breuvart, fn. 15.  
334 Apart from proof of power in the relevant market, that means that injury must be a 
proximate result of the enforcement actions. This means that the plaintiff must at minimum 
have been ready, willing, and able to manufacture the patented subject matter. See Indium 
Corp. of America v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 379, 385 (N.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 781 
F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
335 See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 994 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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An illustrating and recent example of a Walker Process type fraud against a 
government body is the settlement in October 2005 between the FTC, Akzo 
Nobel, and its subsidiary Organon. More specifically, this Akzo Nobel-
Organon settlement concerned ‘fraudulent misrepresentation’ to the US 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to delay generic entry. Charges 
against Organon involved false representations to the FDA about the claims 
of a patent listed on the FDA's Orange Book,336 so as to delay by about 
eight months the introduction of generic competition to its antidepressant, 
Remeron. Under the settlement, Organon agreed to pay tens of millions of 
dollars in damages and to comply with strong injunctive terms barring 
future anti-competitive conduct.337
6.3.3 The Sham Litigation Doctrine 
The second exception concerns sham litigation, including sham IP litigation, 
and is based on a showing that the antitrust defendant (i.e. the IP plaintiff) 
knew that his infringement claim was objectively baseless.338  
In California Motor, the Court stated that antitrust laws may apply where 
the litigation ‘is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an 
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor 
and the application of the Sherman Act.’339 While the Court noted that a 
pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may be considered a ‘sham’, it also 
acknowledged that the boundary between sham and legitimate conduct may 
be ‘a difficult line to discern and draw.’340 Since the Supreme Court did not 
even attempt to remedy this obscurity, lower courts were left with the 
difficult task – something that was to have a negative impact on consistency 
and legal certainty.341  
 
                                                 
336 The FDA's Orange Book (officially entitled ‘Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations’) lists all approved drugs and related patents for each drug. The 
FDA obtains this information from New Drug Applications (NDAs), which must include 
information on any patent covering the drug, any method of using the drug for treatment of 
disease, or any method of delivery of the drug, for which a claim of patent infringement 
could reasonably be asserted against an unauthorized party. See Thomas Leary, ‘Antitrust 
Issues in the Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes – Part II’, 1/24/02, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/learypharmaceuticalsettlement.htm. visited on June 20, 
2007. See also Gunther & Breuvart, pp. 671-72 for a brief preliminary overview of the US 
drug approval process (the Hatch-Watchman drug approval process). 
337 See www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/10/organon.htm, visited on June 20, 2007. See also Eccles & 
Ferla, pp. 4-5.  
338 See Meurer, pp. 538-540. 
339 California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), at 510-11. 
340 Id. at 513.  
341 In particular, there was a dispute among the lower courts as to ‘the proper mix of 
subjective and objective criteria in determining whether specific litigation should be 
entitled to Noerr-Pennington immunity. While some circuits held that litigation which 
raised a legal issue of genuine substance could never be a sham, others would confer such 
litigation only a presumption that it was not a sham, leaving the issue open to rebuttal by 
evidence that the suit was brought purely to cause inconvenience, harass, or harm 
competitors, and not for the end of obtaining favourable judicial relief. See Neal R. Scholl 
& Shepard Goldfein, ‘The Supreme Court and the Sham Exception’, N.Y. Law Journal, 
May 18, 1993, at 3. See also Hsieh, pp. 173-76.  
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Faced with inconsistent and sometimes contradicting decisions, the Supreme 
Court in Professional Real Estate (PRE)342 sought to settle the uncertainty 
once and for all. The case involved a copyright infringement action brought 
by Columbia Pictures against PRE, which caused PRE to counterclaim that 
Columbia Pictures’ infringement suit was a violation of the Sherman Act. In 
particular, PRE claimed that the copyright infringement action was a sham, 
brought with the intent to monopolise and restrain trade.343 Columbia 
Pictures argued that the suit was no ‘sham’ and that it was therefore entitled 
to Noerr-Pennington immunity for petitioning the government.344  
Having noted that ‘the sham exception contains an indispensable objective 
component’, the Supreme Court adopted a two-part test for when a lawsuit 
loses antitrust immunity and can be termed a ‘sham’;  
(i) First, the suit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable 
litigant could realistically expect success on its merits.  
(ii) Only if the challenged litigation is objectively merit-less, ‘may a court 
[then] examine the litigant’s subjective motivation.’345 Here, focus should 
be on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals an ‘attempt to interfere directly 
with the business relationship of a competitor’346 through the ‘use [of] the 
governmental process – as opposed to the outcome of that process – as an 
anticompetitive weapon’.347  
Upon an application of the two-part test to the facts, the Supreme Court 
concluded that Colombia Pictures had had ‘probable cause’ in bringing its 
copyright infringement action. Consequently, the objective component was 
satisfied and a finding of ‘sham litigation’ precluded.348
In Nobelpharma,349 the Federal Circuit confirmed that the enforcement of a 
patent for sham purposes is a type of anti-competitive act, which is separate 
and independent from the enforcement of a patent obtained by Walker 
Process fraud.350  
As the sham litigation doctrine stands today, the objectively baseless 
standard is thought to apply to the lawsuit as a whole, with the consequence 
that a lawsuit will not be held to be a sham if some causes of action are 
baseless but others are well founded.351 Sham litigation suits can allege 
either that the patent holder knew that their relevant patent was invalid or 
that the patent holder knew that the patent, while valid, was not being 
infringed. In addition, sham litigation counterclaims are frequently filed in 
patent infringement suits.352
                                                 
342 Professional Real Estate Invs., Inc v. Columbia Pictures Inds., Inc., 113 S.Ct 1920  
(1993).  
343 Columbia Pictures Inds., Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Invs., Inc., 944 F.2d 1525, 
1527 (9th Cir. 1991) 
344 PRE Invs., Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Inds., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1920, 1924 (1993).  
345 113 S.Ct at 1928 (emphasis added).  
346 113 S.Ct. at 1929 (quoting Noerr).  
347 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991).  
348 113 S.Ct at 1929-30. See Hsieh, pp. 173-79. 
349 Nobelpharma AB v Implant Innovations, Inc. (141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
350 See Gunther & Breuvart, fn. 16. 
351 See Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556, 565 (4th Cir. 
1990) and Matsushita Elecs. Corp. v. Loral Corp., 974 F. Supp. 345, 357 n. 20 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997). 
352 See Balto & Wolman, pp. 75-6.  
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A recent example of the application of both the Sham doctrine and the 
Walker Process doctrine is the In re Buspirone Patent Litigation from 
2002.353 This involved six antitrust complaints brought by states, generic 
drug producers and purchasers as well as consumer organizations against 
Bristol-Myers Squib (BMS) for unlawfully maintaining its monopoly for 
buspirone-based drug products. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that BMS, 
in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, unlawfully had maintained its 
monopoly by improperly listing a patent in the FDA's Orange Book of 
patents.354 BMS moved to dismiss the claims on Noerr-Pennington and 
patent immunity grounds.355 These motions were denied by the court.356 
Since the government's role in the listing of a patent in the Orange Book 
was only ministerial, it did not, in the court’s view, constitute petitioning 
under Noerr-Pennington.357 Rather, the listings were held to be fraudulent 
under Walker Process doctrine.358 Moreover, the court held that the 
subsequent patent litigation arose from misrepresentations in the process 
and was therefore baseless and a ‘sham’.359
In applying the PRE definition of sham litigation and the objective test, the 
district court found that no reasonable litigant could have expected success 
on the merits of BMS's interpretation of the patent claims.360 According to 
the court this was ‘not a case in which there are occasional places in which 
[BMS had] mischaracterized or mistaken the relevant issues or legal 
standards. It [was] a case where [BMS had] repeatedly argued for a position 
that require[d] establishing a number of claims, each of which ha[d] no 
basis.’361 Consequently, BMS's conduct was ‘objectively baseless’.362  
The Buspirone decision is significant for several reasons. First of all it 
suggests that a submission to the government is not petitioning, and that it is 
therefore not immune under Noerr-Pennington. Secondly, it is the first 
decision to apply the Walker Process doctrine outside the context of a filing 
with the PTO. Lastly, it makes clear that inconsistent positions taken by a 
patent holder may serve as a basis for a finding of an objectively merit-less 
claim and a sham litigation.363
 
Following these events in 2002, the FTC in 2003 then alleged in a complaint 
that BMS had engaged in a decade-long pattern of anticompetitive conduct 
in order to delay generic competition to the three drugs BuSpar, Taxol and 
Platinol.364 More specifically, the FTC complaint alleged that BMS wilfully 
                                                 
353 In re Buspirone Patent Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
354 Buspirone, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 366. 
355 Id. at 367-69.
356 Id. at 380.
357 Id. at 369-73.
358 Id. at 373-75.
359 Id. at 375-76. Compare the AstraZeneca decision below.  
360 Id.  
361 Id. (citing California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 
(1972) for the proposition that objective baselessness can be established by a 'pattern of 
baseless, repetitive claims’). 
362 Id. 
363 See Balto & Evans, supra n. 432, at 38. 
364 Of particular interest for the purposes of the present thesis are the FTC allegations in 
relation to Buspar; the FTC alleged that BMS engaged in monopolization of the drug in 
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maintained its monopoly over each of the three products by abusing 
government regulatory processes by, amongst other things, improperly 
listing patents for all three drugs in the Orange Book in order to obtain 
unwarranted 30-month stays on FDA approval of generic competitors.365  
According to the FTC, BMS had thus violated the anti-monopolization 
provision of Section 5 of the FTC Act366 by intentionally misleading the 
FDA about the scope, validity, and enforceability of these patents.367 The 
FTC concluded that Noerr-Pennington immunity did not apply to Orange 
Book listings because they do not constitute petitioning. In addition, the 
FTC stated that the filings fell outside of the Noerr-Pennington exception 
because they involved knowing and material misrepresentations.368 
In re Bristol-Myers Squibb the FTC approved the issuance of a final 
Consent Order against BMS.369 This eliminated BMS's ability to obtain a 
30-month stay on later-listed patents (i.e. patents listed in the Orange Book 
after a generic manufacturer has sought FDA approval for a competing 
generic version). The Order also barred a 30-month stay in cases where 
BMS had engaged in misconduct in connection with obtaining and listing 
the patent. The relevant misconduct included (i) inequitable actions before 
the PTO in obtaining the patent, (ii) making false or misleading statements 
to the FDA in connection with listing the patent, and (iii) providing patent 
information to the FDA that was inconsistent with information provided to 
the PTO.370
The BMS decision is significant because it represents the first Orange Book 
enforcement action brought by the FTC against a brand name drug 
company, as a result of which it is now clear that improper Orange Book 
listings could constitute a violation of US antitrust laws.371  
                                                                                                                            
violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act by, among other practices: (i) providing false and 
misleading information to the FDA in order to cause the FDA to list the patent in the 
Orange Book and withhold approval for generic buspirone products; (ii) wrongfully 
submitting the patent for Orange Book listing without a reasonable good faith belief that the 
patent met the statutory listing requirements; and (iii) initiating and maintaining objectively 
baseless lawsuits against generic buspirone competitors, without regard to the merits of 
these lawsuits. 
365 See In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb, FTC Docket No. C-4076 (complaint) (2003), 
available at http:// www.ftc.gov/os/2003/04/bristolmyerssquibbcmp.pdf. Visited on June 
20, 2007. 
366 That is, the acts unreasonably restrained trade in violation of Section 5 of the FTA, 15 
U.S.C. § 45. 
367 In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb at 24-26. 
368 Id. at 24. Moreover, the complaint alleged that BMS had entered into anti-competitive 
settlements contrary to Section 5 of the FTC Act (Id. at 5-7, 18-20, 24, 26). 
369 See In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb, FTC Docket No. C-4076 (decision and order) 
(2003), avalible at http:// www.ftc.gov/os/2003/04/bristolmyerssquibbdo.pdf. Visited on 
June 20, 2007. 
370 In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb (decision and order) at 6-7. See Balto & Wolman, 
pp. 76-79; See also Gunther & Breuvart, pp. 674-676. 
371 Id. Compare the AstraZeneca decision below.  
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6.3.4 Infringement Suits as Part of Scheme to 
Monopolize 
Finally, a third category of exception to the general rule that antitrust 
enforcement will not lead to antitrust liability was established in Kobe.372 
Here, it was established that a patent holder may incur antitrust liability 
when bringing a patent infringement suit even without bad faith where the 
lawsuit is part of a larger scheme to monopolise that would violate Section 2 
of the Sherman Act.373  
In Kobe, such a scheme was found to exist by looking at the infringement 
suits in combination with other activities. These involved acquisitions of all 
material patents in the industry, the signing of covenants not to compete as 
well as threatened suits against companies trading with the alleged patent 
infringers.374 However, as the court noted, in isolation from the other 
activities, the infringement suits themselves would not have been 
unlawful.375
6.4 Abuse of a Dominant Position through 
IP Enforcement in the EC 
Some examples of national rules on abuse of process were dealt with above. 
As to the Community level, EC competition law concerns in this context 
may arise only where it can be argued that a dominant undertaking’s abuse 
of process has negative implications on competition on the common 
market.376 More specifically, vexatious litigation issues – though rare – have 
arisen in the context of Article 82 and thus in situations involving an abuse 
of a dominant position.377
6.4.1 Background – BBI / Boosey & Hawkes 
That it may be an infringement of Article 82 for a dominant undertaking to 
pursue legal proceedings against a competitor was first suggested in BBI/ 
Boosey & Hawkes.378 Here, a dominant firm had allegedly initiated 
groundless harassing copyright infringement actions against a competitor in 
order to prevent it from entering the dominant firm's market.379 According 
                                                 
372 Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Corp., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952). 
373 See Kobe at 422-24; Dairy Foods, Inc. v. Dairy Maid Prods. Coop., 297 F.2d 805, 809 
(7th Cir. 1961); Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. Harco Prods., Inc., 512 F.2d 993, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 
1975). 
374 Kobe at 424-25. 
375 Id. at 425. See Balto & Wolman, p. 79.  
376 Note that the anti-competitive considerations of such an action is entirely sui generis 
from the existing abuse of process doctrines illustrated above. ‘Two very different 
mischiefs are at issue.’ See Steven Preece, pp. 120-21. 
377 That ‘abuse of process’ is not to be found in Article 82 exemplification of abuses is not 
an issue, as the list  is not exhaustive. See above. 
378 BBI/Boosey & Hawkes [1987] OJ L286/36. See also Jones & Sufrin p. 423.  
379 See para. 9 of the decision where the most significant allegations were summarised. 
Under point (a) it was stated ‘that B&H had pursued unjustified litigation in the United 
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to the complainant’s submission, this conduct was abusive. However, as the 
Commission decision merely concerned the imposition of interim measures, 
the Commission did not pursue these allegations. Consequently, the 
question as to whether vexatious litigation could be an abuse was left 
unanswered.380 Nevertheless, this does not prevent one from arguing that 
there is nothing in the decision that suggested that the Commission did not 
consider the harassing actions as an Article 82 abuse. 
6.4.2 Decca Navigator System 
A somewhat clearer example is Decca Navigator System381. The case 
concerned the DNS, an international radio navigation system invented by 
Decca and operated throughout the world for navigation mainly at sea. It 
consists of transmission of signals by land-based stations and devices, which 
receive these signals (receivers). When the basic patents which prevented 
third parties from manufacturing receivers legally without a licence expired 
in the mid-1960's, Decca sought other ways of defending its strong market 
position. Through a series of agreements, Decca licensed the right to the 
signals to which it claimed to have copyright and shared the market for 
receivers with competitors. However, Decca was then informed by Delta 
Marine of its intentions to import and to market a DNS-compatible, non-
Decca receiver in the UK. Decca responded that such actions would infringe 
its copyright relating to the DNS and that it would take legal actions to 
prevent Delta Marine from realising its plans. When they nevertheless did, 
Decca brought legal proceedings against Delta Marine and other companies 
importing the receiver in a number of countries, in most cases for ‘unfair 
competition’.382
Delta Marine complained to the Commission about Decca’s behaviour. In 
its decision, the Commission cited an internal telex, based on information 
from Decca, stating that 'Decca's tactics towards [its competitors] is to 
exhaust them by cases in eight countries at a time.’ Moreover, the 
information revealed that Decca pursued ‘the consistent policy of asking a 
long series of questions in each single case, questions which demand an 
answer from [the competitors]’, and that Decca’s aim was ‘to fatigue [them] 
on legal questions rather than beat them on legal ground'.383  
The commission based its finding of abuse of Decca's dominant position on 
the conduct around the conclusion of the agreements as well as on the 
changes in signals made for the purpose of impeding the functioning of 
                                                                                                                            
Kingdom against BBI for breach of copyright which it (B&H) eventually had to abandon 
but which had the effect of imposing a heavy financial burden on the applicants and of 
delaying the launching of the new range at a critical time’. 
380 See para. 11 of the decision: ‘The present Decision is not directly concerned with the 
allegations of vexatious litigation and other harassing tactics but only with the closure of 
accounts and refusals to supply’. 
381 Decca Navigator System OJ [1989] L 43/27. 
382 Decca argued that the competing companies were free-riding on the DNS financed by 
Decca. Both Danish and Dutch courts rejected that claim and considered that Decca’s 
transmission signals could be used legally by anybody in possession of an appropriate 
receiver. Id para. 48.  
383 Id para. 50.  
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competing receivers. By that conduct, Decca had aimed at protecting the 
monopoly position it enjoyed for commercial receivers and had intended to 
exclude, obstruct and coerce competitors.384
As to the copyrights claimed by Decca, the Commission argued that it was 
not necessary to ascertain whether those really existed. For, in the 
Commission’s words, ‘the object of the agreements had been to allocate the 
markets’ and ‘the substance of the copyright alleged did not justify an 
agreement containing such far-reaching restrictions of competition. The 
Community system of competition does not allow an improper use of rights 
under national copyright laws which frustrate Community competition 
law.’385  
Despite the fact that the Commission decision does not explicitly comment 
on Decca’s procedural strategy and the question whether such behaviour 
could be reconciled with Article 82, it appears that the Commission 
regarded the procedures brought, or the threats thereof, as part of the total 
picture, i.e. as part of the strategy amounting to an abuse of a dominant 
position. According to some commentators, the decision thus represents an 
example of a situation where procedural measures may amount to an abuse 
under Article 82.386 Clear is however, that other elements of Decca’s 
behaviour offered enough legal ground for the decision and that the 
Commission thus did not have to engage in the more sensitive act of 
restricting the right of access to the courts.387 The value of the decision in 
this context is therefore limited. 
6.4.3 ITT Promedia v. Commission 
Of more value in this respect is the later judgement in ITT Promedia.388 The 
case concerned an appeal against the decision by the Commission to reject a 
complaint made by Promedia against Belgacom, the dominant (and former 
monopoly) telephone operator in Belgium. Promedia had previously 
enjoyed the exclusive right to publish telephone directories in Belgium, 
which it had been granted by RTT, the predecessor to Belgacom. However, 
as discussions to conclude a renewal of this concession broke down, a 
sequence of lawsuits and counter-claims between the two parties 
followed.389  
Promedia complained to the Commission about Belgacom's conduct in 
1994. It alleged inter alia that Belgacom had abused its dominant position 
by initiating vexatious litigation against it before the Belgian courts.390 That 
complaint was rejected in a Commission decision in 1996 (hereafter referred 
                                                 
384 Id paras. 97-98. 
385 Id para. 104. Compare above. 
386 Lundgard Hansen Kim, Kjøbye Lars, Saugmandsgaard Øe Henrik, ’EU-
konkurrenceretten’, Köpenhamn, 1998, s. 195.  
387 Compare the AstraZeneca decision below. 
388 Case T-111/96 ITT Promedia NV v. Commission [1998] ECR II-2937. 
389 Steven Preece, p. 119.  
390 Complaint IV/35.268. One of the other elements of the complaint, that Belgacom had 
infringed Article 82 by imposing excessive prices for access to subscriber data, ultimately 
was the subject of a settlement between Belgacom and the Commission in April 1997. 
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to as ‘the contested decision’).391 While the Commission conceded that the 
bringing of litigation by a dominant firm could infringe Article 82, the abuse 
was not made out in the instant case.  
Such an abuse could, in the Commission’s view, only ever be the case 
provided two cumulative criteria were fulfilled – namely where a dominant 
undertaking brought an action:  
(i) which could not reasonably be considered as an attempt to establish its 
rights and could therefore only serve to harass the opposite party and  
(ii) which was conceived in the framework of a plan whose goal was to 
eliminate competition.392
The Commission’s test – based on the human right of access to the courts – 
was thus not whether the right claimed exists, but whether the dominant 
undertaking may reasonably consider that it does.393 On the basis of the 
evidence put forward, the Commission considered that Belgacom's legal 
actions, which included counterclaims and lawsuits of its own initiation, 
could reasonably be construed as attempts by that party to establish its legal 
rights. They could not have been seen as so unreasonable and groundless 
that they were only serving to harass Promedia.394 Moreover, since two of 
the actions were actually counterclaims, they could not be viewed as being 
part of a plan to eliminate competition.395
 
Promedia sought annulment by the CFI of the Commission's rejection of its 
complaint.396 It alleged inter alia that the Commission's rejection was based 
upon a manifest error of assessment. Promedia also argued that the 
Commission had failed to provide an adequately reasoned decision as 
required by Article 253 EC. However, it did not challenge the Commission's 
cumulative criteria themselves. Consequently, the CFI stated that it merely 
had to ‘establish whether the Commission correctly applied the cumulative 
criterion’ and that ‘there [was] no need for it to rule on the correctness of the 
criteria chosen by the Commission in the contested decision’.397
The CFI then went on to note that the right to access to the courts was a 
fundamental right, common to the constitutional regimes of all Member 
States, and  laid down in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR.398 Accordingly, 
the CFI stated that it was only ‘in wholly exceptional circumstances that the 
fact that legal proceedings are brought is capable of constituting an abuse of 
a dominant position within the meaning of [Article 82]’.399 Referring to 
earlier case law, the CFI also stated that such ‘[a]n exception to the principle 
                                                 
391 Commission decision by letter of May 21, 1996, rejecting complaint IV/35.268. NB: 
This Commission decision has not been published (as rejected complaints never are). 
392 The contested decision, point 11. 
393 Jones & Sufrin, p. 424.  
394 See Case T-111/96 ITT Promedia NV v. Commission [1998] ECR II-2937, para. 41. 
395 Id. para. 42. 
396 Case T-111/96 ITT Promedia NV v. Commission [1998] ECR II-2937. 
397 See paras. 58-59. Despite the fact that the CFI did not rule on the correctness of the 
criteria, but confined itself to holding that they had been correctly applied ‘[t]he implication 
of the CFI judgement […] is that the criteria themselves are correct’, see Jones & Sufrin, 
pp. 423-24. 
398 Id. para. 60. 
399 Id. 
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of access to the courts, which ensures the rule of law, must be construed and 
applied strictly, in a manner which does not defeat the application of the 
general rule’.400  
In relation to the legal proceedings in question, involving two counter-
claims and an action relating to the enforcement of a contractual term 
relating to IPRs, the CFI concluded that the Commission had applied the 
first cumulative criterion correctly.401
As it was clear that the first counter-claim could be regarded as the assertion 
of what Belgacom reasonably considered as its legal rights,402 such a 
proceeding could not be seen solely as an attempt to harass Promedia.     
The fact that the national law, which gave Belgacom the rights it was 
asserting, could have infringed EC competition law itself was irrelevant.403 
This was also the case in relation to the second counter-claim made by 
Belgacom.404
Arguments alleging that the Commission decision infringed Article 253 EC 
were also rejected by the CFI.405 Contrary to Promedia's assertions, the CFI 
was of the opinion that the Commission had adequately established why an 
action brought by Belgacom relating to a contractual requirement to 
transfer IPRs did not fulfil the cumulative criteria.406 Under the contractual 
provisions in question, Promedia was required to transfer to Belgacom ‘the 
licences resulting from patents or similar forms of legal protection granted 
in relation to works performed or carried out in connection with this 
agreement, as well as the know-how required’ for publication of the 
directories.407 Belgacom had asked the Belgian courts to order a transfer of 
the trademark rights relating to the directories (as well as related know-how) 
alleging that this was within its contractual rights. According to the CFI, the 
Commission's decision stated clearly that Belgacom could reasonably have 
considered such a transfer to be within the scope of its contractual 
entitlement. Furthermore, the Commission had noted in its decision that the 
applicant had not established in fact or law how the action by Belgacom 
went beyond the scope of the contract.408 Hence, there was no deficiency in 
the Commission's statement of reasons to warrant annulment of the decision 
in this regard.409 Consequently, Promedia was cleared of having abused its 
dominance by bringing legal proceedings against its customer.410
                                                 
400 Id para. 61.  
401 Id. para. 115. 
402 Id. para. 93. 
403 Id. para. 94.  
404 Id. paras 116, 117. 
405 Id. para. 132.  
406 Note however that the CFI did hold that a claim for performance of a contractual right 
by a dominant undertaking could constitute an abuse in certain circumstances, para. 140. 
407 Id. para. 19 
408 Id. para. 129. 
409 Id. para. 132.  
410 This, despite the fact that a Belgian tribunal had held that these proceedings were 
vexatious or frivolous in character. See Lawrance & Treacy, p. 8. 
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6.4.4 An EC ‘Vexatious Litigation Doctrine’? 
More important than the actual outcome of the case is, however, that the 
CFI judgment can be seen to have confirmed that vexatious institution of 
legal proceedings can constitute an abuse of a dominant position, albeit 
only in very limited circumstances where a dominant firm brings an entirely 
groundless litigation with predatory intent.411  
Moreover, it seems that in the absence of criteria formulated by the 
Community courts, the Commission's cumulative criteria will have to 
suffice. In any event, the strict Commission criteria seem to reflect the CFI’s 
cautious approach, wary of any careless creation of a new abuse involving 
the bringing of legal proceedings.412
More uncertain is the question whether vexatious threats of legal 
proceedings will be enough to constitute an abuse under Article 82. While 
ITT Promedia does not expressly state that this could be the case, it has been 
argued that they would, provided all the other criteria for an abuse are 
satisfied. After all, the anticompetitive economic effect of unilateral conduct 
by dominant firms is Article 82’s primary concern. ‘If a dominant 
undertaking seeks to preserve or strengthen its dominant position on 
markets by vexatiously threatening to bring, or actually bringing, legal 
proceedings against its competitors, then this must surely serve to hinder the 
maintenance of competition still existing on that market. Smaller, weaker 
competitors will be tempted not to enter or to leave such markets so as to 
avoid the expense and time of litigation, whatever the merits of the 
dominant firm's case.’413 In addition, it is arguable that the special 
responsibility imposed upon dominant undertakings must extend to 
restraining such firms from hindering the maintenance of competition by 
threatening or commencing lawsuits they know to be groundless.414
Thus, in ITT Promedia the CFI arguably confirmed that predatory litigation 
by a dominant firm could be an abuse of a dominant position under Article 
82 provided, of course, that the other requirements of that article are made 
out. However, the circumstances under which the abuse will crystallise are 
strictly limited. For the bringing of legal proceedings to constitute an abuse, 
they effectively must be predatory – there can be no reasonable cause of 
action in the sense that the proceedings can only serve to harass the other 
party – and the action must be part of a plan by the dominant firm to 
eliminate its competitor. 415
6.4.5 The Legal Position Post ITT Promedia 
In view of the case law hitherto presented, and in particular with regard to 
ITT Promedia, it may thus seem conceivable that the threatening, or at least 
bringing, of entirely vexatious proceedings by dominant firms will infringe 
Article 82 EC, provided that the cumulative criteria are satisfied.  
                                                 
411 Jones & Sufrin, p. 424.  
412 Compare the AstraZeneca decision below.  
413 Steven Preece p. 120.  
414 Id. 
415 Steven Preece p. 122.  
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At the same time, it may seem relevant to question the legitimacy of the 
criteria set out by the Commission. Since the CFI did not expressly approve 
those criteria, a counter-argument has often run to the effect that these 
merely were established in a Commission decision, and thus do not have 
any binding effect in national law. Arguably, therefore, stronger precedents 
by the CFI, or ideally the ECJ, on the criteria themselves would be required 
to settle the matter once and for all. According to this view, ITT Promedia 
did not change the fact that parties in cases involving predatory litigation are 
kept in a state of legal uncertainty, with the consequence that pleading 
claims or counter-claims for infringement of Article 82 in national courts 
remains difficult.416  
Moreover, while some have argued that an Article 82 EC ‘vexatious 
litigation abuse’  could work alongside and complement the existing causes 
of action and rules of procedure in national law, others have questioned 
whether the abuse can be said to have much value in the form it was given 
in ITT Promedia.417 Considering the strict Commission criteria, the 
opportunities for alleging such an abuse of dominance would also appear to 
be much more limited than the existing national doctrines of abuse of 
process mentioned above.    
Irrespective of any practical obstacles, the legal position post ITT Promedia 
must be characterised as one of uncertainty and lack of authoritative 
precedents. Whether this can be said to have been remedied by the recent 
AstraZeneca decision will be examined in the following section. 
 
                                                 
416 Steven Preece, p. 121.  
417 Id.  
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7 AstraZeneca & Its Defence of 
Losec 
Traditionally, the Commission’s antitrust enforcement activity in the 
pharmaceutical sector has focused on removing private obstacles to parallel 
trade in pharmaceuticals within the Single Market. With the AstraZeneca 
decision in the Summer of 2005, however, the Commission adopted its first 
abuse of dominance decision in that sector.418 In particular, the Decision is 
the first antitrust case in which the Commission has tackled misuse of patent 
and drug regulatory approval systems in the pharmaceutical industry on the 
basis of Article 82 of the EC Treaty, that way blocking or delaying market 
generic entry.419 The main findings of this case will be examined below. 
However, for a proper understanding of the facts of the case it is necessary 
to first highlight the main features of the pharmaceutical industry.   
 
The pharmaceutical industry is a high technology and knowledge intensive 
industry consisting of two categories of undertakings; The first category is 
composed of large multinational pharmaceutical undertakings, which are 
responsible for the majority of the R&D investment, hold the majority of the 
patents and often dominate the markets for patent protected prescription 
medicines. For these undertakings, innovation is crucial as competition on 
this level revolves around developing new or improved medicines. By way 
of contrast, the second category is composed of a number of often smaller 
companies, which carry out relatively little R&D of their own, produce off-
patent generic medicines or patented medicines under licence and compete 
mainly in terms of price, service and efficiency.420
The research-based category operates on a high-risk/high-reward basis. 
Since relatively few of the created chemical entities ever receive marketing 
approval,421 and of these, even fewer are commercially successful, the R&D 
process in the pharmaceutical industry is indeed an extremely lengthy, 
costly and risky business. On the other hand, a best selling medicine can be 
extremely profitable. According to OECD figures, 75 per cent of 
pharmaceutical company profits come from only 10 per cent of all 
medicines. Moreover, for some pharmaceutical undertakings, two or three 
products account for 70 to 80 per cent of their total sales.422  
                                                 
418 COMP/37.507 — Generics/Astra Zeneca, 15 .06.2005. See ‘AstraZeneca: the first abuse 
case in the pharmaceutical sector.’ EC Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 3 — 
Autumn 2005, p. 54. See also ‘Competition in Pharmaceuticals: the challenges ahead post 
AstraZeneca’,418 Nadia De Souza, Directorate-General for Competition, unit B-2, EC 
Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 1 – Spring 2007, p. 39 f. 
419 See Gunther & Breuvart, p. 669; Lawrance &  Treacy, p. 7. 
420 Gunther & Breuvart, p. 669. 
421 According to OECD, for every 10,000 products patented, only 100 will reach human 
trials and only 10 will be marketed. See Biggar, Darryl R., ‘Competition and regulation 
issues in the pharmaceutical industry’ (February 6, 2001), Org. for Economic Co-operation 
& Dev., Best Practice Roundtables in Competition Policy No. 32, p. 91. Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=318769 or 10.2139/ssrn.318769. Visited on June 20, 2007. 
422 Id. p.91. 
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The long term prosperity of research based pharmaceutical undertakings 
thus depends solely on their ability to continually develop superior new 
medical products and to profitably market these medicines. In this context, 
strong IP protection is necessary to ensure that companies can recoup their 
R&D expenditure and be rewarded for their innovative efforts. In particular,  
as R&D is funded almost exclusively from the profits resulting from the 
exclusive rights during patents' lifetime, the protection of patents is 
fundamental. Indeed, when the patent finally expires, the brand name 
manufacturer can no longer prevent generic manufacturers from producing 
and selling medicines, which are bio-equivalent to its previously patented 
medicine. Even though the competitive impact of generic entry will vary 
upon brand loyalty and price elasticity of the demand, it tends to be 
significant. As the average price of a generic medicine is typically between 
50 and 70 per cent of the average price of the original brand name 
alternative, it is not unusual for a generic medicine in the US to achieve a 50 
per cent market share within a year of patent expiration.423
For the just mentioned reasons, and in particular to offset the substantial 
costs and delays associated with obtaining marketing approval, many legal 
systems (including the European Community and the US) have extended the 
duration of patent protection in the pharmaceutical industry. However, in 
order to keep health costs low, they have also adopted policies seeking to 
encourage competition by generic manufacturers and consumption of lower 
cost generic medicines by consumers once the patents expire.424
Obviously, these latter policy measures have not been welcomed by the  
pharmaceutical industry. In their efforts to preserve exclusive rights and 
profits resulting from their costly patents against aggressively competing 
generic manufacturers, brand name pharmaceutical undertakings have 
implemented various practices that have given rise to antitrust scrutiny not 
only from the US FTC and Courts but –  as is evident from the AstraZeneca 
decision – recently also by the European Commission.425
7.1 Background & Arguments 
The Commission investigation of AstraZeneca’s (AZ’s)426 practices with 
respect to its Losec medicine started in 1999, following a complaint 
received from a generic group concerning alleged activities undertaken by 
Astra.427 At that time, Losec, which initially received patent protection in 
Europe in 1979 for pioneering a new generation of medicines to treat 
stomach ulcers, had become the world's best-selling prescription 
medicine.428 Following dawn raids at the company's premises in the UK and 
                                                 
423 Id. p.100; See also FTC, ‘Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration, An FTC 
Study, July 2002’, p.9. Available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf. 
Visited on June 20, 2007. 
424 See Gunther & Breuvart, pp. 676-80. 
425 See Gunther & Breuvart, pp. 669-70.  
426 AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca Plc. 
427 The merger of Astra AB with Zeneca to form AstraZeneca plc was completed in 1999. 
See AstraZeneca’s Brief on Alleged Infringement of Article 82 EC, June 2005, p. 3*. 
428 Gunther & Breuvart, p. 677. 
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in Sweden in 2000, the Commission opened formal proceedings by issuing a 
Statement of Objections outlining its preliminary findings in 2003.429 At 
AZ's request, an oral hearing was held in February 2004.  
After a six-year investigation, the Commission concluded that AZ had 
infringed Article 82 EC and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement430 by virtue 
of certain actions in the 1990s, which allegedly afforded protection to its 
Losec (omeprazole) products from competition from generic versions in a 
number of Member States.431 AZ was found to hold a dominant position in 
the market for proton pump inhibitors (PPIs) and to have abused this 
dominant position by (i) making deliberate misrepresentations before 
national patent offices and courts to obtain and preserve extended patent 
protection, through so-called supplementary protection certificates (SPCs) 
for Losec; and (ii) misusing the rules and procedures applied by national 
medicines agencies when issuing market authorisations for medicines by 
selectively withdrawing market authorisations for Losec capsules in various 
Member States.432
AZ responded by rejecting the Commission’s allegations.433 According to 
AZ, the Commission case was ‘legally and factually flawed’ and the actions 
of Astra ‘misconstrued’. Moreover, AZ argued that the Competition’s very 
narrow definition of the concept of dominance meant that almost any 
company introducing an innovative product would be at risk of being held 
‘dominant’ with the special responsibility not to impair competition. This, it 
argued, would discourage such companies from competing on the merits, 
even though they were not on a true analysis dominant. In AZ’s opinion, 
such a constraint would discourage open competition and ultimately 
innovation and competitiveness.434  
More specifically, AZ argued that it had supplied detailed evidence negating 
the allegation that Astra had occupied a dominant position in the appropriate 
                                                 
429 European Commission Press Release IP/ 03/1136, ‘Commission warns AstraZeneca of 
preliminary findings in Losec antitrust investigation’, July 31, 2003. Available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/1136&format=HTML&age
d=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. See also AstraZeneca’s press release of 31 July 
2003, available at http://www.astrazeneca.com/pressrelease/571.aspx. Visited on July 5, 
2007.  
430 Article 54 of the EEA Agreement contains the same prohibition as Article 82 EC with 
regard to the EEA. Under Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2894 of 28 November 
1994 concerning arrangements for implementing the Agreement on the European Economic 
Area ‘the Community rules giving effect to the principles set out in [Articles 81 and 82 EC] 
shall apply mutatis mutandis. (OJ L 305, 30.11.1994, p. 6). The case law of the ECJ and the 
CFI in relation to interpretation of Article 82 of the Treaty applies equally to Article 54 of 
the EEA Agreement. See Article 6 of the EEA Agreement, Article 3 (2) of the EEA 
Surveillance and Court Agreement, as well as Case E-1/94 of 16.12.1994, paras. 32-35. 
431 See the Decision, p. 2, recital 2.  
432 See the Decision, p. 2. recitals 3-5. See also Gunther & Breuvart, p. 677-78; Lawrance & 
Treacy, p. 7; Alexander Böhlke, ‘Monopolies and Market Dominance: Waiting for 
Modernisation’, G.C.R. 2005, 8(9) Supp (The European Antitrust Review 2006), 50-52, p. 
2.  See also www.simmons-simmons.com June 2005, p. 1. Visited on June 20, 2007. 
433 See AstraZeneca’s ‘Brief on Alleged Infringement of Article 82 EC’, June 2005. 
Available at 
http://www.astrazeneca.com/sites/7/imagebank/typearticleparam511187/astrazeneca-ec-
omeprazole-investigation-brief.pdf. Visited on June 20, 2007. 
434 Id. p. 1. 
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market in the 1990s. According to AZ, the Commission adopted a narrow 
and unsustainable product market definition that failed to take account of 
the competitive constraints imposed on Losec435 by H2 antagonists and 
competing PPI’s.436
In relation to the alleged ‘SPC abuse’, AZ did not accept as alleged by the 
Commission, that Astra made any deliberate misrepresentations to patent 
offices or courts to obtain or preserve extended patent protection. In AZ’s 
view, ‘[e]ntitlement to SPCs was sufficiently complex that even the highest 
German court did not consider the interpretation of the law was clear and 
asked the ECJ for a ruling on interpretation that was eventually handed 
down in December 2003’. Moreover, ‘[t]he ECJ made no suggestion of 
deliberate misrepresentation on the part of Astra, and AZ maintains that a 
good faith, reasonable approach was taken at all times.’ Furthermore, AZ 
argued that the Commission had confirmed that it was not alleging that 
Astra had misused its IPRs in any way. Also, AZ put forward, there was no 
case law establishing that an Article 82 infringement could arise solely from 
the way in which a company deals with national patent offices.437
As to the ‘MUPS abuse’ allegedly committed by selectively withdrawing 
market authorisations for Losec capsules and replacing them with the 
MUPS tablet formulation, AZ argued that these were legitimate business 
decisions by some of Astra’s local marketing companies.438 Finally, AZ 
argued, that the Commission had not taken into account the fact that generic 
companies, if they so wished, could have relied on published literature to 
secure their own marketing authorisations, irrespective of the existence (or 
not) of Astra’s product registrations. 439
7.2 The Commission Decision 
Nevertheless, the Commission found that AZ had, from 1993 to 2000, 
abused its dominant position on the PPI market440 and thus infringed Article 
82 EC (as well as Article 54 of the EEA Agreement) by: 
                                                 
435 According to AstraZeneca ‘H2 antagonists were the first products used in the treatment 
of treatment stomach acid disorders and were the established therapy at the later time of the 
introduction of Losec, the first PPI. The H2 antagonist Zantac, marketed by GSK, was a 
leader in this class of medicines. Patents for Zantac expired between 1997-2002 in the UK 
and US. In 1999, Zantac had worldwide sales of $1.037bn’. Id. p. 3**. 
436 Id. p. 2. 
437 Id. 
438 According to AstraZeneca, the MUPS formulation offered significant benefits over 
capsules for certain categories of patients and its launch in 48 countries worldwide belied 
Commission claims about its selective introduction in Europe. Moreover, product 
withdrawals were undeniably a part of normal business practice by Astra’s local marketing 
companies and were within the bounds of applicable law. Consequently, it was not 
unlawful to withdraw the registrations for those products. 
439 See AstraZeneca’s Brief, p. 3. 
440 The decision emphasises Losec's unique mode of operation and therapeutic superiority. 
As a breakthrough product protected by IPRs it effectively creates its own market, leading 
to AZ’s dominance in the period of patent/SPC protection. The decision suggests IP owners 
are less likely to have such a gatekeeper status outside the pharmaceutical sector. See 
Sophie Lawrance in Managing Intellectual Property, at 
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(i) the pattern of misleading representations before patent offices in 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United 
Kingdom and before national courts in Germany and Norway;441 and 
(ii) their requests for the surrender of the market authorisations for Losec 
capsules in Denmark, Norway and Sweden combined with their withdrawal 
from the market of Losec capsules and launch of Losec MUPS tablets in 
those three countries. 
For these infringements essentially consisting in preventing or delaying 
market entry of generic versions of Losec (omeprazole based products) the 
Commission fined AZ €60 million.442
7.2.1 The Two Abuses 
The Decision considers that both infringements were committed with the 
intention of unfairly restricting competition from generics and parallel 
imports.443 The two abuses will be looked at separately below. 
 
7.2.1.1 Misleading Representations 
In relation to the first abuse – AZ’s misleading representations as part of its 
SPC strategy for omeprazole444 – the Commission found that, beginning in 
1993, the applicants had engaged in the pattern of deliberate 
misrepresentation to patent agents, patent offices and national courts in 
order to obtain SPCs to which they knew they were not entitled for their 
patented product omeprazole, the active substance in Losec.  
According to Regulation 1768/92/EEC,445 holders of patents protecting 
medicinal products are able to apply for an extension of up to five years of 
the term of their patent beyond the patent period of 20 years by filing for a 
‘Supplementary Protection Certificate’. SPCs are a means to ensure that 
pharmaceutical companies will benefit from a period of marketing 
exclusivity, which is sufficient for them to recoup their initial R&D costs 
and, in fine, to protect pharmaceutical research in the EC.446  
                                                                                                                            
http://www.managingip.com/includes/magazine/PRINT.asp?SID=648513&ISS=22412&P
UBID=34. 
441 See the Decision, Article 1, p. 1  and Article 1, p. 2, p. 198. 
442 Id. Article 2 of the Decision. Note that when determining the level of the fine to be 
imposed on AZ (which technically could have been much higher than €60 million), the 
Commission took into account the novelty of the case under European competition law as 
mitigating against heavier financial sanction. 
443 See Case T-321/05 – AstraZeneca v Commission, Action brought on 25 August 2005 
Official Journal C 271, 29/10/2005 p. 24. The Commission relies on evidence suggesting 
that there was a centrally adopted strategy to reduce competition from generic entrants and, 
in certain cases, parallel trade. It infers that the conduct was not ‘normal’ competition on 
the merits from AZ’s awareness that its interpretations of the law were questionable. 
Compare Sophie Lawrance in Managing Intellectual Property, at 
http://www.managingip.com/includes/magazine/PRINT.asp?SID=648513&ISS=22412&P
UBID=34. 
444 See pp. 133-167 of the AZ Decision, in particular pp.166-67 and recitals 773-76.  
445 Regulation concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for 
medicinal products, [1992] O.J. L182/1. 
446 See Gunther & Breuvart, p. 678; www.simmons-simmons.com June 2005, p. 2.  
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Pursuant to Article 19 of the Regulation, products such as Losec, which 
were already on the market when the Regulation came into force were 
entitled to SPCs only if their first marketing authorisation in the EU was 
granted after certain cut-off dates. At the time AZ filed its applications the 
interpretation of ‘first marketing authorisation’ was far from certain. In fact, 
it was not until the German Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) made an Article 234 
EC reference on the point to the ECJ that the expression was clarified.447 
Nevertheless, the Commission found that AZ concealed the date on which it 
had received its first authorisation for Losec (as this was given prior to the 
decisive dates in the Regulation), thereby enabling it to obtain extra 
protection for Losec in various Member States.448 AZ’s pattern of 
misleading representations and concealment was viewed as an ‘overall SPC 
Strategy’. On this basis, it was concluded that AZ had abused its dominant 
position within the meaning of Article 82 EC in Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK and within the meaning Article 54 of 
the EEA Agreement in Norway. The said abuse, which was found to have 
been carried out during two stages with a view to preventing, or at least 
delaying, generic market entry, was of a single and continuous nature.449
 
7.2.1.2 Misuse of Regulatory Procedures 
As to the second abuse – the selective capsule deregistration combined with 
the tablet/capsule switch as part of AZ’s Losec post patent strategy450– the 
Commission found that in 1998/1999 the applicants had operated the 
strategy of selectively withdrawing their original Losec capsules, replacing 
them with tablets (but maintaining the same dose of active ingredient), and 
subsequently, following applications by generic firms for authorisation in 
1998, requesting the deregistration of the marketing authorisations for the 
capsules in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.451  
                                                 
447 Case C-127/00, Hässle AB v Ratiopharm GmbH [2003] E.C.R. I-14781. The first 
marketing authorisation was held to be the date of grant of the authorisation to place the 
products on the market as medicinal products in the Member State in which the application 
was submitted. (‘According to the judgment [...] it is the technical authorisation which is 
decisive pursuant to Article 19 of the SPC Regulation.’, see the AZ Decision, recital 740, 
pp. 158-59.) See also www.simmons-simmons.com June 2005, p. 2. 
448 ‘…this Decision raises no objections against AZ for having incorrectly interpreted the 
relevant law (in casu the SPC Regulation) […] but concerns AZ’s pattern of misleading 
representations to patent agents, patent offices and national courts as part of its overall SPC 
Strategy for omeprazole. Against this background, the proceedings and the outcome in Case 
C-127/00 Hässle […] are not decisive for this Decision [...] Any lack of clarity in the SPC 
Regulation and in particular Article 19 thereof cannot therefore justify AZ’s misleading 
representations and concealment as part of its SPC Strategy.’ See p. 143 and recital 666 of 
the AZ Decision. See also Lawrance & Treacy, pp. 7-8. 
449 The misleading representations were initially made by AZ in the form of its instructions 
to patent agents and applications to patent offices in relation to omeprazole in June 1993 
and November-December 1994 in inter alia the six countries mentioned above. Later, AZ 
also persisted in its misleading representations before the patent offices in Belgium, the 
Netherlands and the UK as well as before national courts in Germany and Norway. See 
recitals 773-74 of the AZ Decision. 
450 See pp. 167-87 of the AZ Decision, in particular pp. 186-87 and recitals 860-62. 
451 Note that Lawrance & Treacy (p. 8) argue that if one compares this part of AZ’s conduct 
with the established abuse of refusing to supply (since the withdrawal of the Losec 
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Under the relevant legislation at the time of the deregistration there was 
some doubt as to whether, as a consequence, the generic applications should 
be granted. In addition, in at least one case, the regulatory authorities 
withdrew a parallel import licence for the capsules. Generic firms and 
parallel importers were in litigation with AZ on this matter with the ultimate 
involvement of the ECJ.452 Following the ECJ’s judgements in 2003, 
Council Directive 2001/83/EEC on the Community Code relating to 
medicinal products for human use was amended by Directive 2004/27/EEC 
of 31 March 2004. As the law now stands, the first marketing authorisation 
for a product will form the basis of a global authorisation which will include 
subsequent authorisations relating to changes in formulation, strength etc. of 
the medicine.453 Thus, the withdrawal of the authorisation for one version of 
the product should not affect access to the market for generic manufacturers 
or parallel importers.454
However, irrespective of any uncertainty at the time of the practice, the 
Commission found that the strategy of selectively changing from Losec 
capsules to tablets or selectively withdrawing marketing authorisations for 
the capsules amounted to misuse of regulatory procedures. This meant that 
AZ had abused its dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 EC in 
Denmark and Sweden, and within the meaning of Article 54 of the EEA 
Agreement in Norway, with a view to preventing, or at least delaying, 
generic market entry and parallel trade. Also this abuse was of a single and 
continuous nature, which followed in part from the high degree of 
centralisation and coordination at the top level within AZ that characterises 
the abusive behaviour. Moreover, the abusive behaviour was held to have 
formed part of a common strategy of a pan-European nature.455
7.2.2 The Exclusionary Strategies  
For the purposes of the present thesis – vexatious litigation – focus will be 
on the first abuse and the exclusionary strategies directed at generic and 
research competitors. 
                                                                                                                            
marketing authorization in effect deprived generic competitors of something they needed to 
be able to enter the market), the AZ Decision arguably implies that a dominant company is 
under an obligation not only to continue to supply existing customers (as is clearly 
established by case law) but to supply all comers. Under existing case law, obligations to 
supply new customers have been imposed only in very unusual circumstances, such as 
‘essential facilities’ cases, where access to the facility is indispensable for market entry. ‘A 
marketing authorization for an individual product cannot realistically be regarded as 
indispensable, as its existence does not preclude others from developing competing drugs 
for the same indication or, indeed, from compiling their own data.’ 
452 See the preliminary ruling in Case C-223/01, AstraZeneca A/S v Laegemiddelstyrelsen 
[2003] E.C.R. I-11809 and Case C-113/01, Paranova Oy [2003] E.C.R. I-4243. 
453 See Art.6(1) and Art.10(1) of Directive 2001/83 on the Community Code relating to 
medical products for human use, as amended by Directive 2004/27. 
454 See Gunther & Breuvart, p. 679; www.simmons-simmons.com June 2005, pp. 2-3.  
In order to support its decision, the Commission indicated that the finding of the ‘de-
registration’ abuse ‘cannot [...] affect incentives to innovate’, in so far as marketing 
authorisations (unlike patents and SPCs) are not intended to reward innovation, but instead 
merely give the right to sell products on the market. See recital 843, pp. 181-82.  
455 See the AZ Decision, recitals 860-61, p.186. 
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7.2.2.1 Directed at Generic Competitors 
Regarding the first abuse, the Commission found not only that the SPCs 
falsely granted had enabled AZ to threaten and sue competitors,456 but also 
that AZ had continued to rely on the misleading representations in national 
courts when AZ’s initial misleading conduct vis-à-vis the patent offices 
resulted in proceedings (brought by generic manufacturers with a view to 
invalidating AZ’s SPCs).457  
Citing ITT Promedia,458 the Commission argued that such use of public 
procedures and regulation, including administrative and judicial processes, 
may, in specific circumstances, constitute an abuse.459  
Moreover, in response to AZ’s argument based on the special treatment of 
IPRs, the Commission, again citing ITT Promedia, stated that ‘both the 
acquisition of a right and its enforcement may in themselves constitute an 
abuse’.460  
According to the Commission, the special responsibility incumbent on 
dominant undertakings not to impair genuine undistorted competition also 
covered the possible use of public procedures and regulations, including 
administrative and judicial processes, with the clear purpose of excluding 
competitors.461
Furthermore, in response to AZ’s argument that conduct as a defendant 
could not be abusive, the Commission added: ‘Contrary to the claims by 
AZ, relying on the judgement in ITT Promedia462, the Commission has not 
concluded that the conduct of defence cannot constitute an abuse. It simply 
argued that, by itself, such conduct could not be conceived as forming part 
of a plan to eliminate competition. In this case, the Commission has 
demonstrated that the misleading representations before certain national 
courts are part of the implementation of such a plan.’463
Whilst ‘initiating legal proceedings could, in certain circumstances, be 
abusive in so far as the aim was to harass the opposing party by imposing 
costs and delay upon that party, the conduct of a defence could not be 
equated, as a matter of course, to the institution of legal proceedings.’ 
Considering that a finding of abuse would severely limit the right of access 
to courts, such a finding could only be established ‘in wholly exceptional 
circumstances’. However, ‘[i]n this case, the costs and delays associated 
with legal proceedings were not the result of AZ’s defence, but of AZ’s 
initial misleading representations leading to the granting of SPCs’. In other 
                                                 
456 See p. 164, recital 760. 
457 See recitals 629 and 681, (pp. 136 and 146 resp.); in particular p. 155 f., recital 727 f. 
458 Case T-111/96 ITT Promedia.  
459 See recital 327, fn. 447, p. 80 and recital 743, fn. 602, p. 159.  
460 See recital 742 and fn. 601, p. 159, referring to ITT Promedia, paragraph 139. See also 
recital 328, fn. 448, p. 80. Note the way in which the Commission sidelines the distinction 
between the ‘existence’ and ‘exercise’ of IPRs, focussing instead on the concept of the 
‘subject matter’ of the right. See Sophie Lawrance in Managing Intellectual Property, at 
http://www.managingip.com/includes/magazine/PRINT.asp?SID=648513&ISS=22412&P
UBID=34. 
461 See recital 747, pp. 160-61 (referring to recitals 324-28). See in particular recitals 325, 
327 and fn. 446, pp. 79-80. 
462 ITT Promedia, paragraph 42. 
463 See recitals 736-37, p. 158. 
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words, ‘AZ’s conduct of its defence before the national courts concerned 
was simply the continuation of the pattern of misleading representations 
initiated by AZ well before the competitors instituted proceedings, and not 
the cause of the costs and delays suffered by them.’464  
‘In such circumstances it [was] not necessary to consider whether, by itself, 
the conduct of a defence based on misleading representations could qualify 
as abusive on its own, considering that AZ knew perfectly well at the time 
of making the misleading representations in question that Losec [had not 
been entitled to extended protection], and could therefore not be said to have 
asserted, at that moment, rights which it could reasonably have considered 
to be its own’.465
 
7.2.2.2 Directed at Research Competitors 
In addition to these exclusionary strategies directed at generic competitors, 
the Commission also established that AZ had been able to use both its 
substance and other patents to exert considerable pressure on its research 
based competitors Takeda, Byk Gulden and Esai through patent litigation in 
numerous countries. These actions all resulted in overall settlements more or 
less dictated by AZ. That way, AZ had in effect been able – through its 
patents – to put pressure on, and raise the costs of, its much smaller 
competitors.466  
However, rather than suggesting that AZ’s legal actions had not been 
legitimate, the Commission viewed the actions instituted by AZ as relevant 
when assessing its dominance.467  
Through the infringement proceedings, AZ had been able, to a large extent, 
to dictate the terms of Takeda’s continued existence on certain markets and 
its right to enter other markets on a worldwide scale.468  
Moreover, as emerged from internal documents,469 a ‘worldwide campaign 
of patent litigation against Byk Gulden had been carefully planned by AZ at 
the highest level of the company’. The same documents indicated that patent 
litigation was ‘lengthy and, therefore, costly’, imposing a greater 
proportionate burden on the smaller competitor.470 The fact that Byk Gulden 
had brought claims for patent invalidity was in the Commission’s view 
irrelevant, as the bringing of counterclaims was held to be a standard 
defensive reaction of a company subjected to patent infringement 
proceedings in the pharmaceutical sector. It did not put the company sued 
on an equal footing vis-à-vis the litigant.471
                                                 
464 See recital 738, p. 158.  
465 See recital 739, p. 159, referring to ITT Promedia, paragraphs 73, 93, 111 and 116. 
466 See recitals 87-96, pp. 21-23 and recitals 521-5, p. 117. 
467 See recital 535, p. 120.  
468 See recital 537, p. 120.  
469 (See recital 93.) 
470 (See recitals 78-86.) 
471 See recitals 538-39, p. 120.  
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7.2.3 The ‘Vexatious Litigation Doctrine’ Post 
AstraZeneca 
AstraZeneca is the first antitrust case in which the Commission has tackled 
misconduct before national authorities in the pharmaceutical industry on the 
basis of Article 82 EC. The Decision, which represents a step further in the 
Commission's already strict approach to sanctioning restrictions on parallel 
imports and on market access for generic products,472 introduces abuse of 
the patent system as a novel type of infringement of Article 82 EC and lays 
down that delaying generic entry is an abuse of a dominant position.473  
Arguably, however, the AstraZeneca decision also reaffirms and clarifies 
the earlier ‘vexatious litigation doctrine’ developed in ITT Promedia. Alone 
the fact that the Commission in its Decision refers seven times to that 
case,474 may be seen to support such a conclusion. In relation to the conduct 
of defence as a potential abuse under Article 82 EC, it could even be argued 
that the Commission has taken the Promedia doctrine one step further.475  
On the other hand, the Commission does not once comment or develop on 
the ITT Promedia criteria. Nor does it view AZ’s litigation tactics on its 
own as an abuse. Instead, it uses the litigation tactics to support its finding 
of dominance as well as the overall picture of AZ’s abusive strategy 
originating in the misleading representations.476 From these considerations 
one could draw the conclusion that the Commission in its AstraZeneca 
decision clearly was not able or willing to fully give effect to an EC 
‘vexatious litigation doctrine’.  
Irrespective of which opinion one favours, the Decision leaves many 
questions unanswered, hopefully to be clarified in the pending appeal.477
 
7.2.3.1 Can Groundless Threats Suffice? 
First, while it appears more or less settled that the vexatious institution of 
legal proceedings could constitute an abuse, the AstraZeneca decision did 
not give much guidance as to groundless threats and the question whether 
this could amount to an abuse under Article 82 EC.478
 
7.2.3.2 Conduct of Defence as an Abuse? 
Second, whilst the Commission clarifies that the conduct of defence could 
not be equated, as a matter of course, to the vexatious institution of legal 
proceedings, and though by itself, such conduct could not be conceived as 
forming part of a plan to eliminate competition, the Commission 
                                                 
472 See Gunther & Breuvart, p. 679. See also Lawrance & Treacy, p. 8, where it is argued 
that ‘comparisons with existing types of abuse [under Article 82 EC] suggest that the 
Commission is pushing the boundaries of the provision’. 
473 See Gunther & Breuvart, p. 669; Lawrance & Treacy, p. 7. 
474 See the Decision, fn. 446-48 (p. 80); p. 158 and fn. 597-98; fn. 601-2 (p. 159). 
475 See below. 
476 Compare above.  
477 Case T-321/05, AstraZeneca v. Commission, Action brought on 25 August 2005. 
478 In this respect, the stance taken in ITT Promedia was thus maintained. 
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nevertheless states that the conduct of a defence cannot be ruled out as an 
abuse. However, as the Commission did not find it necessary, on the facts of 
the case, to consider whether, by itself, the conduct of defence based on 
misleading representations could qualify as abusive on its own, this 
important question was left unanswered.479
 
7.2.3.3 Harassing Litigation as a Factor Indicating 
Dominance? 
Third, in relation to the legal actions against the research competitors, the 
Commission does not question AZ’s assertion that these were legitimate, but 
states that ‘the legal actions instituted by AZ are nevertheless highly 
relevant for assessing its dominance in this case’. Considering that it had 
been proven that AZ saw these patent litigations as a practical and effective 
measure to impose a burden on smaller competitors, this approach may 
seem somewhat odd. Was this kind of behaviour not exactly of the harassing 
kind that should itself constitute an abuse under ITT Promedia? 
 
7.2.3.4 Widening of the Special Responsibility? 
Finally, it seems that the rather vague concept of special responsibility 
incumbent on dominant undertakings now covers the even vaguer ‘doctrine 
of vexatious litigation’ in cases where legal proceedings are used with an 
exclusionary intent.480 Consequently, the many uncertainties surrounding 
the potential abuse are likely to impose a heavy burden on dominant 
undertakings, or undertakings that fear that they might be considered to be 
dominant. This is especially so in industries such as the pharmaceutical 
industry, in which IPRs are of particular significance and where 
infringement actions, and the threat of such actions, are commonplace.481
7.3 The Pending Appeal 
In the appeal brought on 25 August 2005, AZ is seeking to quash the 
Commission's Decision. The applicants challenge it on several levels;  
(i) First of all, AZ alleges that the Commission mistakenly defined the 
relevant market as being only that of proton pump inhibitors (PPIs), used for 
the treatment of gastrointestinal acid related diseases, and excluded 
histamine receptor antagonists (H2 blockers) from the relevant market. 
                                                 
479 Still, if contrasted with the less permissive statements in ITT Promedia, the reasoning in 
the AstraZeneca decision may nevertheless be seen as a development. 
480 See recital 747, p. 160: ‘In any event, the special responsibility incumbent on dominant 
undertakings not to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market also 
covers the possible use of public procedures or regulations with the clear purpose of 
excluding competitors, in particular where the authorities or bodies applying such 
procedures or regulations have no or little discretion (see recitals (324)-(328)).’ 
481 Whish, p. 680. See also Lara J. Glasgow, ‘Stretching the Limits of IPRs: Has the 
Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?’, 41 IDEA 227 (2001), at 231. Available at 
http://www.idea.piercelaw.edu/articles/41/41_2/2.Glasgow.pdf. Visited on June 20, 2007. 
See further Gunther & Breuvart, p. 669.  
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(ii) According to AZ, the contested Decision does not consider whether the 
applicants would still be in a dominant position if H2 blockers were 
included in the relevant market. Obviously, such a market definition would 
influence the Commission’s finding of dominance.  
The applicants further challenge the Commission's findings of  
infringements on legal grounds; 
(iii) Regarding the alleged misrepresentations with respect to patents, AZ 
considers that such misleading representations made in the course of 
applications for IPRs cannot in law amount to an abuse unless and until the 
dishonestly obtained rights are enforced or are capable of being enforced.  
(iv) AZ also consider that Article 82 EC, properly interpreted, did not 
impose on them an obligation to maintain a marketing authorisation for a 
product they no longer marketed, merely because it would make it easier for 
generics and parallel traders to compete with it. 
The applicants also challenge the Commission's findings of infringement on 
factual ground.  
(v) AZ submits that the Commission failed to adduce evidence proving to 
the correct legal standard [in relation to] the alleged abuse of IPRs and 
that, furthermore,  
(vi) there was no strategy for selectively changing from 'Losec' capsules to 
tablets or selectively withdrawing marketing authorisations for the 
capsules.482
 
Like other cases on anti-competitive abuses, the AstraZeneca decision is 
clearly controversial. The final word as to whether it was merely competing 
on the merits or whether it is guilty of abusive behaviour has not yet been 
spoken. Indeed, there is a very fine – sometimes invisible – line between 
these two positions,483 especially, where as here, the facts are subject to 
dispute and new abuses are involved. There is no doubt that the pending 
appeal is about to set a very important example. It will be interesting to see 
whether the CFI follows the Commission’s line of reasoning. However, it is 
not unlikely that the ECJ will have the final word.484
Until then, pharmaceutical companies holding a dominant position in the 
Community will need to take care that their conduct towards national 
authorities does not lead to foreclosure of competition by blocking or 
delaying market access for generic versions or parallel imports of their 
protected medicine.485 This effect of the decision may, as will be seen in the 
next section, be easier to reconcile with the body of US cases where certain 
abuses of administrative systems as well as of the court process have been 
held to infringe antitrust law, than with the Article 82 review process which 
aims at adopting a more flexible, economics-based approach and at 
encouraging innovation. 
                                                 
482 See the pending appeal, Case T-321/05, AstraZeneca v. Commission, OJ 2005 C271/24. 
483 Compare Whish, p. 196-97.  
484 Compare www.simmons-simmons.com, p. 1.   
485 Id. pp. 1 and 3.   
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8 Vexatious Patent Litigation – 
EC & US Approaches 
Compared 
As shown above, case law regarding anticompetitive patent infringement 
actions on the interface between IP and competition law keeps evolving, 
until now mainly on a US – but gradually it seems, also on an EC – basis.486 
However, while vexatious litigation issues have given rise to several 
landmark cases in the US, the Community Courts have so far neither 
explicitly challenged this kind of anticompetitive behaviour, nor fully 
recognised any vexatious litigation doctrine under Article 82 EC.  
Part of the explanation for this may be that the behaviour in question 
hitherto has been rare in the EC. In addition, in the EC (unlike in the US) a 
vexatious litigant could only ever be caught if implemented by a company 
which is dominant in the first place, something which further reduces the 
number of cases which could form a basis for a developing doctrine.  
Nevertheless, with the recent AstraZeneca decision provided by the 
European Commission, there is now clear case law on both sides of the 
Atlantic to challenge abuses of governmental procedures – including the 
court process – in relation to IPRs. In particular, this is the case where the 
misuse of IPR systems and procedures is aimed at extending IP protection 
(so-called ever-greening) and, thereby, at blocking or delaying potential 
competitors from entering the market.487 Arguably, this may have opened 
the door for further convergence in the vexatious litigation context.  
8.1 Curtailment of the Right to Bring 
Patent Infringement Actions 
The fact that patent litigation, when pursued as a strategy, generally 
involves extremely high stakes tends to increase its strategic and 
competitive importance to firms interested in excluding unwanted rivals. 
Instituting patent infringement proceedings clearly represents one potential 
way in which undertakings exploit the right of access to the courts for 
competitive and strategic benefit. That way, private litigation against 
competitors creates a potential tool for harassing, harming and extorting 
them.488 To prevent such use of the court process, the US and EC systems 
                                                 
 & Ferla, p. 8. 486 Eccles
487 See Lawrance & Treacy, p. 7; Eccles & Ferla, p. 8.  
488 Compare R. Preston McAfee1 and Nicholas V. Vakkur, ‘The Strategic Abuse of the 
Antitrust Laws’, Journal of Strategic Management Education 2004 1(3), Senate Hall 
Academic Publishing, pp. 3-4. As it is likely to be much more expensive for the defendant 
firm to defend against a patent infringement lawsuit than for the plaintiff firm to bring the 
suit, vexatious litigation is a useful strategic tool in attacking a rival. One way for the 
defendant to defend themselves is to attack in response. Antitrust suits are frequently filed 
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(as was seen above) have invented different rules that, albeit subject to strict 
conditions and only in exceptional circumstances, can restrict the 
fundamental right of access to the courts. The question is however, if the 
rules really are as different as they at first glance may seem. Perhaps it may 
even be argued that the Commission’s AstraZeneca Decision constitutes 
proof of an EC approach converging with the different approaches in the 
US. It may thus be worth comparing the Commission’s approach in 
AstraZeneca with the three main US theories examined above, each of 
which warrant exception from the Noerr-Pennington immunity and thereby 
the right of access to the courts.  
8.2 EC and US Convergence? 
As was seen above, a vexatious plaintiff’s purposeful anticompetitive 
conduct will be caught under Section 2 of the Sherman Act if the plaintiff 
company obtains a patent by committing a Walker Process fraud on the 
PTO and then attempts to enforce that patent on its competitor. According 
to the Commission allegations, AZ had obtained not its patent, but the SPCs 
as a direct result of its misrepresentations before the national patent offices, 
and then tried to enforce the extended patent protection on its competitors in 
the national courts, not only through the conduct of defence (in relation to 
its generic competitors), but also through infringement actions initiated by 
AZ itself (against its research competitors). Even if one would accept AZ’s 
argument concerning the legal uncertainty and that the SPCs were not 
secured by fraud, the fact would still remain that AZ eventually did come to 
know that the certificates were invalid, but still pursued the infringement 
actions. In the US, AZ’s behaviour would therefore most likely be viewed 
as problematic under the Walker Process doctrine. However, upon a 
comparison with the reasoning in the actual Decision it is evident that the 
Commission did not seek to take the Promedia doctrine this far. Indeed, an 
independent abuse in ‘Walker Process form’ therefore seems unlikely to 
receive recognition in the Community, at least within the nearest future.  
 
However, as was also seen above, a litigant enforcing its IPR may also lose 
antitrust immunity and violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act if the lawsuit is 
held to be a ‘sham’ under the two-fold Professional Real Estate (PRE) test.  
As was pointed out above, the Commission’s AstraZeneca decision states 
that ‘AZ knew perfectly well at the time of making the misleading 
representations in question that Losec [had not been entitled to extended 
protection], and could therefore not be said to have asserted, at that moment, 
rights which it could reasonably have considered to be its own’. Nor can AZ 
or any reasonable litigant therefore realistically have expected success on 
the merits, as AZ both knew that the SPCs were invalid and that there 
therefore had been no infringement of the patent right. As to AZ’s 
subjective motivation, it is evident from the internal documents that the 
baseless lawsuits concealed an attempt to interfere directly with the business 
                                                                                                                            
in response to other suits, because they balance the settlement process and make the 
imposition of costs more symmetric. 
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relationships of a competitor, through the use of the court process as an 
anticompetitive weapon. Consequently, it seems likely that AZ’s behaviour, 
in the US, would not escape the reach of the sham litigation doctrine either. 
Again, however, the Commission found it more convenient to chose 
another, less controversial route to support its finding of abuse. 
 
It then remains to be examined whether the Commission’s reasoning shares 
any common features with the last of the US theories presented above. 
Under this doctrine, a patentee may incur antitrust liability when bringing a 
patent infringement lawsuit, even absent bad faith, where the infringement 
suit is part of a larger monopolization scheme that would violate Section 2 
of the Sherman Act. Considering the facts of the AstraZeneca case as 
presented above, it seems that a US court would have strong reasons for a 
finding of abuse on this ground. Moreover, upon a comparison with the 
reasoning in the actual decision, it seems apparent that the Commission’s 
approach strongly resembles this monopolization scheme doctrine. In 
particular, the Commission neither suggests that AZ’s legal actions against 
its research competitors were instituted in bad faith, nor  does it view AZ’s 
lawsuits on their own as an abuse. Rather, it uses the infringement 
proceedings to support its finding of dominance and as part of AZ’s scheme 
to monopolise. 
 
On this basis, it seems at least conceivable that, despite the specificities of 
the US and EC patent and antitrust systems, the conduct deemed to be 
unlawful under Article 82 EC as blocking or delaying generic market entry 
would also have been prohibited if considered under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, and vice versa.  
Hence, although one may argue that the notions of monopolization under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act and abuse of a dominant position under 
Article 82 EC are not identical, they seem to lead to analogous solutions 
when applied to the strategies employed by brand name pharmaceutical 
undertakings to block or delay generic market entry. 
Moreover, as may be seen from an examination of the case law, the 
decisions emanating from the US and EC competition authorities seem to 
have an influence on each other.489 Particularly, the European Commission 
seems to have been influenced by US precedents in its AstraZeneca 
                                                 
489 In the US, the AstraZeneca case and, more specifically, the finding of the ‘de-
registration abuse’, although unlikely to be replicated in the EC, might have an influence on 
a number of private antitrust actions pending before US district courts, in which the 
plaintiffs are alleging a novel theory of antitrust liability – as opposed to the classic theories 
based on patent obtained by fraud or sham litigation – based on so-called ‘anti-competitive 
life cycle management’ of drug products by the brand name drug companies concerned. 
Basically, these lawsuits allege that the brand name drug companies engaged in 
exclusionary anticompetitive schemes by reformulating their products and ‘managing their 
life cycle’. Since these allegations seem to some extent similar to AZ's replacement of its 
Losec capsules with a tablet formulation, combined with requests to European national 
medicines agencies to deregister the market authorisations for the capsules, it is likely that 
the Commission's finding of a ‘de-registration abuse’ will have an influence on how these 
cases are dealt with by the US district courts. See Gunther & Breuvart, pp. 681-82. 
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decision.490 In the future, it will be interesting to see whether the 
Commission keeps following in the footsteps of the US Courts and the FTC 
by penalising the obtaining and/or enforcement of patents against generic 
manufacturers through objectively baseless patent litigation. 
8.3 Private Antitrust Enforcement & 
Patent Litigation Insurance  
(i) Private Antitrust Enforcement – From the perspective of a drug 
manufacturer subject to proceedings in the US or the EC, any similarities 
between the respective approaches of the FTC and the Commission, while 
important, are likely to be overshadowed by one of the key differences 
currently existing between the two jurisdictions – the issue of the financial 
consequences of their actions. 
In the US, while the FTC's focus is often on imposing behavioural remedies 
on the company to prevent repetition of the prohibited conduct, a significant 
financial threat exists in the form of private antitrust actions, including not 
only antitrust actions initiated by generic competitors (claiming damages for 
the profits they lost as a result of the antitrust violation), but also private 
class actions initiated by drug purchasers.491 If these latter plaintiffs are 
successful in proving antitrust liability, they are entitled to damages 
amounting to the difference between the price effectively paid and that 
which they would have paid but for the brand name company's alleged 
antitrust violation (i.e. if the generic manufacturers had not been restrained 
from entering the market). Depending on the size of the market for the 
medicine, and the length of the period over which the unlawful conduct was 
deemed to range, this of itself could amount to a significant financial 
penalty. Of even greater concern for the defendant company, however, is 
that the total damages award would be trebled pursuant to Section 4 of the 
Clayton Act.492 Much due to this, the US continues to be the centre of 
gravity for private antitrust litigation in terms of the volume of litigation.  
                                                 
490 The Commission has explicitly acknowledged the influence of US case law in its 
reasoning by indicating that ‘misrepresentations before patent offices and misuse of 
regulatory procedures for the authorisation of medicines have previously been held to be 
antitrust violations by US courts and the FTC.’ See Press Release IP/03/1136, July 31, 
2003, Commission warns AstraZeneca of preliminary findings in Losec antitrust 
investigation, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/1136&format=HTML&age
d=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
491 Such class actions are invariably brought in parallel to any ongoing FTC proceedings, 
but may also be initiated even where the FTC decides not to investigate a manufacturer's 
practices itself. Furthermore, direct and indirect purchasers of a pharmaceutical product 
constitute separate classes, and each has standing to bring a damages claim for loss suffered 
as a result of the allegedly unlawful practices. 
492 S. 4 (a) of the Clayton Act states that ‘any person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therfor in any district 
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an 
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the 
damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee’. 
The spectre of such potentially huge damages awards has undoubtedly influenced the 
decision of the defendants in such cases to enter into settlement agreements with the 
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Due to a number of practical and legal obstacles to the commencement of 
proceedings, such wide scale private enforcement has not been replicated in 
the EC. Since the case of Courage v Crehan,493 it has been clear that some 
form of remedy should be available to those harmed by infringements of 
Articles 81 or 82 EC.494 However, any action must be brought at a national 
level, and must comply with the various legal and procedural requirements 
of the relevant Member State.  
To facilitate private enforcement and follow up on the decentralisation of 
the EC competition laws triggered by the passing of Regulation No. 1/2003 
in 2004, the Commission sponsored a comprehensive review of the 
conditions under which private parties can bring actions for damages before 
national courts for breaches of EC competition laws.495  
As was noted by the subsequent Comparative Report, the state of private 
enforcement in the EC is in a state of ‘total underdevelopment’, with an 
‘astonishing diversity’ existing between the systems adopted by various 
Member States. Various barriers to action faced by private plaintiffs were 
identified,496 which, while varying in intensity from country to country, 
collectively serve to reduce the number of private actions brought.497 In 
spite of various efforts made at dealing with these issues,498 Competition 
Commissioner Mario Monti, prior to leaving office, acknowledged that 
‘much more needs to be done.’499  
                                                                                                                            
plaintiffs (without acknowledging any wrongdoing). Such settlements have themselves 
imposed substantial payment obligations on the brand name manufacturers. For example, 
the total settlements agreed upon in relation to BuSpar, Taxol and Platinol amounted to 
$535 million, $135 million and $50 million respectively. 
493 Case C-453/99, Courage v Crehan [2001] E.C.R. I-06297. 
494 See also Crehan v Inntrepreneur [2004] EWCA 627 (judgement by an English court 
awarding damages in a competition case); Provimi Ltd v. Roche Products Ltd et al, [2003] 
QBD (6 may 2003) (holding that a non-English claimant suffering injury outside of 
England may sue non-English cartel participants in English courts so long as the cartel 
included English participants). 
495 Ashurst, ‘Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC 
competition rules – Comparative Report’, August 31, 2004, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/private enforcement/index en.html.  
496 These include: confusion as to the legal basis for bringing a claim; the lack of 
specialised competition courts to hear claims; difficulties in consumers obtaining standing 
to pursue claims; restrictions on the ability to bring class actions; heavy evidential burdens 
on the plaintiff (both regarding proof of anticompetitive conduct and a causal nexus 
between such conduct and the loss suffered, particularly in jurisdictions with limited 
disclosure obligations); the absence of punitive damages and procedural difficulties, be they 
short limitation periods or unduly long proceedings. It is important to note that these 
obstacles to private enforcement are not necessarily perceived as ‘problems’ that require 
solutions. To the contrary, the working paper expressly warns against an unqualified move 
towards the system in the United States, see below. For further analysis, see Tony 
Woodgate and Jane Jellis, ‘Private EC Antitrust Enforcement’, available at 
www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/private.cfm. Visited on June 20, 2007. 
497 According to the report, as at October 2004, there had only been 12 successful damages 
awards for breach of competition law since the EC antitrust enforcement system was set up 
in 1962.  
498 Efforts made by the Commission, include e.g. programs to improve the training of 
judges in EC competition law and the creation of a database of EC competition law based 
actions brought in the Member States. 
499 Mario Monti, ‘Private litigation as a key complement to public enforcement of 
competition rules and the first conclusions on the implementation of the new Merger 
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Against this background, the Commission in late 2005, continued its efforts 
to enhance enforcement by issuing a Green Paper,500 accompanied by a 
detailed Commission Staff Working Paper.501 The Green Paper focused on a 
number of the procedural hurdles identified in the Comparative Report, and 
invited public comments to specific questions presented.502  
Far from seeking radical changes, the Green Paper aims for cautious reform 
and an optimal balance between the benefits and costs of private litigation. 
Even if private enforcement is regarded as an important complement to 
public enforcement that should be facilitated, the Commission seems very 
conscious of the risks of falling into the excesses seen in the USA: ‘The US 
system is often perceived as encouraging unmeritorious or vexatious 
litigation. This system should be examined carefully and lessons drawn 
from it, as well as from the experiences of other foreign jurisdictions in this 
field, as appropriate. The protection of rights deriving from community 
competition law is important, but it is also important to keep excessive 
litigation in check and to try to achieve some form of moderation in the 
enforcement system.’503
Hence, although the Commission has pushed for critical developments for a 
more active private enforcement scheme, it would be unrealistic to expect 
that this will lead to a system that closely resembles the US model.504
In any event, the success and effects of any reforms will not be calculable 
for some time, and in the meantime, the ability of the threat of private 
actions to act as a deterrent against pharmaceutical companies' abusive 
practices will remain substantially less significant in the EU than in the 
USA.505 Nevertheless, there is no doubt that enforcement agencies are no 
longer the sole enforcer of competition laws – private enforcement of 
competition laws will expand its role outside the US in ensuring competitive 
markets and consumer welfare.506
 
(ii) Patent Litigation Insurance – Closely linked to the issue of private 
enforcement is the current plans to introduce a Patent Litigation Insurance 
(PLI) Scheme in Europe. Following the first study commissioned by the DG 
                                                                                                                            
Regulation’, Speech to the 8th Annual Competition Conference of the IBA, Fiesole, 
September 17, 2004. 
500 The ‘Green Paper – Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules’, 19.12.2005, 
COM(2005) 672 final, is available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0672en01.pdf.  Visited on 
June 20, 2007.  
501 The ‘Staff Working Paper’, SEC(2005) 1732 (Annex to the Green Paper), is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/sp_en.pdf. Visited on June 
20, 2007. 
502 Green paper at 12. 
503 Green paper para 47 (emphasis added). 
504 Charles E. Koob, David E Van Jr and Arman Y Oruc, ‘Developments in Private 
Enforcement of Competition Laws, Getting the Deal Trough’ – Private Antitrust Litigation 
2007, pp. 3-7. 
505 Gunther & Breuvart, pp. 682-83.  
506 Charles E. Koob, David E Van Jr and Arman Y Oruc, pp. 3-7. See also Eddy De Smijter, 
Constanze Stropp and Donncadh Woods, Directorate-General Competition, unit A-1, 
‘Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules’, EC Competition 
Policy Newsletter, No. 1 – Spring 2006, pp. 1-3, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/cpn. 
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for Internal Market and Services in 2002,507 and in the light of the need for 
definitive conclusions, a follow-up study was commissioned in 2004 with 
the aim to evaluate on a highly detailed basis, the feasibility of a small 
number of insurance schemes for insuring European Patents (and, when they 
exist, Community Patents) against patent litigation risks.508 The Report 
considered that ‘patent litigation insurance has long been considered 
potentially important as a means of ensuring access to patents to small and 
medium-sized enterprises [SMEs] which do not have extensive legal 
resources and are put off from developing, patenting or litigating patents on 
new technologies owing to the expense and complexities in EU patent 
systems.’509  
In short, the Report found that it had been demonstrated that industry on the 
whole would welcome a widespread PLI scheme and that this would 
particularly benefit SMEs. Since a mandatory scheme would be viable, 
premiums could be affordable and some insurers willing to enter at the 
outset it was concluded that a scheme could succeed.510 A PLI scheme 
would arguably avoid the unsatisfactory status quo, have beneficial effects 
on the patent system and facilitate the desired technical advance in the 
EU.511  
Very little space in the Report was given to the issue of vexatious or 
frivolous litigants. In essence, all that was said was that, ‘[t]he problem of 
vexatious litigants is answered by the application of excess and co-
insurance. In addition, of course, no action which qualified for insurance 
support because it had a 51% or better chance of success could be called 
vexatious or frivolous.’512 Although settlement would be encouraged, ‘the 
right to fight would always be preserved (subject to the risk assessment) in 
order to retain the validity of the patent system.’513  
8.4 Anticipating Future Approaches 
Apart from the European Commission’s Communication entitled, ‘A 
stronger EU-US Partnership and a more Open Market for the 21st 
century’,514 in which the Commission acknowledges that the EC and US 
                                                 
507 The 2003 Report can be consulted on 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/patent/index.htm.  
508 See ‘The feasibility of possible insurance schemes against patent litigation risks – a 
study for the European Commission by CJA Consultants Ltd’ – February 2006. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/patent/index_en.htm.  
509 See the Report, p. 11.  
510 See the Report,  p. 16.  
511 See the Report, p. 14. 
512 See section 14.21.1 of the Report, p. 44 (emphasis added). See also p. 15 where it is 
stated that ‘the patentee would be liable for the cost, save when defence was involved, 
unless the assessment of its chances was 51% or better’. 
513 See the Report, p. 15.  
514 Communication from the European Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee: A stronger EU-US 
Partnership and a more open market for the 21st century 18.5.2005, COM(2005) 196 final, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/us/revamping/com2005_196_en.pdf. 
Visited on June 20, 2007. The Commission Communication contains a wide range of 
practical policy proposals for a joint EU-US strategy to boost economic integration. 
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economies have become ever more intertwined and therefore calls for better 
and reinforced regulatory antitrust policy co-operation, such transatlantic 
harmonisation initiatives have so far been limited to certain areas of antitrust 
policy such as merger control and international cartels.515  
The interface between antitrust and IP law is probably one of the areas 
where important differences remain between the US and the EC. Given the 
increasingly global nature of the corporations and products involved, this 
may seem surprising. Nevertheless, the influence that the decisions of US 
and EC competition authorities have on each other must not be 
underestimated. Arguably, the Commission's AstraZeneca decision and its 
implications on the IP and competition law interface signify that the 
transatlantic influence even goes beyond the previous cooperation and 
harmonisation efforts. Hence, the Decision constitutes proof of subtly 
developing transatlantic co-operation and harmonisation of antitrust 
policies, including the IP and antitrust interface.516
 
Consequently, the current pro-IP approach applied in the US, is likely to 
influence coming trends in the EC too. Past and recent evolutions in US 
case law, as well as speeches by representatives of the US Agencies, 
indicate that intervention in the antitrust and IP interface will be limited to 
blatant cases of monopolization that directly harm consumers, such as 
misrepresentations to the PTO to delay market entry or vexatious patent 
litigation. Another closely related area where the US agencies seem ready to 
intervene is that of settlements of patent disputes in the pharmaceutical 
industry. Recently, such settlements arising between branded 
pharmaceutical undertakings and generic competitors have been under 
considerable scrutiny by the US competition agencies. In particular, there 
has been significant FTC interest in settlements that are alleged to involve a 
patent owner paying an alleged infringer in return for an agreement by the 
infringer not to compete in the relevant market.517 This general trend was 
reinforced by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and 
Modernization Act 2003, which requires brand-name companies and generic 
producers to file their brand-generic settlement agreements with the FTC 
and DoJ.518 Although ‘[most] patent settlements probably are pro-
                                                 
515 E.g., the European Commission and the Agencies are working together to promote 
convergence among the world's antitrust enforcers, notably within the International 
Competition Network (ICN). However, until now, the ICN has mostly concentrated its 
efforts on merger control, issuing recommendations to improve competition agencies' 
merger review processes. The IP and antitrust interface has not yet been on the agenda. 
516 Compare Eccles & Ferla, pp.8-11. 
517 See Chairman Timothy J. Muris, ‘Prepared Statement of The Federal Trade 
Commission Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation’, United 
States Senate (Washington, D.C., Apr. 23, 2002) available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/pharmtestimony.htm. Visited on June 20, 2007. The FTC 
has also more recently stressed that exclusion payments in pharmaceutical patent 
settlements harm competition. See ‘Anticompetitive Settlements in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Before the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the United States Senate’ (January 17, 2007), available at  
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/070117anticompetitivepatentsettlements_senate.pdf. 
Visited on June 20, 2007. 
518 Balto & Wolman p. 82; See also Eccles & Ferla, p. 3. 
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competitive or competitively neutral’519 and constitute efficient means to 
avoid costly and time-consuming litigation,520 the US agencies see a 
number of potential antitrust concerns that may arise in the settlement 
context.521 First, there is a public interest in the determination of whether 
the patent really is valid or properly procured. As was noted in Glaxo Group 
Ltd.,522 ‘[i]t is as important to the public that competition should not be 
repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable 
invention should be protected in his monopoly.’523 Secondly, the terms of 
the settlement may actually delay or prevent the entry of a competing 
product, or divide a market between competitors.524 Furthermore, the 
settling challenger may have important evidence about the validity of the 
patent that may be lost in the settlement.525 Thus, a patent settlement may 
serve the interests of the parties at the expense of consumers and 
competitors.526 Although, this particular problem has so far not received the 
same kind of attention in the EC, it is likely that it will in the near future.527
 
More generally, however, the issue of the exercise of IPRs as an abuse of a 
dominant position is being examined in the still ongoing Article 82 EC 
Review conducted by the European Commission.528 This reform has been, 
and is, an important opportunity for the Commission to clarify and adjust its 
approach to abusive use of IPRs. Read in the light of the EAGCP Report,529 
there seems already to be a developing trend in Europe to stress the 
importance of IPRs and, sometimes, its supremacy over competition law. As 
a result, when analysing cases involving e.g. allegedly abusive misuse of 
patent and drug regulatory approval systems, the Commission will have to 
take into account not only the exclusionary effects of the conduct vis-à-vis 
generic drug competitors, but also the potential pro-competitive effects and 
efficiencies of the conduct, as well as the effects that its own enforcement 
actions might have on returns on investments and incentive to innovate in 
the research-based pharmaceutical industry.530  
                                                 
519 See generally David A. Balto, ‘Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks’, 
55 Food & Drug L.J. 321, 327-28 (2000).  
520 Licensing Guidelines, supra n. 89, at § 5.5. 
521 Commissioner Thomas Leary, ‘Prepared Remarks, Antitrust Issues in Settlement of 
Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes’ (Chicago, Ill., Nov. 3, 2000) 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/learypharma.htm. Visited on June 20, 2007. 
522 U.S. v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973).  
523 Id. at 58 (quoting Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892)). 
524 See Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Intl., 256 F.3d 799, 811 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (provisions in the settlement ‘were not necessarily ancillary restraints but rather 
could reasonably be viewed as an attempt to allocate market share and preserve 
monopolistic conditions.’) 
525 United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co. 374 U.S. 174, 195-96 (1963). 
526 Balto & Wolman, p. 82. 
527 Compare e.g. AZ’s conduct in relation to its research competitors in the AZ Decision.  
528 See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/article_82_review.html.    
529 The Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy is an independent group of 
experts commissioned by the Chief Economist of the Directorate General for Competition 
(DG Comp). This report was specifically commissioned to provide the Commission with an 
economic approach to Article 82 and, consequently, to give an opinion on the reform of the 
Commission's policy on the abuse of dominant position. 
530 Gunther & Breuvart, p.  
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The ‘pro-IP trend’ also seems to be endorsed by the European Competition 
Commissioner Neelie Kroes, who has clarified that promoting innovation is 
a top priority on her agenda.531 In addition, DG Competition has released a 
Consultation document on state aid for innovation,532 which, amid other 
things, identifies the ‘problems affecting innovation in Europe’.533 Amongst 
those problems, the Commission stresses the ‘unsatisfactory IP protection’ 
and the ‘unattractive risk/reward ratios for investing in radically innovative 
products’.534
Yet, the Commission continues to take on a hard stance in relation to the 
alleged anticompetitive use of IPRs by dominant undertakings, particularly 
in the pharmaceutical industry. Since the adoption of the AstraZeneca 
decision, Commissioner Kroes explained to the European Parliament in 
response to an oral question in the Summer of 2006,535 that although the 
Commission will take due account ‘of the need for the industry to recover 
its research and development costs, given the industry’s heavy dependence 
on innovation for its further competitiveness’, the aim was ‘to promote 
competition in innovation for patented medicines between the 
pharmaceutical producers, which has declined in Europe in the last decade, 
and to encourage inter-brand competition from generic substitutes after 
patent expiry’. Commissioner Kroes emphasised that this should ‘in time, 
contribute to ensuring a wider choice of both patented and generic 
pharmaceutical products to European patients at affordable prices’. 
Commissioner Kroes summed up that this was why ‘the Commission will 
give greater priority to competition in the generic sector in the immediate 
future.’536 Hence, while acknowledging the need for brand name drug 
manufacturers to recoup their R&D expenditure and to be rewarded for their 
innovative efforts, Commissioner Kroes also emphasizes that IP protection 
of medicines will, in some circumstances, come second to the promotion of 
competition from generic products, which drives down prices.537 
Nevertheless, the Commission seems to expect that current enforcement 
activities will contribute to the Lisbon Agenda by stimulating innovation in 
the pharmaceutical sector whilst delivering on cost-containment through 
generic competition.538  
 
                                                 
531 See Neelie Kroes, ‘Towards a pro-active competition policy in favour of innovation’, 
Speech at the conference Promoting Innovation and Competitiveness, A Transatlantic 
Dialogue; The Hague, The Netherlands; 27th & 28th April 2005. Available at  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2005_006_en.pdf  
532 See ‘Consultation document on state aid for innovation’, available at  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/others/action_plan/cdsai_en.pdf.  
533 Id. pages 18 to 19.  
534 Id.  
535 Commissioner Neelie Kroes’ ‘Reply to Oral Question put by the honourable Member of 
the European Parliament Mr von Boguslaw Sonik’, (H-0459/06). Available at 
http://www.futurdeleurope.parlament.gv.at/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+CRE+20060613+ITEMS+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=BG. Visited on 
June 20, 2007. 
536 Id.  
537 Lawrance & Treacy, p.  
538 De Souza, p. 41.  
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Others seem less convinced by the Commission’s enforcement approach and 
argue that it risks having a chilling effect on innovation,539 something that 
in the long run will be far from consumer-friendly. In particular, they argue 
that the AstraZeneca decision raises the question of whether the competition 
authorities should intervene in this way in an industry, which is already 
heavily regulated, and which, furthermore, is not fully harmonized across 
the EC.540 Although it is clear that, in principle, pharmaceutical companies 
are subject to the competition rules, it may thus be questioned whether this 
decision goes too far and that the Commission is indeed pushing the 
boundaries of Article 82 EC.541
Above all, however, it may be argued that the prevailing legal uncertainty 
surrounding the abuse of IPRs is likely to have a paralysing effect on the 
competitiveness of dominant undertakings at large. Considering also that 
decentralised enforcement of EC competition law can lead to very different 
outcomes from one Member State to the other, especially in complex IP and 
antitrust cases, there is a obvious need for the Commission (and the ECJ 
through its case law) to set clear Guidelines on the application of Article 82 
EC to IPRs holders.542  
Still, irrespective of any such guidelines, most commentators would agree 
that there is little doubt that the coming and much awaited judgment of the 
CFI in the AstraZeneca appeal case will shape the coming trends. 
Considering the economic importance of the undertaking involved and the 
effects that this judgment is bound to have on the pharmaceutical industry, it 
could set the tone of EC policy with respect to the antitrust and IP interface 
in the coming years. Until it does, the Commission will most likely continue 
to build on the inter-brand competition approach introduced in its 
AstraZeneca decision, and tackle various types of life cycle management 
strategies by research based pharmaceutical companies aimed at raising 
rivals’ entry barriers.543
                                                 
539 Although the Commission ‘is at pains to point out that its decision is not intended to 
have a chilling effect on innovation’, IPRs holders ‘will see this as a further case which 
constrains their commercial freedom and increases uncertainty’. See Gibson Dunn, 
‘European Commission Raises Stakes in IP/Antitrust Battle’, June 16, 2005, available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/practices/publications/detail/id/766/?pubItemId=7813. Visited 
on July 5, 2007.  
540 Arguably the regulatory framework already contains specific provisions designed to 
balance the competing interests of patentees and generic manufacturers so that additional 
competition intervention is not warranted. Note e.g. that the Canadian Competition Bureau 
in 2004 refused to intervene in relation to ever-greening practices on this ground. See 
Lawrance & Treacy, p. 8.  
541 Id.  
542 Eccles & Ferla, pp. 9-10. 
543 See De Souza, p. 39 f. 
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9 Conclusive Comments 
According to the US courts, both competition law and IP law ‘are aimed at 
encouraging innovation, industry and competition’.544 Similarly, the 
European Commission considers that there is no ‘inherent conflict between 
[IPRs] and the Community competition rules’.545 However, in practice, 
during much of this century IP law and antitrust law have coexisted 
uneasily, with a great deal of tension between the two bodies of law. While 
IP law provides for temporary legal monopolies, competition law aims at 
preventing monopolisation. The optimal balance between the two bodies of 
law must be found, so that innovation can be encouraged and anti-
competitive behaviour prohibited, thereby safeguarding incentives for future 
inventions.  
 
In this balancing process, much may be learned from experiences made 
across the Atlantic. Given that economic principles do not, unlike law, vary 
from country to country, there are often good reasons to examine 
competition cases brought elsewhere. There are, however, significant 
divergences in the underpinning philosophies of the US and EC regimes, 
and principles from one system should not be automatically applied to the 
other without good justification.546 That full convergence across the 
jurisdictions ought to be promoted is thus far from obvious. Policy makers, 
competition authorities and the courts on both sides of the Atlantic have 
therefore devoted much attention and effort to striking the appropriate 
balance within their own jurisdictions. In so doing they have nevertheless 
been influenced by case law from the other side of the Atlantic.547
 
In particular, the pharmaceutical industry has become a major target for 
antitrust investigations and litigation on both sides of the Atlantic. As a 
result of this increasing antitrust scrutiny from competition authorities, the 
options left to the research based pharmaceutical industry in the face of 
generic competition have dramatically reduced.548 Above all, it seems that 
the possibility to engage in aggressive litigation tactics has been restricted. 
For although a pharmaceutical undertaking in a dominant position, like any 
other dominant undertaking, has the right to protect its IPRs – in particular 
by initiating infringement proceedings – recent developments under US and 
                                                 
544 Atari Games v Nintendo, 897 F.2d at 1576 [14 USPQ2d 1034] (Fed Cir 1990). 
545 Guidelines on Technology Transfer Agreements. 
546 In other words ‘many valuable ideas for the interpretation of Community law can be 
derived from the discussions going on on the other side of the Atlantic and from the 
solutions found by the American courts. However, prudence must be counselled in 
transferring concepts and theories from one legal system to the other. There are substantial 
differences between the various elements going to make up US law and those going to 
make up Community law, with the result that not every problem confronting one of the two 
systems finds a counterpart in the other legal system.’ Advocate General Kirschner in Tetra 
Pak Rausing SA v Commission Case T-51/89 [1991] 4 CMLR at 343-44) in Furse, pp. 5-6. 
547 Eccles & Ferla, p. 1. 
548 Gunther & Breuvart, pp. 683-84. 
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Community law have lead to a situation where such legal action in 
exceptional circumstances may infringe Section 2 of the Sherman Act and 
Article 82 EC, provided it is clearly groundless and aims at eliminating a 
competitor.549  
 
As a consequence of the Commission’s AstraZeneca decision – the first EC 
case in relation to patent ever-greening – pharmaceutical companies holding 
a dominant position will need to take care that their conduct towards patent 
offices and medicinal authorities does not lead to foreclosure of competition 
by blocking or delaying market access for generic versions or parallel 
imports of their protected medicine.550 In particular, however, they will 
have to take care when it comes to patent infringement actions against 
competitors before national courts, as this issue is still clouded with 
uncertainty. 
 
The fact that the Commission did not base any of its findings of abuse 
entirely on the ITT Promedia doctrine of vexatious litigation as an abuse of 
dominance does not diminish the significance of the fact that AZ’s 
behaviour in this regard certainly contributed to the overall picture of 
abusive and anticompetitive acts. In this respect, the Decision seems to 
share common features with the US case law on monopolizing schemes of 
infringement suits. However, parallels may also be drawn to the US Walker 
Process and Sham Litigation doctrines. Though the Commission Decision 
lacks the weight to establish an EC version of the US doctrines on 
monopolization through vexatious litigation it is possible that the CFI in the 
appeal will add more authority to the arguably developing EC doctrine. 
Whether the AstraZeneca appeal case will set its mark as the leading case 
for ‘vexatious patent litigation’ as a possible independent abuse under 
Article 82 EC remains to be seen. Nevertheless, until the Community Courts 
have ruled on the matter, dominant pharmaceutical manufacturers will face 
significant legal uncertainties as far as patent infringement actions are 
concerned. Currently, neither the pursuit nor the settlement of patent 
infringement litigation appears an unfettered right.551 Both the litigation and 
the resolution of infringement cases should therefore be undertaken with 
sensitivity toward antitrust risks. 
                                                 
549 Emmanuel Dieny, ‘The Pharmaceutical Industry and Competition Law between the 
Present and the Future’, E.C.L.R. 2007, 28(4), 223-232, at 225.  
550 Lawrance & Treacy, p. 7. See also Gibson Dunn at  
http://www.gibsondunn.com/practices/publications/detail/id/766/?pubItemId=7813: ‘Whilst 
it is encouraging that the EU continues to stress the importance of innovation and the need 
to reward innovation, this decision does not help that cause. It points to a policy where the 
antitrust analysis of whether or not any given behaviour is abusive should be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis. In the real world, that is a recipe for uncertainty and risk-taking’. 
551 Compare Deborah A. Coleman, Akron Law Review 2004, Intellectual Property 
Symposium Issue Article: ‘Antitrust Issues in the Litigation and Settlement of Infringement 
Claims’, 263, at 286.  
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